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Shaped by some similar but also contrasting geostrategic and domestic political 
circumstances, in 2009 Sweden and Taiwan - both non-aligned - coincidentally decided 
to suspend conscription and shift to an all-volunteer force (AVF). Without facing an 
immediate military threat to its territory, Sweden aims to build a capability-based 
expeditionary force that is usable for both international and domestic operations. For 
Taiwan, while still facing the military threat from the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC), 
the goal is to build a smaller but smarter AVF with an enhanced deterrence capability to 
defend the homeland in wartime and to conduct disaster relief operations during 
peacetime. Their ongoing experiences in military personnel reform present an 
opportunity to examine critical issues surrounding the post-decision implementation 
process of the AVF.  
This study compares and contrasts the concurrent AVF transformation in both countries 
by discussing their historical and strategic contexts and examining the drivers of change. 
The AVF implementation process is considered in terms of the strategic goals and 
objectives that both countries aim to achieve, how they define the metrics and criteria of 
their respective AVF transformation, and the factors that facilitate or impede the 
implementation process. The key objective of the thesis is to better understand the 
current status of AVF implementation in Sweden and Taiwan and to evaluate their 
likely chances of success. This thesis offers a contribution to the literature on the 
decline of mass armed forces, which hitherto has not included a European/Asian 
comparative analysis. Furthermore, the thesis has policy relevance to both countries, 
enabling them to share some lessons from each other, and to other countries considering 
a similar course of action.  
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Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a dramatic transformation in the 
international security environment. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the 
Warsaw Pact substantially decreased the military threat to the Western world. Owing to 
this reduced level of military threat, the armed forces, whose structure and purpose was 
rooted in Cold War thinking, gradually lost their function and legitimacy. Since then, 
Western countries cut down on armaments production and decreased the size of their 
military establishment. In particular, the armed forces of European states have been 
undergoing radical reform; with a handful of exceptions, most of them have been 
transforming their militaries. They are doing so by both downsizing the military 
establishment and also ending conscription and shifting towards an all-volunteer force 
(AVF) system. Despite the fact that, historically speaking, compulsory military service 
was the backbone and major source of manpower for the armed forces, this military 
transformation has become increasingly prominent. 
 
After the Second World War, the UK, Ireland and Luxembourg were the only countries 
to adopt the AVF in Europe; however the situation changed dramatically after the fall of 
Berlin Wall. In the European context, starting with Belgium and the Netherlands, which 
decided to abolish conscription in 1992 and 1993 respectively, the following European 
countries have to date already ended conscription: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
France, Italy, Croatia, Latvia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Hungary, and Czech Republic. The latest participants in this trend in 
the past three years have been Sweden and Germany. Both countries, which have a 
tradition and long history of conscription, ended conscription in 2010 and 2011 
respectively.  
 
The trend of ending conscription has also aroused keen debate in East Asia. In a 




a serious military threat to regional security, in 2009, nonetheless, Taiwan still decided 
to do away with conscription. Judging from the transition cases in Europe, shifting from 
conscription to an AVF was not an easy task, and it has sparked various issues in terms 
of what is required to accomplish a successful AVF implementation. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse and evaluate the implementation efforts of AVF 
transition in Sweden and Taiwan through examining the goals and objectives of 
transition, identifying metrics and criteria for implementation, and discussing the factors 
and conditions that influence the results of transition. Although the focus of research is 
primarily on the post-decision implementation process, it would not be convincing if the 
process of decision making itself were not discussed; a review of the background and 
context of the decision is essential as it forms an important part of the goals and 
objectives of transition. In order to take both pre and post decision processes into 
account, two conceptual approaches are adopted as the foundation of the thesis: the first 
approach provides a theoretical foundation- theoretical arguments about the nature and 
causes of the decline of mass armed forces and the abolition of conscription; the second 
approach is an empirical foundation - cases of the post-decision implementation 
processes in the West and what lessons can be drawn from those cases. These two 
approaches are intertwined and both play important roles in this study. 
 
To analyse the likely success of AVF transition in both cases, it is imperative to 
scrutinise the details of their goals of transition. In general, like every other country 
seeking this kind of change, both Sweden and Taiwan are trying to accomplish the same 
goal, namely a zero draft. However, underneath this shared general goal, the specific 
objectives for achieving AVF in both countries (and in other countries considering this 
transition) are not necessarily the same; the differences stem from the fact that they are 
operating in different contexts. The two cases share characteristics of any shift to AVF; 
but this thesis focuses on the specifics of transition through an analysis of similarities 
and differences between Sweden and Taiwan. 
 
Understanding the decision to shift to an AVF including strategic goals and specific 
objectives is essential. Before examining their implementation process, hence, the 




comprehended. Nonetheless, as this thesis focuses on the process of post-decision 
implementation, reviewing pre-decision processes in detail and predicting the future of 
AVF transition are beyond the scope of study. To fully understand what their goals are 
and the objectives they contain, such as size, structure and mission of their armed forces, 
this study first needs to review the contexts of decision-making and identify the drivers 
of change. This chapter reviews the literature on the decline of mass armed forces 
(MAF) as a theoretical approach from which to discuss the key theories about major 
drivers of change in military organisations in western states after World War II.  
 
In terms of research timeframe, based on the implementation process this thesis makes 
an evaluation of how likely both transitions are going to be successful, rather than 
predicting the outcomes of their future. It starts with the time when both countries took 
the decision to end conscription and finishes when this thesis is completed in September 
2013, and sets out to analyse how both cases define their goals of transition in terms of 
specific objectives, what they have done so far about those objectives, what metrics for 
success are adopted to achieve these objectives, and what are the factors and conditions 
that would either help or hinder the implementation of AVF. The conclusion of the thesis 
will provide an evaluation of how likely the success of their attempts will be. It is 
important to note that this thesis will not be able to conclude by dichotomising whether 
the transitions in both cases have succeeded or failed; it will rather, through an empirical 
assessment, analyse how well (or poorly) both countries have performed during the 
implementation process, and will make suggestions on what they should be doing in 
order to fix any remaining problems.  
 
1.1 Overview of background 
 
Changes in security environment and decline of mass armed forces 
 
Due to changes in the international security environment and the end of ‘total war’ 
following the conclusion of the Second World War, states started to demobilise their 
mass armies.1 Since then the overall size of the military establishment in Western states 
                                                     
1 Post 1945 the idea of total war persisted but with deterrence in the nuclear age (Cold War); eventually 




has been substantially reduced; most importantly, the structure of armed forces has 
gradually been transformed from the Cold War type (mass army relying on conscription) 
to a smaller but more professional force equipped with more complex weapon systems. 
The conscript ratio (CR, defined as the number of conscripts as a proportion of the total 
number of employed military personnel) also decreased because armed forces started to 
recruit and rely more on volunteer soldiers.2 A few Western states shifted their military 
structure away from conscription to an all-volunteer force (AVF) system, such as the 
UK in 1960, US in 1973, Canada in 1945 and Australia in 1972, while most West 
European states reduced the size of the military establishment, although persisting with 
conscription. To examine the phenomenon of force reduction and the shift in military 
personnel structure, the theory of the decline of mass armed forces gradually emerged.  
 
The MAF played a crucial role in both World Wars and persisted in the East-West 
confrontation during the Cold War era. Its structure comprised a relatively 
homogeneous system based on compulsory military service for manpower supply, and 
relied on a mass of citizens with a small core of professional cadres to perform military 
tasks.3 Military sociologists argued that the decline in MAF started after the 
demobilisation of armed forces following the end of the Second World War - a total war 
- in 1945. Van Doorn observed that military organisation shifted away from a mass type 
to a professional force after 1945.4 Burk also pointed out that, since the end of Second 
World War, the format of military organisation in the liberal democracies of Western 
Europe and North America has fundamentally changed.5 A new military system - what 
Janowitz called the ‘force-in-being’, which was a smaller force equipped with more 
sophisticated weapons and able to react quickly for international missions - gradually 
emerged.6 All this notwithstanding, and despite a smaller size of the military, 
conscription was still widely adopted as the dominant system for military manpower in 
the Western armed forces during the Cold War era.  
 
                                                     
2 With adoption of a two-tier system, which is a mixed personnel system combining conscripts and 
volunteers. 
3 Dandeker, C 1999, Facing uncertainty: Report No 1, Swedish National Defence College, p.49. 
4 Van Doorn, J 1975, ‘The decline of the mass army in the west’, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 1, No. 
2, February, pp.147-156. 
5 Burk, J 1992, ‘The decline of mass armed forces and compulsory military service’, Defense Analysis. 
Vol. 8, No 1, pp.45-59. 




The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Warsaw 
Pact altered the geostrategic balance of the world and significantly reduced the level of 
military threat, especially in Europe. While the post-Cold War peace is considered a 
norm in the North Atlantic context, the change in security environment in East Asia 
after the Cold War has been less evident than that of West Europe. Given the new 
security environment, militaries in Western Europe with mass army type were thus 
subject to increasing criticism and soon became obsolete as territorial defence was no 
longer the primary objective of the armed forces. With the pace of decline in the MAF 
being accelerated by the end of Cold War, the pace of reform in the military 
organisation of Western states has thus been relatively quick. In contrast to the 
conscripts of the MAF, the personnel of AVF are considered to be more professional,7 
flexible and can be deployed rapidly in support of today’s expeditionary missions, 
including war-fighting and peacekeeping, internal security and policing, humanitarian 
relief and nation-building.8 This increased efficiency is due to higher motivation and 
longer training among AVF personnel.   
 
After the end of Cold War, owing to a much reduced military threat to national territory, 
the most important and underlying legal and moral justification for conscription - 
territorial defence - gradually lost its claim to be the main mission priority. Thus it was 
possible and legitimate for Western states to further reduce the size of their military 
establishment. Since the main mission of today’s armed forces has shifted to outside 
European territories for various types of abovementioned expeditionary operations, the 
functions and capabilities of conscripted forces have been found to be limited and 
insufficient. To date, by law, no country in Western Europe deploys conscripts abroad to 
perform expeditionary missions unless they volunteer and undergo appropriate training. 
This raises a question: is it because of political legitimacy or skill problems that 
countries are constrained from sending conscripts overseas? In the political context, as 
there is a limited threat to national territory, the politicians and the public think it is not 
legitimate to send conscripts abroad because they are obliged to defend the territory. As 
                                                     
7 There is confusion in literature as people often tend to misinterpret that AVF means ‘professional’ force. 
Compared with conscript soldiers, volunteer soldiers serve for longer period, thus becoming more 
professional experts in terms of combat skills and other military specialties. Professional has been used 
too often as another word for volunteer. 
8 Edmunds, T 2006, ‘What are armed forces for? The changing nature of military roles in Europe’, 




for skills, it depends upon the missions; for example, reserve police, communication and 
engineering corps [based on volunteer ex-conscripts with appropriate civilian skills] on 
international missions such as in Bosnia might be more competent and useful than 
regular infantry units.  
 
In spite of the decision of most European states to restructure and transform the armed 
forces after the Cold War, and partly due to their geographic proximity to Russia, 
Scandinavian states still upheld the conscription system. Owing to its military 
nonalignment and neutrality policy, Sweden managed to avoid becoming involved as a 
combatant in two world wars. It was not allied throughout the Cold War and as such it 
did not share NATO’s collective security protection. However, Sweden has acted as an 
informal member of NATO in that it is still an aspect of Sweden’s defence, and even 
more so in recent years. Its consequent needs for self-defence drove the unique structure 
of the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) and conscription thus became an essential source 
of personnel. It has also helped Sweden develop a strong and advanced defence industry. 
This reflects the fact that if countries are unsure or not confident about an alliance, not 
only does conscription play an important role, but they also need to develop an 
indigenous defence industry as a backup. Despite a long tradition of neutrality and 
conscription, since operations in Bosnia the mission orientation of the SAF has 
gradually shifted from territorial defence to expeditionary peace keeping and support 
operations. Finally in 2009, Sweden decided to suspend conscription and shift to an 
AVF. 
 
In East Asia, the decline of MAF has not been as evident as it has been in Europe. The 
level of military threat in this region has not reduced as the People’s Liberation Army of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been significantly modernised during the last 
decade and the situation in North Korea is still unstable and unpredictable, especially 
under the control of Kim Jong-un. Given this hostile and unpredictable security 
environment, countries in this region have not made fundamental reforms to the 
personnel structure of the armed forces. Taiwan, which faces a persistent threat from 
China and lacks international recognition as a fully-fledged state, has felt it has had to 
rely on conscription to staff its armed force for more than half century in order to 




shift to an AVF in the West, coincidentally in 2009, Taiwan decided to suspend 
conscription. Nevertheless, Taiwan set a longer timeframe, aiming to terminate drafting 
soldiers by the end of 2014.9 
 
The theoretical framework of this thesis relies on two major themes as theoretical 
approaches. The first reviews and examines the literature of decline of the MAF from 
which this research gains as a whole and identifies the research question. It sets up this 
research by discussing the MAF literature. However, despite the fact that the MAF 
literature covers a wide range of issues and subjects, it has rarely explored and studied 
the on-going implementation process of the AVF. Therefore, another approach is needed 
in order to bridge this knowledge gap. The second approach is focused on the analysis 
of the implementation process. For convenience, these two approaches are labelled as 
A1 and A2. Although this thesis does not aim to re-explore the MAF literature, 
analysing the background and context is by no means trivial. To this end, the A1 
identifies the studying field and the research question, and sets the context of the thesis. 
The second approach (A2), on the other hand, covers the empirical and essential part of 
the thesis with the aim to answer the research question. Each approach has its function 
this thesis; nevertheless, they are not on an equal footing as the main task of the thesis is 
not to discuss the MAF literature but rather focusing on the analysis of the 
implementation process. In other words, A2 plays a larger role than A1. This does not 
deny the contribution of the first approach because the AVF implementation cannot be 
analysed from a vacuum. 
 
Although much has been written on the theme of force transition in Western states, the 
literature focuses mainly on why decisions were made with little analysis of how their 
transformations were implemented and managed. In addition, even less literature 
focuses on Scandinavian states; among them, Sorensen, Leander, Petersson and 
Dandeker stand out.10 Also, research on the MAF in East Asian states has long been a 
                                                     
9 Note: both states suspend, not abolish conscription. 
10 See Sorensen, H 2000, ‘Conscription in Scandinavia during the last quarter century,’ Armed Forces 
and Society, Vol.26, No.2, Winter, pp.313-334.; Leander, A 2006, ‘Enduring Conscription: Vagueness 
and Varnplikt in Sweden’, The Changing Face of European Conscription, eds P Joenniemi, Ashgate, 
pp.119-136.; and Leander, A 2003, ‘Disenchanted conscription: a military recruitment system in need of 
justification’, working paper, Danish Institute for International Studies.; Petterson, M 2011, Defense 
transformation and legitimacy in Scandinavia after the Cold War: theoretical and practical implications, 




neglected topic since there has been not much on dynamics of conscription and MAF in 
East Asia in the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, comparisons of AVF transition 
between Eastern and Western states were rarely made. The cases of Sweden and Taiwan 
provide an opportunity to fill the knowledge gap with regard to this theme.  
 
1.2 Literature review 
 
In order to establish the conceptual framework of analysis to examine the two cases of 
AVF transition, reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature on the decline of MAF 
and AVF transition is essential. This includes two components which serve as the twin 
approaches of the conceptual framework of the thesis. It first reviews the major sources 
on the decline of MAF, which include Janowitz (1971), Van Doorn (1975), Feld (1975), 
Kelleher (1978), Burk (1992, 2006 & 2007), Van der Meulen & Manigart (1997), 
Manigart (2006), Haltiner (1998 & 2003), Dandeker (1999 & 2003), Williams (2008) 
and Segal (2009).11 Reviewing these contributions helps form the theoretical 
foundation of this thesis by examining why and how the MAF in the western world has 
declined in response to the changes in social trends and the international security 
environment. As mentioned in the previous section, it is a question of balance how far 
the first approach (A1) drives the thesis compared with the second approach (A2). A1 
sets the context and helps the thesis show that transition has been neglected. A2 is the 
main focus which sets out to provide basis for framework of goals, objectives, metrics, 
                                                                                                                                                           
No 2, Swedish National Defence College. 
11 There is extensive literature about the decline of MAF, such as Janowitz, op. cit.; Van Doorn, op. cit.; 
Feld, M 1975, ‘Military Professionalism and the Mass Army’, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 1, p.191.; 
Kelleher, C 1978, ‘Mass armies in the 1970s, The debate in Western Europe’, Armed Forces and Society, 
Vol 5, No 1, November, pp.3-30.; Burk, op. cit.; Burk, J, 2006, ‘Military mobilization in modern 
western societies’, in Handbook of the Sociology of The Military, eds Giuseppe Caforio, Springer, New 
York, pp.111-128; Burk, J, 2007, ‘The changing moral contract for military service’, in The long war: a 
new history of US national security policy since world war II, eds A Bacevich, pp.405-455.; Van der 
Meulan, J and Manigart, P 1997, ‘Zero Draft in the Low Countries: The final shift to the All-volunteer 
force’, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 24, No. 2, Winter 1997, pp.315-332; Manigart, P, 2006, 
‘Restructuring of the Armed Forces’, in Handbook of the Sociology of The Military, eds Giuseppe 
Caforio, Springer, New York, pp.323-343; Haltiner, K 1998, ‘The definite end of the mass army in 
Western Europe?’, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp.7-36.; Haltiner, K 2003, ‘The decline 
of the European Mass Armies’, in Handbook of the Sociology of The Military, eds Giuseppe Caforio, 
Springer, New York, pp.361-384.; Dandeker 1999; Dandeker, C 2003, ‘Building Flexible Forces for the 
21st Century’, in Handbook of the Sociology of The Military, eds Giuseppe Caforio, Springer, New York, 
pp.405-416. 2003.; Williams, J 2008, ‘The military and society beyond the postmodern era’, Orbis, Vol 
52, Issue 2, pp.199-216.; and Segal, D 2009, ‘Building and Maintaining a post-9/11 All-Volunteer 
Military Force,’ in The impact of 9/11 on politics and war: the day that changed everything?, eds M 




factors and conditions, a crucial empirical part of thesis so there is not much room for 
MAF theory. However, A1 has rarely touches upon the management of transition 
process, which is the main focus of this research, as analysis of literature shows that not 
much has been done.  
 
The second theoretical approach focuses on empirical analysis by discussing the cases 
of post-decision implementation in the US and major west European countries. It aims 
to generate a framework to examine the transitions in Sweden and Taiwan through the 
analysis of these cases. Most of the literature on AVF reforms were conducted after the 
AVF transition in the UK in the 1960s; major studies include Bachman, Blair & Segal 
(1977), Janowitz and Moskos (1979), Segal (1989), Jehn & Selden (2002), Bos-Bakx & 
Soeters (2003), Battistelli (2003), Boëne (2003), Forster, Edmunds & Cottey (2003), 
Williams (2005), Gilroy and Williams (2006), Lecomte (2006), Rostker (2006), Hartley 
(2007), Tresch and Leuprecht (2010).12 These contributions provide a comprehensive 
analysis and evaluation of how the transitions were implemented, what obstacles and 
problems were encountered, what measures were undertaken to solve problems and 
whether those measures were effective. This knowledge is potentially useful to 
countries seeking to make the same transformation. In this regard a question can be 
asked in which case might be more suitable for the SAF to emulate or learn from and 
which models of change might best fit the needs of Taiwan. 
 
 
                                                     
12 Bachman, J, Blair, John & Segal, D 1977, The All-Volunteer Force. The University of  
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.; Janowitz, M and Moskos, C 1979, ‘Five years of the all-volunteer force: 
1973-1978’, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 5, No.2, February, pp.171-218.; Segal, D 1989, Recruiting 
for Uncle Sam, University of Kansas Press, Lawrence.; Jehn, C & Selden, Z 2002, ‘The End of 
Conscription in Europe?’ Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 20, No. 2, April, pp.93-100.; Bos-Bakx, 
M, & Soeters, J 2003, ‘The professionalization of the Netherland’s Armed Forces’, in Conscription vs. 
all-volunteer forces in Europe, eds M Malesic, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, pp.83-99.; 
Battistelli, F 2003, ‘The professionalization of the Italian Armed Forces’, in Conscription vs. 
All-Volunteer Forces in Europe, eds M Malesic, Baden-Baden, pp.151-171.; Boëne, B 2003, ‘Going, 
Going, Gone: How France did away with conscription 1996-2001’, in Conscription vs. All-Volunteer 
Forces in Europe, eds M Malesic, Nomos Verlansgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, pp.101-132.; Forster, A, 
Edmunds, T, & Cottey A 2003, Soldiers and societies in postcommunist Europe: legitimacy and change, 
Palgrave, New York.; Williams, C 2005, ‘From conscripts to volunteers: NATO's transitions to 
all-volunteer forces’, Naval War College Review, Winter. Accessed 2 Nov 2009.; Lecomte, J 2006, ‘The 
rise and death of conscription: the case of France’, in The Changing Face of European Conscription, 
eds P Joenniemi, Ashgate, p.78.; Rostker, B 2006, The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force. Rand 
Corporation. Santa Monica, CA.; Hartley, K 2007, ‘The British Experience with an All-Volunteer 
Force’, in Service to Country: Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries, eds C 
Gilroy & C Williams, The MIT Press, Cambridge, p.287-312. Tresch, T & Leuprecht C 2010, Europe 




1.2.1 The Decline of Mass Armed Forces and Conscription 
 
This section discusses the first theoretical perspective, which reviews the definition and 
history of the decline of MAF. The past 60 years have seen a considerable reduction in 
the size of military establishment all over the world, especially in Western Europe. In 
addition, the proportion of defence budgets against national GDP, the conscript ratio and 
the average length of compulsory military service have also been in constant decline. 
Since the 1990s, conscription as a basis of military manpower has been waning at a 
remarkable pace. Owing to the considerably reduced military threat, countries in West 
Europe such as Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Italy and Spain started to shift away 
from conscription to an AVF system. The literature on the MAF and its decline is ample; 
the major arguments are discussed below. 
 
History and definition of the MAF 
 
The structure of the MAF relies on a small core of professional cadres (on a voluntary 
basis) and the mass conscripted citizens to perform military tasks. The term ‘mass 
armed forces’ usually refers to large standing armies,13 and they can be traced back to 
the military systems of the European industrial land powers from the 19th century until 
the end of World War II. The rise and spread of the MAF was marked by the French 
‘Levée en Masse’ introduced in 1793; five years later France passed the ‘Jourdan Law’ 
in September 1798 which ushered the era of the mass conscript army.14 The ‘Levée en 
Masse’ greatly influenced Europe’s military organisation for the next 150 years until 
1945. The MAF experienced a short-term decline during 1815-1850, and rose again and 
spread in 1870 with the dominance of Prussian Army in the 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian 
War. The trend of MAF also spread to Asia as Japan copied the model of Prussian Army 
to develop a mass army in conjunction with its new Conscription Law passed in 1873. 
In fact, early in 1870, Japan had already modelled its navy on that of the Royal Navy in 
an effort to modernise its military and respond to western power in Asia. The MAF 
flourished from the rise of the Prussian Army in 1870 and served as the backbone of 
                                                     
13 The MAF mainly focused on armies as they are more labour-intensive rather than navies and air forces 
because they are more technology or equipment intensive. There is a military idiom in western militaries: 
‘Army equips the man, Navy and Air Force man the equipment’.  




military manpower supply during the two world wars until 1945. Therefore, the end of 
World War II is considered by military sociologists as the starting point in the decline of 
MAF. 
 
Dutch sociologist Jacques Van Doorn wrote an influential article on the MAF in the 
founding years of military sociology and made an analysis of the decline of the MAF; 
his definition of the MAF comprises three components.15 First, the MAF is large in size 
which is associated with the high military participation ratio (MPR).16 Second, the 
MAF is relatively homogeneous and undifferentiated, meaning the weapon technology 
used by forces is fairly simple. Third, society can mobilise its members for large-scale 
collective objectives; examples include the conscription army of the Nazi and Soviet 
forces during WWII,17 and it can also be found in democracies at war such as UK and 
US. Until now, the totalitarian states (e.g. North Korea, Iran and Syria) have been still 
able to mobilise their populace en masse for political and military purposes.  
 
The model of the Prussian army in the 19th and 20th centuries represents a typical format 
for the MAF. The Prussian commander-in-chief Helmuth von Moltke stressed to the 
Reichstag that, ‘without conscription, the state’s security would be forfeit and therefore 
all productivity lost’.18 The victory of the Prussian mass army over France during the 
Franco-Prussian War was partly because the French models of military organisation and 
railway systems were inferior to those of Prussia.19 After that war, the German 
conscription model of military organisation had thus become the basis of the European 
land powers. General mobilisation turned what had been a privilege into a civic duty; it 
became an item of dogma that without general mobilisation the state could not go to 
war.20 It served as a means for Germany to fight two total wars in 1914 and 1939, 
although it still led to its defeats.  
 
Using a quantitative method, Swiss military sociologist Karl Haltiner defined the MAF 
                                                     
15 Van Doorn, op. cit., p.149. 
16 The military participation ratio ‘MPR’ was first termed and defined by Andreski as the proportion of 
military utilized individuals in the total population. See Andreski, S, Military Organization and Society, 
Routledge& Kegan Paul Ltd, 1954, p.33. 
17 Russia calls World War II as a ‘Great Patriotic War’. 
18 Strachan, H 1983, European armies and the conduct of war, Routledge, London, pp.109-111. 
19 Howard, M, 1961, The Franco-Prussian war, Routledge, pp.1-8. 




by looking at the Conscript Ratio (CR). He adopted the MPR and CR to evaluate how 
far the decline of MAF in Western Europe has progressed since the Cold War. He 
divided and defined the West European armed forces into four types: 
 
Type 0. All-volunteer forces, e.g. UK and Ireland. Belgium, France, Netherlands, 
Italy, Spain and Portugal joined this group in late 90s and early 21st 
Century.  
Type 1. Conscripts constitute less than 50 percent of the armed forces (also called 
pseudo-conscript forces). The majority of the force members are 
volunteers although these forces could legally rely on universal 
conscription for the recruitment of their military personnel. 
Type 2. More than half, but less than two thirds of the armed forces are filled with 
conscripts. The military organisation is in MAF type. 
Type 3. Armed forces whose CR was above two thirds; they can also be called 
‘Hard Core’ conscript Forces. 
 
Applying the two selected cases to Haltiner’s model, Sweden is now in Type 0 as it 
reached a zero draft in July 2010. Taiwan is currently adopting a two-tier system and 
has successfully reduced its conscript ratio from 57% in 2005 to 30% in 2012; thus it is 
now in Type 1 and is aiming to reach Type 0 by end of 2014 (Figure 1-1).21 
 
Drivers of Decline of MAF and Main Arguments 
 
With the MAF defined, military sociologists have been keen to identify the drivers that 
have contributed to the decline of MAF and abolition of conscription. Their arguments 
have gone a long way towards explaining why this phenomenon happened. After the 
end of the Second World War, armed forces in most western states still kept conscription 
but underwent force transformation from a mass type to what Janowitz called a 
‘force-in-being’. This trend has been observed in many western states and the fall of 
Berlin Wall has undoubtedly further encouraged the decline of MAF.22 Therefore, this 
section examines the drivers of the decline of MAF by dividing into two periods: 
                                                     
21 Ministry of National Defense, 2013, Ministry of National Defense 2012 performance report, 9 May, 
p.40. 

















Figure 1-1 Typology of Force Structure and Expected Changes in Europe 
Source: Haltiner, 2003. Sweden, Taiwan and Germany adapted and updated by author. 
 
Post WWII- 1945 to 1990 
 
The early works on the decline of MAF in military sociology were primarily produced 
during the Cold War era. In the context of the post-WWII demobilisation of armed 
forces and military standoff between NATO and the Eastern bloc, Western countries 
sought to decrease the size of armed forces by downsizing the military establishment, 
cutting the length of compulsory service and recruiting more volunteers (thus the CR 
went down). Morris Janowitz analysed the changing nature of the armed forces after 
WWII by defining the military as a constabulary force which is always ready to act, 
ready to use force at the lowest level, and their underlying goal is to preserve viable 
international relations rather than victory.23 From a sociological perspective, Janowitz 
argued that the waning support for the MAF was associated with advancing 
industrialism and individualism of the youth cohorts which eroded the public belief in 
the moral worth of compulsory military service. To be specific, Janowitz further 
explained that high levels of education and material abundance in the youth population, 
the declining appeal of nationalism, changes in public attitudes towards military service, 
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and a growing unwillingness of the majority of citizens in the western democratic 
societies to perform military service have also played a key role in the decline of MAF.  
 
From a strategic perspective, Janowitz stressed that the growth in the destructive 
capacity of modern weapon systems made mobilisation of conscripts for a mass army 
virtually irrelevant to an effective military organisation.24 Furthermore, the armed 
forces had gradually shifted to a constabulary force and need to contain conflict with 
rapid response.25 He and Charles Moskos identified four basic elements contributing to 
the attenuation of conscription.26 First was the deployment of nuclear weapons, which 
generated a military posture of deterrence. Second, drafted ground troops had 
demonstrated limited utility. Third, the tasks of national security in the western societies 
must compete with those associated with social welfare and management of the 
environment. Fourth, the idea that military service was an opportunity to acquire and 
demonstrate masculine traits declined due to changes in youth culture. These factors 
reduced the chance of a return to conscription.  
 
Van Doorn was one of the early European military sociologist who discovered the 
decline of MAF, he identified that the erosion of MAF was due to: ‘increasing 
unpopularity with the general public, especially the younger generation; diminution of 
unspecialised mass characteristics in the military such as infantry; and diminution of the 
power of political elites to command the uncritical support of the population.’27 He also 
emphasised that the basis of the MAF was being subjected to increasing pressure, and 
plans for an AVF were becoming more definite in the west. A prudent prediction was 
made by Van Doorn that the tendency to reduce the draft in the west would continue, 
though it would not culminate in the end of the draft in all cases.  
 
1990s – Post Cold War 
 
The fall of Berlin Wall broke up the bipolar strategic stance of the world, and created 
                                                     
24 Janowitz, M 1983, Reconstruction of Patriotism, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p.57.  
25 Janowitz, Morris. 1971. The Professional Soldier. New York: Free Press, p.418. Constabulary force is 
defined as: ‘continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and viable 
international relations rather than victory’. 
26 Janowitz, M and Moskos, C 1979, ‘Five years of the all-volunteer force: 1973-1978’, Armed Forces 
and Society, Vol. 5, No.2, February, pp.171-218. 




conditions for Western states to facilitate the pace to restructure their armed forces and 
abolish conscription. The decline of MAF in this era has accelerated, as can be seen, 
with a rapid shift away from conscription. Like the domino effect, starting from 
Belgium in the early 1990s, countries in Europe one after another abolished or 
suspended conscription and shifted to AVF (with a handful of exceptions). With the 
infusion of international and geostrategic factors, an immediate cause due to much 
reduced threat (especially from the Soviet Union) contributing to the decline of MAF, 
military sociologists in this period paid more attention to these factors. Nevertheless, at 
the same time the social factors also gained its momentum. Military sociologists thus 
started to embark on how social factors had influenced the decline of MAF. 
 
Burk integrated political and societal factors and elaborated on what he called political 
realist and social dominance approaches to answer the question of why MAF in the 
West has been in decline.28 The political realist approach argues that elite decisions 
about conscription reflect considerations of cost and technical efficiency; while the 
social dominance approach stresses the willingness of citizens to accept either 
conscription or voluntary military service as legitimate. To explain variation in patterns 
of national adherence to the norm of compulsory military service, he accentuated that a 
perspective is required which is broad enough to take both political and societal factors 
into account.29 In terms of military manpower issues and due to a more complex 
military division of labour, Burk observed that armed forces relied more on 
highly-trained professional and longer-serving career soldiers. In addition, he also 
analysed the trends in technological development of modern weapons, increasing limits 
on the utility of military interventions, and changing life-style associated with increased 
affluent materials which have combined to bring about this shift in the format of the 
military.  
 
Burk questioned Janowitz’s argument about the declining appeal of nationalism which 
undermined people’s motive for public service. He believed that national identity crises 
and the weight of national political traditions are general political-moral factors, which 
help explain the varied pattern of response to pressures for voluntary recruitment 
associated with the decline of MAF. He compared four country cases: the UK, US, 
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France and Germany, which had similar levels of economic, political and military 
development, to explain why France and Germany maintained conscription while the 
UK and US abolished it. The principles of territoriality and constitutionality were 
identified as the key factors that affected the fate of conscription; both France and 
Germany faced boundary and constitutional crises, while neither the UK nor the US 
confronted serious challenge from the uncertainty of territorial or constitutional crises. 
Finally, Burk echoed Van Doorn’s argument that the decline of the MAF and the rise of 
the force-in-being would not necessarily foreshadow an end to conscription. 
 
The aforementioned drivers of the decline of MAF in terms of technical and social 
factors were also pointed out by Van der Meulen and Manigart, who found that 
technological advancement and socio-evolution were the major drivers in the 
fundamental change in military organisation. In light of the AVF transitions in Belgium 
and the Netherlands, they predicted a situation that without a major deterioration of 
international relations in Europe, a zero draft would be the rule throughout Europe 
within 10 years.30 Their prediction proved to be correct.  
 
As discussed earlier, Haltiner introduced the decreasing CR as a key indicator of the 
decline of MAF and argued that the lower the CR, the more a force is based on 
voluntary personnel, and the more can it be called a volunteer force.31 Haltiner 
forecasted that the era of MAF was nearing its end in Western Europe even though not 
all states would abolish conscription in the near future. Based on what Burk called the 
political realist’s perspectives of international relations and strategy, Haltiner 
emphasised the importance of strategic and military goal-bound factors based on the 
AVF transitions in Western Europe. He argued that: 1. being a member of defence and 
political alliances (such as NATO); 2. being far from a direct military threat; and 3, 
participating frequently in international missions would facilitate the abolition of 
conscription and the change of military format into a force with no or a low number of 
non-voluntary military personnel. His arguments were used to examine the two selected 
cases. 
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Nevertheless, one fact has to be stressed that, despite the strong tendency of the decline 
in MAF, the ‘weight of history’ (i.e. social and cultural preferences), impact of 
economic circumstances and a state’s location in the international system, have led 
states such as Norway, Finland and Austria to continue to keep conscription. This 
indicates that states could either maintain conscription or adopt the ‘two-tier system’ 
using conscripts for territorial defence and volunteer soldiers for expeditionary missions 
which still keeps the principle of conscription but with reduced characteristic of MAF. 
 
Summary: Decline of MAF as a theoretical framework for history and context of 
AVF decision 
 
The decline of MAF has been an overarching trend in the western countries. For over 
half a century, many concepts regarding the decline of MAF were discussed and 
developed, and the factors driving the change were also identified. This complicated set 
of factors explains most of the reasons for the decline of MAF and the end of 
conscription. 
 
From a political realist point of view, Haltiner emphasised the strategic and international 
factors in driving the shift in the military organisational format, whereas Burk claimed 
that a combined political realist and social dominance perspective better explained the 
change. In light of their arguments, Dandeker summarised the debates suggesting that 
the decline of MAF and shifting away from conscription to AVF has been caused by a 
combination of societal and international factors with addition of the modern weapons 
technology.32 He found that the international factors have played a more significant role 
in driving this trend. Without ruling out the societal factors, Dandeker interpreted 
Haltiner’s arguments as: ‘the societal changes might undermine the MAF concept but 
that political elites will not judge it right to break with the weight of history unless 
strategic circumstances indicate that it would be prudent to do so.’33 
 
The first theoretical approach underpinning this thesis has not only examined the 
theories of the decline of MAF, but set out the historical context in the initial part of the 
thesis (chapter one and two). Most importantly, it identifies the gap regarding the 
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transition process, which is the main question that this thesis aims to answer. The key 
theoretical question is: ‘How far the similarities and differences in terms of the 
decisions to shift to AVF between Sweden and Taiwan can be explained by the decline 
of MAF theory.’ This framework provides a basis to analyse the pre-decision phase of 
ending conscription with focus on both the longer term and more immediate causes of 
change. 
 
Theoretical argument  
 
Apparently a theoretical framework based on decline of MAF literature – the first 
theoretical approach, can now be established. Adapting it to examine the two selected 
cases, Haltiner’s international model in general works well on the western states, 
including Sweden, as they 1. are far from threats, 2. frequently participate in 
international missions, and 3. join defence alliances (Sweden’s de facto alliance with 
NATO). However, it appears to be less convincing in explaining the case of Taiwan.34 
Burk’s combined approach, on the other hand, appears to be more persuasive in terms of 
Taiwan’s AVF decision because international factors were less influential than domestic 
political and social ones.  
 
Although the theoretical perspective provides abundant literature on decline of MAF, 
only a few studies focus on the post-decision implementing process. Due to this 
knowledge gap, this thesis needs another approach to bridge this gap. The next section 
will embark on a discussion of the second theoretical approach underpinning the thesis: 
the experiences and lessons drawn from the AVF implementations in the West.  
 
1.2.2 Analysing the process of AVF implementation cases of AVF transition in the 
West 
 
In terms of military reform, states often see whether they can achieve it by looking at 
what and how other states have done (for example, France copied the British experience 
in shifting to AVF). When examining how states achieving the goal and particular 
objectives of AVF transition, it is useful to see how other states made the transition. 
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Through empirical case analysis, this section sets out to establish the second approach 
underpinning this thesis. The cases of AVF transition in Western states are discussed 
with a focus specifically on the post-decision implementation process. It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to examine every Western AVF transition in detail; it rather selects 
several transition cases from the UK, US and other West European countries, discusses 
their implementation experiences, and then summarises some common lessons.  
 
This section focuses on three questions: 1. what are Sweden and Taiwan doing, thinking, 
deciding and prioritizing in AVF transition? 2. Cross-fertilisation: whether what they are 
thinking and doing is drawing on what they found out from other cases.35 There is a 
factual question, when other states have made the transition, have both cases looked at 
other transitions such as the UK and US? 3. What does the author as an observer think 
about these issues? It is useful to see if states have looked what other states doing and 
are copying things. States may be inaccurate but they still copy. The observer as an 
independent third party may give a more objective perspective in terms of what states 
want to copy, and what the observer think states could have copied if they did not. 
These three perspectives intertwine and interact with each other, and are a valuable part 
of the analysis. 
 
By reviewing and examining the western AVF cases, this section starts with a brief 
overview of the changing conscription policies and factors initiating transitions, and 
then describes the obstacles and problems encountered by these states during transitions. 
Finally, measures taken by these states are examined to summarise general lessons for 
countries with either ongoing or future AVF transitions. The other main task of this 
section is to build the second theoretical approach by asking an empirical research 
question: ‘To what extent can the experiences from the western AVF cases be relevant to 
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The United Kingdom 
 
The UK was one of the earliest western states to end conscription after the Second 
World War. The 1957 Defence Review played a vital role that proposed the phased 
ending of National Service,36 with the last call-up in 1960 to achieve an AVF by 1963. 
The transition was not instantaneous and took an adjustment period of six years. Navias 
examined the two year period prior to the British decision to terminate the national 
service and explained how British policy makers were constrained from using 
conscripts abroad between the end of WWII and 1957.37 He pointed out that the 
objections to compulsory military service had been a constant factor in British politics, 
and arguments to end conscription were mainly focused on economic and political 
reasons. Interestingly, as Navias found, not too much effort was made by the proponents 
of an AVF to link the termination of national service to a focus on nuclear deterrence. 
This was due to the fact that the Services attempted to retain the national service based 
on a strategic conception that paid little regard to the implications of nuclear weapons 
for conventional force levels. Vasquez identifies three factors contributed to the end of 
National Service in the UK: concern over the use of young conscripts abroad, the length 
of terms of obligatory military service, and the mobilisation and deployment of 
reservists. Beyond social unease with conscription and political constraints on use of 
national servicemen and reservists abroad, he argues that the prominent egalitarian norm 
made selective military service untenable and thus prompted the shift to an AVF.38 
Hartley highlighted that the problem of defence budget in the 1950s was one of the 
main causes for the AVF transition.39 Dandeker also pointed out that the continuing 
pressures on defence expenditure (almost 10 percent of GDP in the 1950s) along with 
the development of UK’s nuclear deterrence helped trigger the change.40 
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 Navias,M., 1989. Terminating Conscription? The British National Service Controversy 1955-56. 
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 24, pp.195-208. 
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Vasquez agrees with Burk that his paired political realist and social dominance approach 
explains in Britain’s decision to end conscription. In addition, weight of history played a 
key role in the decision; it is important to emphasise that the British AVF transition is 
what Dandeker termed an ‘echo of empire’ as the AVF is the historical norm and 
conscription the exception for the UK in its history.41 
 
The AVF transition in UK was not easy and had seen problems in the early stages. With 
regard to the recruitment, in the early years the armed forces could not obtain a 
sufficient number of recruits. It was caused by the low birth rates in the 1950s, the 
tendency for youth cohorts to stay in school longer, rise of individualism in the youth 
cohorts, increased competition in the labour market as well as better training 
opportunities in the civilian sector. Over the period of 1963-1975, the armed forces 
rarely reached 90% of their recruitment targets, especially the Army. To boost recruiting, 
the government launched various incentives to make service life more attractive. 
Various monetary measures were introduced including across-the-board pay increases, 
designing a more attractive career structure and, after 1969, the introduction of military 
salary based on the principle of the comparability with the civilian sector known as the 
‘X factor’.42 
 
The transition also came with a significant military restructuring and downsizing of 
300,000 personnel by 1963. The solutions to remove redundant personnel included 
offering special lump sum payments and relaxation of the retirement rules for premature 
retirements. Even though high defence budget was one of the reasons that UK decided 
to abolish conscription, shifting to AVF did not bring the military expenditure down in 
the first five years of UK’s transition as the defence spending even rose by to 11 percent 
of GDP between 1963 and 1968.43 Nevertheless, the share of defence GDP had shown a 
long-term downward trend from nine percent in 1957 to 2.5 per cent in 2004.44 
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The Armed Forces Of Europe, eds T Tresch and C Leuprecht, Mcgill-queen's University Press. The UK 
is an island and has a longstanding suspicion of a large standing military since the Civil War in the mid 
17th century. 
42
 X factor is a supplement to military salary to allow for the duties and difficulties surrounding military 
service that are not present in civilian life. For example, being on-call or duty 24 hours a day and the risks 
attached to military service. 
43 Hartley, K 2007, op. cit. 




Judging by the British experience of AVF transition, shifting to an AVF is not cheap, and 
often it is more expensive than conscription during the early stage of transition. The 
budget is an important consideration in AVF transition. The other key issues for the 
success of the AVF transition are qualitative and quantitative aspects of recruitment. 
States shifting to AVF tend to encounter a common problem: how to recruit enough 
people with the right quality to serve and how to retain them. As Fabyanic argued, the 
uncertainty of manpower availability in a voluntary system inexorably leads to a 
decreasing cycle of manpower expectations.45 There is one universal yet costly way to 
solve recruitment and retention problems for the AVF: offering monetary incentives. 
The restructuring and downsizing of armed forces also contributed to the 
accomplishment of the British AVF transition.46 However, the question of the 
appropriate size of the military establishment as part of the optimal design of a military 
organisation needs significant research. The British AVF transition was completed 
alongside with major reduction in personnel; the result was demonstrated by the 
efficient and professional performance of the British armed forces during the Falkland 
and first Gulf wars.  
 
The British AVF transition shows that the extent which domestic politics related to 
military manpower can constrain a state’s international action meaning; its experience 
can lend lessons to both Sweden and Taiwan (to lesser extent) in that political factors 
play a key role in the decision of both cases. In light of British experiences of the 
defence budget during transition, it is an interesting question to ask whether Sweden 
and Taiwan realise that budget could be a problem during transition, and whether they 
can draw on lessons from the British experience. 
 
The United States  
 
Throughout the American history, national conscriptions were employed four times 
during various wars. During the American Civil War, the Congress of the Confederate 
States of America passed the first American legislature of the National Conscription 
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Law in 1862.47 The American people generally accepted conscription when service was 
universal; this can be traced back to American Revolution which contributed to the 
expansion of the definition of the citizenry and defined participation in armed conflict 
as part of the normative definition of citizenship.48 It is widely considered that the 
increased protests over the Vietnam War in mid-1960s had caused the public acceptance 
of conscription began to wane.49 The key problems of conscription were summed up by 
the Marshall Commission in the title of report: ‘In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When 
Not All Serve?’50 Economic considerations also facilitated the transition as: 
conscription generated the opportunity costs; AVF could save the costs by preventing 
evasion of draft, maintaining a higher retention and lower turnover rate of personnel, 
and offering better incentives to military personnel.51 In 1969, President Nixon 
announced the formation of the President’s Commission (known as ‘Gates Commission’) 
on an All-Volunteer Armed Force. Based on the report of Gates Commission, in 1970, 
Nixon decided to abolish conscription with the completion deadline set at 1 July 1973. 
The transition to an AVF was completed within three years. 
 
The early stage of transition in the US, especially the quality of recruitment had been 
problematic. The first five years of AVF transition (1973-1978) was summed up by 
Janowitz and Moskos as: ‘the AVF is smaller, more expensive, of lower quality in 
selected but crucial segments, and less socially representative than the economists 
anticipated’.52 They argued that the most important issue of the AVF transition is 
whether the armed forces had been able to attract sufficient numbers of enlisted 
personnel with the right quality, and whether they will be able to do so in the future. In 
particular, they pointed out that the key problem was the recruitment and retention in the 
Army and Marines. During the first three years of transition the military managed to 
reach the planned goal of recruitment. Nevertheless, over the next few years the 
transition encountered some problems. Due to the recovery of the US economy, there 
was a significant increase in salaries in the private sector while military pay failed to 
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keep pace. The consequence was the quality of soldiers dropping dramatically, thus 
caused difficulty in training and competence.53 In tackling this issue, military pay was 
raised in order to be competitive with the private sector. Other measures included 
offering education opportunities (famously known as Montgomery GI Bill) and a 
variety of service bonuses, improving quality of life for military families, diversifying 
the recruitment pool by recruiting more women and ethnic minorities, building a 
professional cadre of recruiters and investing heavily in marketing research and 
advertisement. Not only was the range of extrinsic incentives expanded (monetary 
incentives, education etc.), intrinsic incentives such as a well-defined rationale for 
service (a wide cross section of viewpoints and ideologies recruited into the AVF) were 
also developed. 
 
Gilroy et al analysed the first 15 years of recruiting experiences of the US army and 
found that the free education (GI Bill) is the key to the success of recruitment. Thirty 
years after shifting to AVF, the quality of new recruits in the US armed forces has been 
improved.54 Rostker et al summarised four broad reasons for the success of the AVF 
transition in the US.55 First, Leadership: President Nixon’s decision was no doubt the 
key to reach the success of the AVF. A successful AVF transition requires prudent 
political decision and support. Second, understanding the problems requires substantial 
research. Research had been a critical part of the AVF from its very beginning as the 
Gates Report greatly influenced the decision. Third, skill in management: The AVF 
transition presented special challenges for which new programmes had to be developed. 
The military had to learn about whom and also how to recruit. Finally, the commitment 
to maintaining the solution requires adequate budgets. It is crucial to ensure that 
adequate resources are available to support the AVF. The defence budget must be 
sufficient to support pay raises, to keep pace with both inflation and salary in the private 
sector, to support advertising, professional recruiters, bonuses, quality-of-life incentives, 
housing and educational benefits, and to fund the military retirement programmes. The 
American case shows that the problem of recruitment of quality is more serious than 
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quantity; this lesson should help Sweden and Taiwan emphasise the importance of 
quality rather than merely looking at the immediate number of soldiers. 
 
The British case is unique because conscription is not the norm in British history and 
UK represents a European maritime power; while the American case illustrates the 
transition of world’s most powerful armed forces. Both transitions were finished during 
the Cold War era and thus operated under the Cold War strategic thinking. Therefore, it 
is essential to briefly look at cases from European continental views in the post-Cold 




Belgium was the first country to respond the end of Cold War with the decision to 
abolish conscription announced in July 1992. The transition took one and half years to 
reach zero draft in January 1994. By then, insufficient research and analysis on the 
potential quantity of recruitment had been conducted. It is not difficult to imagine that 
the Belgian armed forces had encountered many obstacles, especially recruitment and 
ageing of personnel.56 The Belgian government tackled the problems through 
redesigning employment contracts and initiating a series of measures attempting to 
make enlistment in the armed forces more attractive. Nevertheless, the armed forces fell 
short of sufficient volunteers and the target announced in the initial plan did not 
materialise. As a result, the Belgian armed forces experienced a sudden loss of young 
soldiers. Reducing the number of redundant personnel by encouraging them to leave the 
military earlier was the key to fix the problem. Early retirement deals along with other 
monetary incentives were offered to senior personnel and later on these measures were 
proved effective. Furthermore, a new short-term contract was proved to be effective in 
bringing down the average age profile of military personnel.  
 
Four lessons were summarised by Manigart regarding the Belgian transition case.57 
First, from a purely military point of view, he suggested that a longer transition period 
would seem to be preferable due to the short (1.5 years) transition period and the strict 
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budgetary constraints. Second, the ageing problem of personnel impacted on the 
military’s operational readiness. Third, during transition Belgium faced difficulties in 
recruiting qualified personnel from labour market, he believed that more structural and 
cultural measures (such as recruiting migrants) were needed to attract sufficient 
qualified soldiers from young cohorts. Finally, in order allow them to solve structural 
disarmament dilemma, he suggested that the force restructuring process requires a 




Despite sharing geographic proximity and similar strategic contexts with Belgium, the 
Dutch AVF transition was relatively less difficult. The Dutch Parliament decided in 
1993 to abolish conscription and shift to an AVF by end of 1997. However, it went 
earlier than expected in September 1996. Unlike Belgium, research on potential 
recruitment of volunteer soldiers was conducted for the state committee advising on the 
transition. Recruitment feasibility studies published in 1993 indicated that it was 
possible to acquire a maximum of 8,000 volunteers on short-term contracts per annum. 
Another key factor is that the AVF transition was carried out simultaneously with a 
significant cut in personnel in order to keep costs low. During the early years of 
transition, the recruitment results were satisfactory, and the Dutch military also spent a 
great effort on retention of personnel. However, the key aspect of the personnel quality, 
educational level of new recruits has always been of concern but in fact it dropped after 
abolition of conscription, but not as much as expected.  
 
Bos-Bakx and Soeters highlighted the factors which helped achieve the Dutch AVF 
transformation.58 First, the public image of military as an employer need to be 
promoted in the first place. In doing so military salaries and working conditions require 
improvements and armed forces have to recruit more women and ethnic minorities. 
Second, labour market need to be constantly monitored because it is important to gather 
accurate information on supply and demand of personnel from the labour market in 
order to fill the ranks of military. Third, there was the factor of flexible contracts. 
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Offering flexible contracts can satisfy the needs of various kinds of young men and 
women. Providing more options makes contracts more attractive. Fourth, there were 
education opportunities; it is essential to social and political acceptance of the AVF, and 
education is needed to reinforce recruitment and to keep the unemployment costs under 
control. Bos-Bakx and Soeters suggested that all these approaches need to be integrated 
in order to achieve a better transition result. In short, the AVF transition in the 
Netherlands was completed in a well-planned manner within the planned transition 




As France was the inventor of the Levée en masse, its abolition of conscription was a 
symbolic move in Europe. The reform was initially proposed by President Chirac during 
the presidential election campaign in 1994-5. In 1996, he announced that ‘France’s 
military would do away with its traditional organisational format, and turn to an AVF by 
2002’. Similar to the Dutch case, before the decision was made, studies on recruitment 
were carried out between 1992 and 1996 to explore potential sources of volunteers. The 
British AVF model was closely studied by French armed forces;59 and military planners 
sought to establish a higher-quality professional force able to deploy more soldiers for 
international missions. Lecomte pointed out that France’s decision was to make the 
transition basically consisted of pushing the French military apparatus to accommodate 
to the changes in the international environment.60 
 
Similar to other transitions, low quality of recruitment was faced by French military.61 
To ensure the recruitment targets could be met, qualification standard of recruitment 
was set lower than originally planned to guarantee its success. Also, an improved public 
image, pay raise, enhanced technology, more comprehensive resettlement aid policies, 
and record high unemployment rates among young people in the country helped French 
armed forces achieve the recruitment targets. The French military took several 
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initiatives to eliminate the quality and quantity problems of recruitment, and to 
strengthen the links between military and society for the new AVF. Improved pay, free 
housing, food and clothing, and other welfare services offered the service men and 
women a decent status in the society. The transition to an AVF was considered 
successful since the targets set by military programming law for 1997-2002 were 95 
percent materialized.62 Another key indicator, the retention rate was also satisfactorily 
achieved and even better than anticipated. On balance, as Boëne commented, ‘the 
French case is heartening for the numerous European countries set to follow suit and 




The pace of the military transition in Southern European countries was relatively slow, 
compared to West Europe; yet they caught up with the trend of abolishing conscription 
in late1990s, as Spain and Italy had all started to reform the personnel structure of 
armed forces.  
 
Due to lack of financial incentives as military pay was much lower than those of the 
public and private sectors, the Spanish transition also faced a recruitment problem. 
From a social perspective, the image of the military to the average citizen was still 
contaminated by the former authoritarian Franco regime which was backed by the 
military. High rates of conscientious objection undermined the success of recruitment 
efforts during the transition as 75 per cent of draft-age men claimed themselves as 
conscientious objectors.64 The Spanish government took many initiatives to cope with 
recruitment problem, including: ensuring military pay comparable to salaries in private 
sector, establishing facilities for recruitment and training professional soldiers, creating 
financial incentives such as bonuses and benefits for new recruits, investing on 
advertising campaign in mass media, and establishing an efficient selection procedure to 
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avoid losses of new recruits. One solution to the recruitment problem was to diversify 
the recruitment pool by recruiting up to 2000 Latin American migrants per annum. 
Besides, the armed forces raised the age of recruits and lowered intelligence standards 
to obtain sufficient recruits (i.e. compromising quality for quantity).  
 
There have been different comments on Spanish AVF transition. For instance, Zubeldia 
argued that the transition process failed to achieve the full professionalisation of 
Spanish armed forces.65 However, Diaz considered Spain’s transition an initial success 
due to the satisfactory results of recruitment and retention rates, and the AVF fully 
integrated women and migrants as an expanded recruitment pool.66 One important 
implication from Spanish lessons is that the poor public image of the military could take 




The Italian government announced a plan to suspend conscription in 1999. A significant 
cut of 90,000 military personnel was also made at the same time. Originally, the 
transition was planned to be accomplished in seven years in order to allow enough time 
to recruit sufficient volunteer soldiers. Later on the Italian government considered the 
period was too long. After the Ministry of Defence conducted a series of research 
enquires that led to decisions to accelerate the end of conscription the transition period 
was shortened from seven to five years.  
 
Recruitment had proved more difficult than anticipated. The decline in the overall size 
of the population and ageing in society had consequently caused recruitment of 
volunteer soldiers more challenging. Similar to the Dutch, to promote recruitment, three 
flexible types of service contracts were introduced; young men and women can choose 
from one-year enlistment (VFA), short-term enlistment (VFB) for three years, and 
career soldiers (VFP) in which soldiers can serve up to age of 60. The costs for the 
transition in a constrained budget environment had also caused serious concerns to the 
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Battistelli commented that, in the context of those contrasts common to other European 
countries, the transition of Italian armed forces proceeded with fewer obstacles than 
expected.67 He argued that this favourable result was interestingly assisted by two what 
he called ‘weaknesses’ of the Italian system: 1. job market statistics and the 
social-economic gap between the North and the South; 2. the youth unemployment rate 
in Italy is among the highest in Europe, which allowed for a large potential recruitment 
pool for military.  
 
Lessons from Western cases  
 
This section sums up the lessons and experiences of post-decision implementation of 
AVF from the Western cases discussed above. Their experiences in implementing the 
AVF help the development of the second theoretical approach that will answer the 
research questions of the thesis. 
 
Recruitment and retention: universal problems 
 
Most countries during their AVF transition faced recruitment and retention problems. In 
order to achieve immediate results in recruitment quantity, some countries such as US, 
France and Spain sacrificed the quality of recruits by lowering the entry standard, thus 
causing problems of reduced competence of soldiers later on. The early years of the 
AVF transition in the US had seen a generally poor quality of volunteer soldiers, 
resulting former president Nixon to comment that ‘the volunteer army has failed to 
provide enough personnel of the calibre we need.’68 
 
AVF: not as cheap as anticipated 
 
The early indications from European cases suggested that the transition to AVF has been 
more expensive. The pay raise, monetary incentives and compensation programmes had 
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together led to increased manpower costs. The share of personnel cost in the defence 
budget during the initial stage of transition also increased. Hartley pointed out that for 
the UK and other countries, the lessons of an AVF are that defence budget constraints 
and rising input costs of personnel and equipment means that difficult defence policy 
choices cannot be avoided.69 
 
Economic and demographic factors play a role 
 
Economic factors, especially the unemployment rate among youth cohorts, have had a 
significant impact on the recruitment of personnel, especially quality. The saying ‘a bad 
economy is good for military recruiting’ confirms this fact. For example, the economic 
recovery of the Netherlands in 1996 had caused the recruitment of volunteer soldiers 
under pressure. In addition, the French experience showed that as unemployment 
figures vary significantly for different levels of education, the incentive scheme must be 
adapted to each specific labour market in order to meet recruiting goals. The issue of 
downward trend in birth rates in Europe needs to be addressed to deal with the future 
recruitment, as the cases of UK, Italy and Spain showed.  
 
Measures & Initiatives 
 
Monetary and in-kind incentives are essential 
 
Monetary incentives have been proved by most examples as a useful measure to attract 
young men and women to serve in the military. Basic pay was universally increased as a 
direct incentive, especially for the less-skilled positions. Other monetary incentives 
include bonuses and special wages which compensates for the hardship of military life; 
the other kind of bonus is paid to those who participate in international missions and 
this is quite substantial compared to the basic pay. In the UK, the hardship of military 
life is compensated in a pay increment called the ‘X-factor’, which links and 
synchronises military salary with the average pay in the private sector. The US offered 
the GI Bill which allowed military personnel to pursue college qualifications after 
leaving the military; it proved to be highly effective in terms of attracting young men 
                                                     




and women to serve in the military. The other important measure is the in-kind 
incentives. After the armed forces shifted to the AVF, the number of married personnel 
has been increasing.70 As merely raising salaries may not satisfy the needs of personnel, 
improving the quality of family life has been introduced. In-kind benefits and tax-free 
compensation are important incentives to military personnel, especially for retention 
purpose.  
 
Improving career options and post-service opportunities  
 
Immediate incentives to military personnel is important to recruit and retain them, 
however, they also need to consider the future of military careers as many young people 
treat a military job as a life-long career. Therefore, a clear and sound career path for 
soldiers needs to be planned in order to retain soldiers longer. There should be chances 
for soldiers to be promoted to NCOs and officers. In addition, servicemen and women 
expect the armed forces to look after them after they leave the armed forces; veteran 
caring programme and retirement scheme has thus become an important issue. 
 
Flexible contracts offer more choices 
 
The armed forces should realise that in general there are two kinds of young people who 
join the military: the first kind who love military life and treat it as a career and the 
second kind who need immediate money and treat military service as immediate ends to 
this situation. Therefore, flexible service contracts offer young men and women more 
choices and may better meet their needs. Lessons drawn from previous cases that 
shorter term seemed to be more welcome; however, it will increase the turnover rate. 
 
Diversifying and expanding recruitment pool 
 
Segal stressed that, in order to recruit qualified personnel in the post September 11th era, 
the military should increasingly rely on ethnic and racial minorities, particularly 
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non-citizens, as well as women.71 Hence, diversifying the recruitment pool has been a 
crucial task not only to boost the number of recruitment, but also to enhance the social 
representation of the military by increasing the proportion of women, minority group 
and people with different ethnic background in the armed forces. By doing so the 
military also fulfils its social function. 
 
Investing in advertising  
 
To increase exposure, the armed forces must learn how to sell themselves in the labour 
market and study marketing strategy. The US armed forces established a professional 
recruiting team and considerably invested on marketing research and advertisement. 
Similar to US, European countries are also working to improve recruitment by building 
professional recruiting teams and investing more in advertisements.  
 
Public image matters 
 
To gain public support for the armed forces and defence reform and to motivate young 
men and women to join the military, it is imperative that the military must improve its 
public image. The Spanish case showed that the stereotyped public attitude towards the 
military had negatively affected the recruitment during its AVF transition. The public 
image of the armed forces is influential in the decision of youth cohorts in choosing the 
military as a career. For example, during the transition, the Netherlands found that the 
image of the armed forces was the crucial factor concerning recruitment as the armed 
forces were competing with the private sector in the labour market.  
 
Conducting research – the need for evidence based policy  
 
Before states made their final decision to end the conscription, research may provide 
useful information and reveal feasibility for the armed forces to identify the potential 
recruitment, estimate budget, and assess impacts and obstacles during transition. Before 
the US decided to abolish conscription, the report of the Gates Commission contributed 
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to the decision-making process as it comprehensively analysed and estimated the force 
level, budget and recruitment. The Dutch case also showed that a feasibility study on 
recruitment conducted before the AVF implementation was influential to its success. 
 
Reform Personnel Structure  
 
Removing ageing and redundant personnel 
 
Ageing has been a problem in many European armed forces, especially at the officer 
and NCO level. In many European countries it is against the law to make personnel 
redundant against their will. To tackle this issue, monetary incentives and attractive 
retirement deals were proposed to encourage redundant or ageing personnel to leave 
military earlier. For example, as an incentive to leave the military, during transition UK 
and France offered a special lump-sum payment to those who were already qualified for 
the military pension but were under the age limit for mandatory retirement.  
 
Reforming NCOs and reserve forces 
 
The NCO corps is the backbone of the armed forces in terms of middle management of 
troops, execution of specialised skills and training soldiers. As such, the quality of 
NCOs could have impacted on the performance of volunteer soldiers. For example, 
France created a new category of contract officers called ‘specialists’ who had acquired 
specific skills in the civilian sector. They do not take command positions but merely 
served in the units as technicians. For established NCO corps, the quality of NCOs 
needs to be enhanced and labour should be clearly divided between officers and NCOs. 
On the other hand, due to the smaller size of AVF, more frequent use of the reservists 
has complemented the American and British regular forces in Afghanistan and Iraq as a 
means to share the heavy burden of war. Spain restructured the reserve system in order 
to complement the smaller AVF structure; it was made up of temporary reservists and 
then added a volunteer component in 2004. In the Netherlands, all active armed forces 
generate a reserve complement called regular reservists in the form of former military 






Restructuring the working environment and conditions 
 
Williams observed that European militaries have attempted to eliminate traditions that 
either annoy service members or produce few or no military outcomes. In an AVF, the 
concept of manpower costs is different from that of conscription. Therefore, the mindset 
about the manpower costs needs to be changed. She argued that it is possible to 
drastically and economically improve working conditions by eliminating unnecessary 
traditions and regulations. However, she stressed that improving the infrastructure of 
military bases could cost a fortune.73 
 
Summary of the process of AVF implementation 
 
The post-cold war AVF transitions in Western Europe have provided a rich source of 
information for military sociologists to explore and extend the themes of decline of 
MAF. Drawing on the experiences and insights from these cases, it has found that 
abolishing conscription and shifting to an AVF has not been easy and countries can face 
unanticipated problems during implementation process.  
 
Acquiring sufficient numbers of volunteer soldiers has always been a major task for 
transition, and this has been proved more difficult if young men and women do not 
think military career, salary and working environments attractive. Even if a country 
managed to acquire sufficient people, quality usually became another problem. To boost 
recruitment and retention of personnel, armed forces in the West have developed and 
offered a number of measures including monetary and in-kind incentives. These 
incentives not only offer better pay to service men and women, but also provide various 
types of caring schemes to their family members. Improving career path and developing 
post-service job opportunity are useful to retain personnel to stay longer. In addition to 
incentives, these countries have also found other effective ways to improve recruitment, 
including designing flexible contracts to meet the needs of the youth cohorts, expanding 
and diversifying recruitment pools, investing in advertising and conducting research. 
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Without a doubt, the public image of the armed forces plays a key role in the 
recruitment as a good public image could help boost the recruitment. 
 
Another common obstacle is budget constraints. Countries tend to assume that shifting 
the AVF along with a considerable downsizing in military personnel, could bring the 
defence budget down. On the contrary, the cost for AVF transition is associated with an 
increase in the personnel costs. In order to attract young people to serve, the pay must 
be attractive and competitive to what is offered in the private sector. In addition, other 
programmes such as retention scheme, retirement plan, bonus and benefits, and caring 
programmes, all require a considerable fund to subsidise. As a consequence, an 
adjustment must be made to increase personnel costs and thus squeeze the budgets for 
operation and equipment acquisition. Warner and Negrusa showed that while AVF is 
usually cheaper than conscription in the long run in terms of real costs to society, 
conscription can have a lower social cost than an equally capable AVF.74 
 
Changes in the personnel structure have been a radical step in the AVF transition. In 
addition to the reduction in military establishment – a crucial part of the transition, the 
armed forces in the West also had to deal with the problems of an ageing society, 
reforming the NCO corps and reservists, and restructuring the working environments 
and conditions. From a broader national context, the economic and demographic factors 
can have an impact on the AVF transition, especially on future recruitment. According 
to Sandell, demographic growth in Europe has altered and his analysis indicated that the 
youth cohorts between the ages of 15 and 29 will drop markedly throughout next four 
decades in most of Europe.75 Economic factors could influence the result of recruitment 
and retention of military personnel, especially during economic upturn because the 
military as an employer has to compete with private sectors. Finally, the length of 
transition needs to be carefully planned; a transition window that is either too long or 
too short could have an impact on the implementation. The experiences and lessons 
drawn from these country cases, both successful and less so, are worthwhile for states 
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seeking the same path like Sweden and Taiwan to emulate, as learning from previous 
cases can help states avoid repeating similar mistakes.  
 
1.3 Research outline 
 
Criteria of success 
 
Chapter one has set up the basis of a comparison of selected cases, summed up the 
discussion of the two theoretical approaches and listed a set of criteria for a successful 
AVF transition. In terms of the decision making for shifting to the AVF system, many 
issues need to be evaluated such as whether states can afford to financially sustain this 
type of military, whether AVF fulfils state’s strategic needs and fits in with its history 
and cultural preferences, and whether the military is able to recruit sufficient number of 
soldiers with the right quality. Once a decision is made, the transition reaches the 
post-decision implementation process, which is the research focus of this thesis.  
  
Analysis of a successful implementation of an AVF relies on a model adequate for 
measuring the criteria of transition. The model contains three key elements which are 
different yet interrelated, namely: 
 
1. The strategic goal and the specific objectives it contains,  
2. The metrics and criteria for a successful implementation and  
3. Those factors and conditions which can facilitate, hinder and influence the transition.  
 
Building on these three elements, this thesis aims to use the second theoretical 
perspective to examine the implementation process by considering the experiences of 
other cases. The criteria and variables in the model can be considered from three 
perspectives:  
1. From states’ perspectives, the criteria, variables and the priorities considered and 
adopted by Sweden and Taiwan. 
2. How states draw on the experiences and lessons from other AVF cases. 





In an interconnected world, when states designed their objectives and metrics for AVF 
implementation, they often do so by comparing their projects with those in other states. 
In the capacity of an independent analyst and observer, it is useful for an analyst to 
make an objective judgment. In terms of causal logic, the ultimate strategic goal 
provides the framework for the specific objectives of the AVF. Particular metrics are 
designed by states to achieve each of the specific objectives, as pathways for managing 
the process from decision to success. These metrics take place in the conditions or 
contexts in which the process of transition is being managed: the conditions can assist 
transition, hinder it, or be neutral in their effects. (See Figure 1-2 for the research 
outline). These three elements are elaborated in the following sub-sections and 
examined in three separate empirical chapters (chapters three, four and five). In short, 
this model aims to help answer the research question of this thesis: 
 
‘Do the nature and manner of decisions, the contexts in which they sit, and the 
metrics they adopt determine and influence the eventual success of all-volunteer 
force transition?’ 






1. Goals and objectives 
 
In terms of country’s own analysis of AVF transition, defining goals of AVF is a priority 
in the process of transition. It is essential to refine the goal of transition into detailed and 
specific objectives as a zero draft is a necessary but not sufficient condition of success. 
Distinguishing differences between goals and objectives of AVF transition is a way of 
understanding the complexity of the two cases. However, in light of the previous 
western cases, some criteria, variables and conditions are likely to be similar. For 
example, the poor quality and low quantity of recruitment are overarching phenomenon 
of AVF which occurred in almost every transition case. This thesis focuses on the 
analysis of similarities and differences in terms of their strategic goals of the AVF. 
Following the goals, the specific objectives set by both cases shape the characteristics of 
both AVFs. Therefore it needs to identify how both cases defined their goals and 
specific objectives regarding the structure, size and function of the new personnel 
system. 
 
2. Metrics and criteria 
 
The second element is metrics and criteria, which comprise the factors that establish 
whether a successful transition has been achieved and also the milestones on the 
pathway to success. The comparative variables and criteria in the metrics aim to explain 
whether both countries are performing well or less so in the implementation process. In 
terms of identifying metrics the following questions will be addressed:  
‘What metrics are adopted by Sweden and Taiwan for measuring success and 
achieving the objectives in terms of which the goal is defined?’ 
‘How do both countries justify these metrics?’ 
‘How do the metrics connect with the goal and objectives?’ 
 
In light of the criteria adopted by both selected states and the experience of other 
western transition cases, some of the metrics are likely to be similar, such as quantity 
and quality of recruitment and retention. Some metrics are rather case specific; for 
example, Sweden managed to phase out conscription within one year, but in Taiwan this 
will take five years. Also an important issue to address is that even the same metrics can 
be understood differently as the circumstances maybe different (e.g. NCO reform). 




Among all criteria, should states plan the budget first in order to finance the transition? 
Or should parliament amend the conscription laws and regulations first? 
 
3. Factors and conditions 
 
Factors and conditions are the facilitators or obstacles that could help or hinder the 
implementation process. For example, soldier’s motivation towards the military service 
and public support for the armed forces can potentially affect the AVF implementation 
results in terms of recruitment and retention. Another crucial factor would be finance as 
defence budget restraints could cause problems in implementation. Some factors are 
case specific; for example, legislation is crucial for Swedish reform, while old-styled 
management has damaged soldiers’ intention to retain in Taiwan’s armed forces. 
 
1.4 Case selection: why Sweden and Taiwan?   
 
This thesis adopts a comparative method in that the nature of thesis is based on two AVF 
transition cases. In general, Yin argued that case studies are the preferred strategy when 
‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over 
events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life 
context.76 In a comparative study, the selected cases must share some common features 
in order to generalise knowledge or facts on a particular issue. Taking this into account, 
Sweden and Taiwan are selected as both possess similar characteristics in terms of 
international security circumstances. Both have not joined any defence alliance and 
have faced a serious military threat in the past.77 Most importantly, in 2009 both 
coincidentally decided to suspend conscription and shift to AVF.  
 
Notwithstanding, the causes behind their decisions to shift to an AVF model seem to 
vary: changes to the international strategic environment, increased expeditionary 
missions and other political reasons triggered Sweden to reform, while domestic 
political and societal issues played a more important role in Taiwan’s AVF decision. In 
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addition, Sweden and Taiwan are quite different cases in terms of international political 
identity. Unlike Sweden and rest of the countries in the world, Taiwan is not recognised 
by the United Nations and international community as a fully-fledged state but rather a 
part of the PRC, and is subject to the complex status quo of a form of de facto 
independent state. Therefore, Taiwan’s armed forces have been banned from 
participating in any kind of international missions which other states with an AVF are 
designed to perform. Despite parallels and goals shared by both cases, the key factor 
should be focused on the differences in their objectives of AVF and metrics for 
implementation. 
 
Both Sweden and Taiwan represent good examples of the AVF transformation in their 
respective geographical regions; Sweden has become the first Scandinavian state while 
Taiwan is the first country in East Asia to suspend conscription after 1990. Through an 
East-West comparative analysis on AVF transition, it is possible that the western theory 
of the decline of the MAF when confronted with case in East Asia (Taiwan) can open 
some new perspectives of thinking on the AVF transition in Asia or even in the world. 
 
Parallels between two cases 
 
1. Non-participation in defence alliances  
 
The war in 1814 dissuaded Sweden from any future armed conflicts and was the basis 
of their neutrality policy. Owing to this policy, Sweden has managed to stay out of wars 
including two total wars for two centuries. Immediately after World War II, Sweden’s 
neutrality policy was based on maintaining a strong self-defence force. It entailed 
non-alignment in times of peace, with a view to remaining neutral in the event of war.78 
Hence, during the Cold War, Sweden intentionally kept a distance from NATO; the 
policy of military non-alliance has been considered to be the best security option for 
Sweden. The Swedes have been relying on themselves for their own national security 
and conscription system was considered the most suitable means to provide the 
manpower source for the Swedish armed forces.  
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In contrast to Sweden’s non-alignment policy, Taiwan has been eager to join the 
international community including participation of international defence alliances. 
Nonetheless, international reality and opposition from the PRC have prevented Taiwan 
from joining in most international organisations and defence alliances. In order to 
provide security against military threat from PRC, the military strategy of Taiwan 
always focuses on homeland defence and deterrence capability, and has been adopting 
conscription as the military manpower supply for over 60 years. Albeit de facto, Taiwan 
heavily depends on the ‘alliance’ with the US through the foreign military sales and 
other training programmes to acquire advanced defensive weapons.  
 
2. Facing military threats 
 
Both Sweden and Taiwan have had to confront a much larger military power in the past. 
Interestingly, the military threats which Sweden and Taiwan have faced are from former 
‘iron curtain’ states, Russia and China. Regardless of keeping neutral, Sweden still 
faced a military threat from Soviet Union during Cold War. Traditionally, Sweden was 
not covered by NATO’s protection umbrella; it had to rely on self defence through 
conscription and its own defence industries, and had even considered developing its 
own nuclear capability. Compared to other West European states, the decline of the 
MAF was relatively less evident in Sweden during and even after the Cold War era. 
After 1990, Russia underwent fundamental changes and reforms in a broad range of 
areas. As Russia becomes more stable, its conducts in terms of foreign, security and 
defence policies would become more predictable. Nevertheless, the post Cold War 
détente does not offer Sweden a security guarantee as it learned cruel lessons from 
neighbouring countries that Russia can launch ruthless attacks at any time. For example, 
the cyber attack on Estonia launched by Russia during April and May of 2007 aroused 
major concerns in Sweden as it feared it could be the next victim.79 This attack was a 
significant warning for Sweden; even though it currently faces no military threat to its 
territory, a similar cyber attack could cause significant damage and chaos to Sweden’s 
economy and social order. Another lesson that is of relevance is the Russian invasion of 
Georgia in 2008, which made it clear that Russia is willing to use force to deepen and 
promote its national interests. As the Russia-Georgia conflict demonstrates, military 
                                                     





force has once again become a major resort in Russia’s foreign policy.80 In addition, in 
recent years the competition over Arctic resources with Russia and other states has 
made Sweden uneasy. 
 
Taiwan has faced a military threat from China for over six decades. China has 
repeatedly claimed sovereignty over self-ruled Taiwan since 1949 and keeps threatening 
to use force if Taiwan moves from de facto to de jure independence. The security over 
the Taiwan Strait is based on the cross strait relations between two sides. In the past five 
years has seen a cross-strait détente due to Taiwan’s open and exchange policy with 
Beijing. However, this does not mean that threat from China has disappeared as China is 
unlikely to give up the ‘One China’ and ‘peaceful unification’ policies over Taiwan. 
China keeps expanding and advancing its armed forces, yet the defence budget has 
always been opaque. The military threat can be judged by the increasing number of 
Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan from some 500 in 2004 to over 1,400 in 2010.81 
Therefore, China still poses a significant military threat towards Taiwan. 
 
3. Coincidence of time: the key factor 
 
In March 2009, the Swedish Ministry of Defence proposed the Government Bill 
2008/09:140 entitled ‘A Functional Defence: a focus that extends over a five-year 
period 2010–2014’.82 The bill was passed (but only with a very small majority -153 for, 
150 against) by the Swedish parliament in June 2009, which led to the suspension of 
Sweden’s long-practised conscription. The bill also acknowledges the realities of 
today’s changing strategic environment and the requirements to build an expeditionary 
force which can immediately be deployed based on voluntary participation. More than a 
century-old institution of universal duty to serve in armed forces was suspended and 
will be launched only in a case of national defence emergency. The bill also emphasises 
that the recruiting system of the armed forces will be modernised so that voluntary 
participation can be the basis for providing personnel to the operational organisation 
rather than compulsory military service.83 
                                                     
80 Tsereteli, M 2009. ‘The Impact of the Russia-Georgia War on the South Caucasus Transportation 
Corridor’, Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C. 
81 Tsai, D, Chief of National Security Bureau, ROC, testified in the Legislative Yuan on 20 Oct 2010. 
82 Swedish Ministry of Defence 2009, ‘A Functional Defence’, Stockholm, Sweden, March. 




Shifting from conscription to AVF has been debated for a decade in Taiwanese society, 
and similar to the case of Spain, ending conscription was the election campaign 
promises of current president Ma. After assuming the presidency in May 2008, he 
reiterated this promise to replace conscription with an AVF within 4 to 6 years, 
indicating that he is determined to follow through with his pledge. Coincidentally at the 
same time (March 2009) when the Swedish government proposed the government bill, 
the Ministry of National Defense (MND) of Taiwan announced that conscription will be 
suspended and replaced by a relatively small AVF with a substantial military cut. The 
AVF is being implemented in a gradual manner, with the number of personnel recruited 
through a voluntary enlistment system increasing ten percent year-on-year from 2009 
with the hope of eventually achieving AVF by the end of 2014. 
 
These three factors justify the selection of these two cases. They provide a good 
opportunity to fill a knowledge gap in the literature of MAF. However, it should be 
noted that the analysis of this study may be relevant and can be applied to some cases, 
but does not mean it fits every country case. Instead, this study should serve as an 




Comparative case study 
 
The comparative case study method was adopted to analyse the concurrent AVF 
transformations in Sweden and Taiwan. It seeks to move beyond plain description by 
providing empirical evidence drawn from across states to systematically compare core 
issues of the AVF transition. Comparative cases studies on the decline of MAF and AVF 
transitions have been widely conducted in the past decades by military sociologists 
mainly focusing on West European states and the US. For example, Kelleher 
investigated the mass armies in the 1970s concentrating on six west European states.84 
Burk compared the experience of the UK, France, West Germany and the US and 
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concluded that western industrial countries had shifted away from the MAF to the 
force-in-being. Sorensen used the Democrat-Deterrence-Deployment model to analyse 
the changes in conscription in three Scandinavian countries: Sweden, Denmark and 
Norway.85 Van der Meulen and Manigart compared and analysed the process of AVF 
transitions in Belgium and the Netherlands.86 Leander conducted a comparative study 
on Swedish and French military reforms.87 
 
The comparative method is effective in overcoming false universalism in which 
conclusions drawn exclusively from one state.88 Through paired comparison, this thesis 
sheds light on different processes with similar states where certain factors are controlled 
to better analyse others. Moskos pointed out that the opportunity to explore the 
characteristics and dynamics of European armed forces and society makes a 
comparative method an appropriate approach.89 According to Burk, adopting 
case-oriented comparative methods is important to explain the variation in patterns of 
national adherence to conscription.90 As Sweden and Taiwan coincidently decided to 
suspend conscription and share some similar features, they lend themselves very well to 
a dual case study; therefore, the comparative method is adopted. 
 
Interviews and documentary analysis 
 
Opinions and experiences from those who specialise in the issues surrounding military 
manpower (e.g. defence decision makers and military experts) are essential to this study. 
The interview results provide a more in-depth analysis than mere document analysis and 
literature review; they also generate important data and information which cannot be 
found in other methods such as archives, documents and media. For example, the 
motivation of government departments can be obtained through interviewing defence 
officials; while journalists’ views somewhat reflect public opinion. To collect 
documents, archives and to conduct interviews, four field trips were made to Sweden 
and two trips to Taiwan. 
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In terms of data collection in Sweden, being a foreign postgraduate student, it would be 
difficult to build a contact network for interviews without assistance from a local 
coordinator, especially interviewing military personnel in the conservative environment 
of the armed forces. Apart from four fieldtrips to Sweden for conducting interviews and 
data collection, the author also participated in meetings hosted by War Studies 
Department to discuss defence reform issues with Swedish experts. With respect to 
Taiwan, the author’s military background makes it less complicated to contact and 
arrange interviews with officials and members of the transition team from the MND. 
Other interviewees include the legislator of the defence committee, defence journalists, 
defence analysts and scholars, NCOs and volunteer soldiers. To explore the hands on 
experience of those who have either actually participated or specialised on the issues of 
AVF transition, interviews were carried out in a semi-structured form. Due to the high 
English proficiency of Swedish people, interviews were conducted in English; whereas 
in Taiwan, Chinese mandarin was the language used to conduct interviews. 
 
Documentary analysis includes finding significant information embedded in the 
documents of relevant issues on conscription and AVF transition in Sweden and Taiwan. 
Information related to this issue is obtained from documents such as memos, records, 
government reports, archives, and policy statements. Archives from Taiwan’s MND, 
Swedish Ministry of Defence, other government agencies and think tanks, together with 
official documents, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review, Defense White Papers, 
Annual Report of the Swedish Armed Forces and Swedish Government Bills have 
contributed to the triangulation of data and increased the reliability of this study. In 
addition, existing studies will also be used to support the empirical evidence.   
 
Cross-national survey 
A cross-national survey, in which the author was involved, was organised and carried 
out by the Swedish National Defence College.91 This survey takes a close look at 
soldiers’ motivation, perceptions, satisfaction and self-evaluations on various issues in 
both armed forces. The survey was conducted in March and April 2011. Data were 
obtained from the structured questionnaire with close-ended questions designed by the 
                                                     




Swedish National Defence College.92 The questionnaire is divided into four parts: Part 
I focuses on respondents’ demographic data including age, gender, education, branch 
and service type; second part measures soldiers’ personal attitudes toward the quality of 
basic military training and factors that influence soldiers’ decision to join and extend the 
voluntary service.93 The third part investigates how the surrounding environment affect 
the willingness of volunteer soldiers to both join and remain in the military, what are 
their self-identities as soldiers, and how they perceive the situation in the military and 
their job satisfaction. The final part explores their perception of military values and their 
intention to extend the service. As respondents’ perceptions are abstract and difficult to 
quantify, the Likert Scale was adopted to divide questions from five to ten scales 
depending on types of questions. The survey evaluates the motivation of volunteer 
soldiers, which associates with the important metric of success: the quality of recruits. 
Despite sufficient quantity and good quality of soldiers, the AVF would not be fully 
competent if soldiers are not highly motivated. 
1.6 Outline of Chapters 
The outline of the chapters is based on the two theoretical perspectives outlined earlier. 
The first two chapters, namely the literature review and the background and context of 
cases, are based on the first theoretical approach as it identifies the research question 
and sets up the context of the thesis. The remaining chapters focus on empirical analysis 
of the AVF implementation in both countries. In light of the second theoretical 
approach as the theoretical foundation, these chapters examine and analyse the goals 
and objectives, metrics, and conditions and factors of the AVF implementation in both 
countries. Based on lessons and experiences of previous AVF cases in western countries, 
the second approach serves as the chief part of thesis in which empirical analyses are 
carried out. It is thus useful to find out whether the lessons drawn from previous AVF 
cases were learnt, studied or copied by the two selected countries. The two theoretical 
perspectives discussed in this chapter identify the key research question: Why the MAF 
literature still has a gap and what is needed in order to bridge the gap? It also explains 
the main focus of the thesis, which is less the decision to move to an AVF and more on 
how that decision has been implemented and with what degree of success.  
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Having reviewed the literature of MAF and previous AVF cases, Chapter Two describes 
the historical, political and strategic contexts and evolution of conscription in Sweden 
and Taiwan; it then discusses the causes of decisions to shift to AVF and formation of 
AVF policy. The causes of change will be explained through the Approach I, the decline 
of MAF; arguments made by MAF writers, particularly Haltiner and Burk, will be 
drawn for explanation. 
 
Chapters Three, Four and Five form the empirical trilogy of the thesis, which focus on 
three elements of this thesis: goals, metrics, and conditions respectively. Chapter Three 
examines the first element, the goal and objectives of AVF. How do both countries 
define their goals for AVF? What are the specific objectives of AVF that both Sweden 
and Taiwan are trying to achieve? What particular types of AVF are Sweden and Taiwan 
trying to build? Then it will start to look at each comparative variable and identify the 
similarities and differences of the AVF objectives between two cases. The link between 
MAF and the goal will be discussed with focus on how threat perception, domestic 
politics and public support affect the goal that both countries constructed? Chapter Four 
identifies and examines the second element, metrics for a successful transition. It 
intends to answer the following questions: What metrics are adopted by Sweden and 
Taiwan for measuring success and achieving the objectives in terms of which the goal is 
defined. How do both countries justify these metrics? What are the factors that 
determine how well both countries do to get from decision to the successful transition? 
And finally how do the metrics connect with the goal? Chapter Five explores the factors 
and conditions. Conditions will be divided into positive, negative and neutral factors. 
This chapter will attempt to hypothesise the factors that either facilitate or hinder in 
achieving the metrics for successful transition.  
 
Chapter Six is an integrated comparison of two cases which comprehensively evaluates 
the results of AVF implementation, and attempts to find out: Have both countries 
achieved their goals and objectives so far? And what obstacles, challenges and problems 
have Sweden and Taiwan faced in the AVF implementation? Chapter Seven is the 
concluding chapter which will provide an evaluation of how likely the efforts of both 
countries to achieve their goals and objectives for all-volunteer force will be successful 










Background and Context of Sweden and Taiwan 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The ‘final decline’ of mass armed forces has been identified in the previous chapter as 
an overarching trend in the wake of the end of the Cold War, especially in the West. Two 
cases reflecting this trend, Sweden and Taiwan share several characteristics in terms of 
their position in international affairs. Both armed forces have undergone similar 
organisational restructuring in the past decade. Similarities can be found in their 
strategic postures as both countries have not joined any defensive alliance such as 
NATO, have faced a serious military threat in the past, and have continued to rely on 
conscription for two decades after the end of Cold War. Finally, both have decided in 
2009 to do away with conscription. 
 
Nevertheless, the reasons for their decisions on AVF transformations are different: the 
changed international strategic environment, mitigated military threat and increasing 
international missions, non-universal conscription, and factors of economic efficiency, 
encouraged Sweden to pursue defence reform. On the other hand, improved cross-strait 
relations with China, and apparent domestic political, social and economic efficiency 
played a more important role in Taiwan’s AVF decision. Both cases share different 
backgrounds in other important aspects such as weight of history, political calculations, 
and social changes. A fundamental distinction concerns international political identity. 
Unlike Sweden, which is a normal state with full sovereignty, Taiwan can only be 
considered a quasi-sovereign state in that it is not recognised by the UN and the 
international community as a fully-fledged state but is formally seen rather as a part of 
the PRC. However, both countries represent good examples of the AVF transformation 
in their respective geographical regions. It is, therefore important, to review the 
background and contexts of both cases, and to discuss the reasons behind their AVF 
decisions. This could help discussion of these issues and principles of their defence 




This chapter reviews and discusses the background of the armed forces and conscription 
in both countries in terms of following themes: the history and legal basis of 
conscription, military threats and strategic environment, defence policy and reform, and 
domestic and international factors that influenced the AVF decision. It then explores 
how the armed forces in both countries have adapted to the new strategic environment 
and transformed their personnel structure. 
2.2 Sweden 
2.2.1 Historical context: Swedish defence and conscription 
While many western states have abolished conscription since the end of Cold War, 
Sweden, along with a handful of other countries, maintained conscription for 20 years in 
the post-Cold War era. Conscription played a central role in Sweden’s defence policy 
for over a century and has been widely considered to be essential for guaranteeing the 
security of the Swedish ‘people’s home’ (Folkhemmet) and the credibility of Sweden’s 
neutrality abroad.94 The concepts of people’s home and neutrality are two essential 
elements of the Swedish national identity. 
 
The weight of history made conscription an important aspect of Sweden’s defence 
policy. It was based on the involvement of all young, healthy males in the military at 
some period in their lives and had been in effect since 1812.95 In line with neutrality 
and military non-alignment, conscription underpinned Sweden’s successful strategy of 
avoiding wars for two centuries, including two world wars. On the other hand, due to its 
non-alignment policy, theoretically Sweden was not protected by NATO’s collective 
security mechanism, and thus was supposed to confront the Soviet Union alone during 
the Cold War. Upholding its non-aligned status entailed a high degree of self-reliance 
for defence and a credible defence industrial base (DIB) to design and produce weapons 
such as jets, tanks and submarines. Sweden’s defence model, similar to Switzerland, 
which was subject to strictly maintaining neutrality and compulsory military system, 
was unique in the western world and successfully provided security for the Swedish 
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people throughout the entire Cold War era. The peculiar geostrategic background and 
neutrality backed by conscription have made the decline of mass armed forces less 
evident in Sweden compared with other West European states.  
 
The deeper roots of Sweden’s military system can be traced back to the age of the 
Swedish empire (1561–1721); since which time Sweden has kept a distinctive and 
unique military system. Foghelin argues that the Swedish defence during the Cold War 
era relied on four ‘pillars’ which not only consolidated the Swedish national identity, but 
ensured peace and security to Swedish people.96 These pillars are: 
1. ‘The concept of “total defence”, meaning all societal functions should support 
national defence. Both military personnel and civilians should bear the defence duty 
and be prepared for defence tasks.  
2. A conscription system, the mainstay of military manpower.  
3. Non-alignment in peace-time and maintaining neutrality during war-time. 
4. An advanced indigenous defence industrial base.’ 
 
These pillars are discussed below. 
Concept of total defence and conscription 
Sweden’s conscription was based on the concept of total defence, and this concept has 
been broadly perceived as an important way to protect the Swedish ‘People’s Home’ 
and emphasised the importance of general conscription, voluntary organisations and the 
armed forces. Total defence was composed of both military and civilian defence 
organisations and, through the Total Defence Duty Act, all Swedish residents aged from 
16 to 70 were obliged to defend the country through various forms of duty.97 The 
principal task of military defence was to be able to engage in armed conflicts in order to 
protect the integrity of Sweden’s territory and immediate environment. 
During the 17th and early 18th century, Sweden was one of the first European countries 
to shift from local militia system that was inherited from the Middle Ages to national 
forms of conscription.98 An allotment-militia system was adopted in the late 17th 
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century which not only supplied soldiers for the armed forces until the end of the 19th 
century, but also contributed to people’s acceptance of the military. Having practiced 
the militia system for centuries, Sweden for the first time introduced conscription in 
1812 in which members of the male cohort between age 20 and 25 were drafted. 
However, conscription was not carried out in a universal format so not every man was 
called up to serve. Learning from the successful experience of the Prussian 
conscript-based army during the Franco-Prussian war in 1871, in the late 19th century, 
general conscription became a necessity in Europe if a country wanted to defend itself 
from land based powers. Under this strategic environment, Sweden was no exception 
and conscription was kept in practice. However, the Swedish government worried that 
universal conscription could make the military too powerful and thus feared military 
subversion, that conscription was made non-universal.99 It was not until the universal 
conscription launched in 1901 that every man within the draft age between 21 to 40 was 
obliged to serve in the military.100 
The Swedish government demanded that ‘a strong popular engagement was the 
precondition if society was to be equipped to handle and resist serious threats, risks and 
pressures in both peace and war.’101 To transform this idea into practice, the ‘Total 
Defence Duty Act’ (totalförsvarsplikt) was introduced in 1994 and extended to all 
Swedish citizens (including women) and all foreign residents who have lived more than 
5 years in Sweden have to perform duties in relation to national defence. Nevertheless, 
in reality only men were drafted; women were not obliged to serve compulsory service 
but could volunteer to be conscripts. In a culturally diversified Swedish society, the 
1994 ‘Total Defence Duty Act’ redefined and re-thought the relationship between state, 
society, and the military.102 
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After the Total Defence Duty Act took effect, all citizens aged from 16 to 70 were 
required to contribute defence duty which could be performed in a civilian, military and 
voluntary capacity should Sweden be invaded. The act also signalled that the old 
defence duty was undergoing a change. An evident part was the reduction in the 
proportion of the youth cohort to be drafted. For example, in 1996 a total of 31,000 men 
were drafted out of an annual cohort of about 50,000; the number dropped to 17,000 in 
2001, and further down to 8,000-10,000 in 2005-7. This meant that while 63% of the 
male cohort in 1996 (dropped from above 80% during the cold war) were summoned 
for military service, only 17 % were actually called up in 2005, showing a significant 
decline.103 This phenomenon generated a legitimacy issue with regard to compulsory 
military service that was no longer universal. In several Western countries, the 
inequality of compulsory service was one of the main reasons that caused the abolition 
of conscription. For example, the non-universal conscription in the US during the 1960s 
incurred serious criticism of its legitimacy, as many people questioned ‘Who shall serve 
when not all serve?’104 The equity issues were also found in France; during the 1990s, a 
substantial reduction was recorded among those finally called to serve.105 While as high 
as 78% of those with a college degree managed to avert military service, it was no 
longer able to justify the legitimacy and equality of conscription.106 
In light of the increasing international peacekeeping missions, the total defence act did 
not assume that the primary duties of the armed forces were only to defend Swedish 
territory but involved missions abroad. Having defined and stipulated the source of 
defence manpower, the ‘total defence duty’ concept also expanded and diversified the 
recruiting pool of the armed forces by promoting the participation of women, 
immigrants, as well as homosexual people in the armed forces and moving away from 
stereotyped identities, thus reflecting a change in the perception of social hierarchies. In 
addition, a redefinition of the link between rights and duties was reflected in the idea of 
‘total defence duty’. The concept and value of performing compulsory military service 
as an exchange for political rights has gradually vanished in Swedish society, and the 
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focus is rather on individual rights that are not dependent upon a military 
contribution.107 
The 1994 Act restructured the military personnel system by not just expanding the 
recruitment pool but providing the means for drafting privileged, educated social groups 
into the armed forces when and if they were needed. It offered the armed forces the 
choice to decide who was suitable for active service. Leander argued that, in principle, 
the 1994 ‘total defence duty’ may have been more encompassing than the definition of 
its predecessor the 1901 law on defence duty because more diversified groups of people 
are required to serve.108 Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, in practice fewer men had 
been drafted by the armed forces. Leander thus identified two problems of this revised 
concept of ‘total defence duty’:109 ‘1. The reduced numbers for compulsory service 
would make the total defence duty seem unfair and arbitrary. 2. It would reduce the 
importance attached to defence issues in society at large.’ 
Conscription has successfully fulfilled its mission by staffing the Swedish armed forces 
to defend the country throughout the 20th century, including two world wars and the 
Cold War. Public support towards conscription in Sweden was relatively positive during 
the Cold War era. Based on polls conducted in the 1990s, Leander observed a steady 
majority of Swedes supporting conscription. Between 1980 and 1991, polls showed that 
an average of 86% of Swedish population favoured a conscription based army over an 
AVF.110 However, this high support of conscription started to fall since the 2000s. The 
2002 opinion polls showed that only a slight majority (52%) of the public supported 
conscription, and 41% favoured an AVF. In 2003, another poll reflected that support for 
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Neutrality and Non-alignment policy 
Without an appreciation of Sweden’s neutrality and non-alignment policy, it is difficult 
to see the whole picture of Swedish defence policy. Neutrality is a foreign policy 
whereby states aim to maintain a neutral status in case wars break out in the region. 
Through non-participation in international defence alliances, military non-alignment is 
how a state implements its neutrality policy. In Sweden it has been intertwined with its 
neutrality policy since the end of World War II and throughout the entire Cold War 
period. Upholding military non-alignment means ‘non-participation in military alliances 
with other states in peacetime in order to claim and maintain the status of neutrality in 
the event of war’.112 Akin to Switzerland, being neutral entailed a strong and 
self-contained military defence. Swedish neutrality relied on keeping a capable 
conscription-based defence force in order to deter a potential invasion from the Soviet 
Union. During its heyday, theoretically, the total defence based Swedish armed forces 
were able to mobilise up to 800,000 troops in case war broke out.113  
After 1989, West European countries started to abolish conscription and shift to the AVF. 
Sweden did not immediately follow suit because it did not feel that the possibility of 
Russian invasion could be totally ruled out. Following Sweden’s entry into the EU in 
1995, the situation changed when the 1995/96 Defence Resolution dictated a reduction 
in appropriations in defence and a change in military tasks. The transformation in 
defence tasks coincided with France’s announcement of its decision to move to an AVF 
in February 1996. Although there was no direct link between France’s AVF decision and 
Swedish calculations, it influenced Sweden to participate in more international missions. 
Ann Leander compared the abolition and retention of conscription in France and 
Sweden respectively and commented that ‘the most common interpretation of these 
contrasting fates is that France has already walked a path that Sweden will soon have to 
take.’114 This was more likely due to the increasingly expeditionary orientation of 
Swedish thinking in defence.115 
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After the mid-1990s, Swedish political elites perceived the possibility of military 
invasion from Russia to have gradually diminished and it was thus possible to engage in 
more international peace operations. Sweden started to shift its defence paradigm from 
territorial defence to international missions because the EU served as an important 
platform for multi-national military collaborations. The traditional concept of 
maintaining a large force for territorial defence was losing its influence and raison 
d’etre.  
Although military non-alignment remained an important element in Swedish foreign 
and defence policy, being an EU member requires Sweden to provide a military 
contribution to its defence. Unlike NATO which is a military actor led by the US, and 
although the EU is not a major military actor, it has its own security mechanism. 
Furthermore, the Swedish armed forces have been involving in peacekeeping operations 
under NATO auspices in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya, and regularly 
participating in manoeuvres with other countries within the Partnership for Peace 
framework. Sweden’s increasing involvement in international operations has gradually 
eroded its neutrality policy. In light of this, in April 2001 Swedish foreign minister 
Anna Lindh publicly announced that Sweden would no longer call itself a neutral 
state.116 Therefore, one of the main tasks of the Swedish armed forces in the years to 
come is to proactively take part in international peacekeeping/support operations. 
Nevertheless, it was not efficient to use conscripts abroad, as they always needed to 
volunteer and undergo special training before they were allowed to perform 
international missions and Sweden has been no exception.117 
Defence Industrial Base (DIB) 
The last pillar supporting Swedish defence system relates to its indigenous defence 
industrial base (DIB), which can be traced back to when Sweden was a more active and 
influential European military power. During the Second World War when Sweden was 
cut off from foreign imports because of its neutrality status, the defence industry had 
become self-sufficient, and since then it had developed to the present scale. During the 
Cold War, Sweden's military non-alignment policy entailed a strong DIB to meet its 
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arms requirements.118 Due to a relatively small population but a rather large 
geographical area, the Swedish defence opted for variety and quality in the development 
of defence equipment. Ranging from rifles to fast jets and submarines, the unique 
Swedish DIB has met the arms needs of the armed forces.  
After the end of Cold War, difficulties in Sweden’s DIB started to loom. The reduced 
threat level led to a cut in defence expenditure and the size of the armed forces. With the 
decrease in domestic weapon demands, internationalisation to extend sales of weapons 
abroad was viewed as a more promising option in order to keep its DIB surviving. 
However, it requires increased international co-operation due to the principle of 
reciprocity.119 Since the mid-1990s, Sweden has exported weapons to some 35-40 
countries annually.120 Another key dimension of DIB is to maintain the capacity and 
know-how of weapon technology. Although internationalisation of DIB is a 
supplementary but useful method, the core strategy still relies on government’s decision 
to keep the DIB by purchasing domestic arms. This was reflected in the 2009 defence 
bill which guaranteed the higher priority of acquiring domestic weapons such as the 
purchase of Gripen. However, questions can be raised about whether the budget for the 
new generation Gripen would compromise the finance for AVF transition? On the other 
hand, given the fact that the objective of AVF is to build a professional and high-tech 
military, would Sweden’s DIB influence the success of its AVF transition?121 
2.2.2 Post-Cold War Era 
 
Even though the strategic environment changed significantly after 1990, owing to its 
geographical proximity to Russia, Sweden did not radically reform the format of 
military personnel system. As discussed in Chapter one, Haltiner argued that states 
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closer to the border of hostile states are more cautious about changing priorities in 
defence structure. Furthermore, the consensus politics in Sweden made defence reform 
even more difficult at least until the recent conservative alliance formed the government 
in 2006.122 Boene et al. pointed out that Sweden underwent a difficult time in adjusting 
to the post-Cold War era. They identified the following factors that affected defence 
reform in Sweden: ‘the end of the standoff between East and West blocs and the 
substantial reduction in military threat which for a long time had structured force 
configuration, civil-military relations, societal cohesion and national identity’.123 These 
factors have facilitated significant changes in the structure of armed forces which 
include, as they suggested, actively taking part in international peace operations, and 
giving up the mass army format by streamlining and downsizing the armed forces.  
Although little in the way of reform took place in the early 1990s, changes occurred in 
the late 1990s. The 1995/96 defence bill had for the first time identified the post-Cold 
War changes in international strategic environment and observed that, while the threat 
from Russia had substantially reduced, regional conflicts and the new transnational 
threats could pose a challenge to Sweden’s security. In addition to territorial defence, 
based on the concept of reciprocity in which helping other states should lead to 
receiving support in return, the bill demanded Swedish defence policy to increasingly 
focus on participation in international peacekeeping/support operations. Ten years after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, in light of the participation in UN operations abroad and the 
absence of a significant territorial military threat, the defence bill (1999/2000:30) 
entitled ‘The New Defence’, offered clear direction in adjusting the Swedish armed 
forces to the post-Cold War strategic environment. It stipulated four main tasks: 
defending Sweden against armed attack; upholding Sweden’s territorial integrity; 
contributing to peace and security abroad; and strengthening the Swedish society in case 
of severe challenge in peacetime.124 
The 1999/2000 defence bill facilitated another defence reform by emphasising the 
importance of international military co-operation.125 With this renewed bill, Sweden 
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aimed to enhance its military co-operation with the Nordic countries within the 
frameworks of Partnership for Peace (PFP), and with other western states under the 
frameworks of UN, EU, OSCE and NATO. More importantly, the bill demanded a new 
personnel concept which required a higher proportion of volunteer soldiers in order to 
perform expeditionary missions. In other words, the 1999/2000 bill signalled that 
Sweden should consider ending conscription.  
NATO: Sensitive issue 
Even though Sweden has not sought formal membership of NATO, there is no doubt 
that NATO has been influential on Swedish strategy both during and after the Cold War. 
Without NATO to counterbalance the Soviet Union during Cold War, Sweden’s 
neutrality and non-alignment would have been difficult to sustain. The Swedes have 
long been reluctant to have formal membership of NATO for obvious reason – it would 
damage Sweden’s non-aligned status, even 20 years after the end of Cold War. 
However, Sweden has been actively participating in NATO-led operations. For example, 
participation of PFP in 1994 was the first time that Sweden was brought into military 
co-operation under a NATO mandate. In 1995, Sweden also decided to take part in 
IFOR in Bosnia under a NATO mandate. While the option of NATO membership 
remains a political taboo and has low public support, Sweden has gradually extended its 
co-operation and interaction with NATO in an increasing number of fields, including 
ISAF in 2003.  
Carrying out NATO missions is an important move for non-aligned Sweden. The 
strategic concepts, military doctrines, compatibility and standards of NATO for 
peacekeeping/support operations have become new military and strategic guidelines for 
Swedish armed forces. These NATO concepts have driven the Swedish armed forces to 
reorganise in directions totally different from its old Cold War thinking and 
configuration, which was based on an exclusive Swedish national profile with 
indigenous doctrines together with Swedish designed weapon systems.126  In other 
                                                     





words, through collaboration with multi-national missions, the “interoperability” of 
Swedish armed forces has been improved greatly.127 
After the Kosovo crisis in 1999, even though Swedes realised the importance of 
developing European crisis management capabilities, it did not persuade Sweden to join 
NATO. The Kosovo crisis offered many useful lessons on how NATO was maintaining 
its stable and central position in the European security order. However, for Sweden, 
non-alignment and neutrality was still regarded as an asset rather than a burden due to 
its strategic culture and weight of history based on two centuries of peace. Participating 
in missions under the UN and EU mandate is more legitimate and convincing in terms 
of domestic public opinion than those under NATO. Although the Kosovo crisis 
indicated that Sweden may be willing to compromise ideals with reality, it still prefers 
that both the EU and NATO should have a UN mandate for their peacekeeping/support 
operations.  
The UN mandate may appear important both for the reason of integrating Russia under 
the UN framework, and for creating an international system based on common 
norms.128 Therefore, despite increasing co-operation with NATO, acquiring NATO 
membership has not been on the agenda in Swedish politics. It would be difficult to 
reach agreement in the environment of consensus politics, which is an obstacle to 
change. The domestic debate on the NATO membership has thus been sensitive and 
cautious. In short, with regard to the co-operation with NATO, everything else other 
than joining it formally as a member seems to be acceptable. Sweden will practically 
keep working with NATO without a de jure membership, at least for the next 10 
years.129 
International missions 
The fundamental proposition of participating in international missions is to build 
security together with other states. To stress this fact, Sweden introduces a solidarity 
clause for the EU and the Nordic countries; the clause states:  
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‘Sweden will not remain passive if a catastrophe or an attack should hit another member country or 
Nordic country. We expect these countries to act similarly should Sweden is under attack.’130 
To comply with the solidarity clause, Sweden must possess the capacity and political 
will to provide military support to other countries. The clause is based on the concept of 
reciprocity, indicating that Sweden is willing to risk damaging its long tradition of 
military non-alignment in exchange of mutual assistance from allied states in case of 
war. This means that neutrality is unlikely to withstand conflict in the nearby region. 
Thus, since Sweden joined EU in 1995, the possibility of maintaining neutral status 
started to wane, especially after the solidarity clause took effect. However, compared 
with the issues of NATO membership, domestic debate on this shift in doctrine has been 
politically less controversial and rather supportive.131 
An international mission is less controversial and more acceptable if it can be flagged as 
a UN one. For example, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is led by NATO 
but established by the UN Security Council. In 1996, Sweden deployed a battalion for 
the first time on the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1999, 
Sweden decided to provide a mechanised company and support units to the 
peacekeeping force in Kosovo. The 1999 decision was the watershed which shifted 
Swedish defence strategy and concept from territorial defence to an expeditionary 
orientation. The largest international mission in post Cold-War era was launched in 
2003: some 500 personnel have been working alongside allied forces as part of the 
ISAF in Afghanistan. In April 2011, Sweden joined the Operation Unified Protector 
(OUP), the NATO military operation in Libya under UN Security Council Resolutions 
1970 and 1973. The Swedish Air Force deployed eight Gripen aircraft to enforce the 
no-fly zone over Libya.132 
As of August 2013, Sweden is currently performing peacekeeping operations in Kosovo 
and Afghanistan. In the light of its international military experience, an issue should be 
addressed regarding the future missions. As performing international peacekeeping 
mission is the main driver of the Swedish AVF transition, it would be difficult to justify 
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the force transformation if there were no peace-enforcement or peace-keeping missions 
with which to be involved. Therefore, the withdrawal of ISAF from Afghanistan in 
2014 might lead to insufficient missions for designed force structure and thus 
generating a further question: Will Sweden be willing to participate in 
Afghanistan-styled kinetic operations again in the future? Or rather will it opt for 
counter-piracy and Libya-styled missions, that is, without significant ‘boots on the 
ground’? This is a challenge for Sweden as its current defence reform significantly 
focuses on international missions. Without proper international missions, the legitimacy 
of its AVF transformation could be jeopardized. 
2.2.3 Political and strategic context:  
Perception of Russia 
After 1990, Russia’s military capability went into decline. On the other hand, Russia’s 
foreign and defence policies were then considered to be more transparent and consistent 
than they were during the previous Cold War decade. The continued economic 
development in Russia and its increasing collaboration with the western world during 
1990-2000 contributed to the stability in Sweden and Scandinavian Peninsula. Despite 
the détente in strategic environment and reduced military threat from Russia, it was not 
until the turn of the 21st century that Swedes began to feel Russia had become more 
predictable and less threatening. According to Government Bill 1999/2000:30, Sweden 
has first time described its emancipation from the tension of Cold War and Russian 
threat.133 
Unfortunately, this emancipation did not last long. Since Vladmir Putin took office as 
Russian president in 2000, his anti-Western ideology has caused some concerns in 
Sweden.134 The 2008 aftermath of Russian invasion over Georgia deepened its worry. 
The Georgian war and Putin-styled governance have proved that Russia can still be 
pictured as a hostile state. Fears of a resurgent Russian military power after the 
Georgian War have ignited some critics in Stockholm to call for a return to a territorial 
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defence posture.135 On the other hand, the increased importance of the Arctic and 
Barents Sea regions also attracts Sweden’s attention as the abundant natural resources 
such as oil and natural gas make the Arctic Circle a strategically important region.136 
The competition for resources in this region is becoming more intense, and therefore 
Sweden does not rule out the possibility of future confrontation with Russia over this 
issue. The former supreme commander of Swedish Armed Forces Hakan Syrén thus 
warned that ‘it would be unwise to build our security policy on a one-sided positive 
assumption about the international development’.137 
2.2.4 Defence Transformation since the Cold War  
Defence Reform 
The Swedish armed forces had already undergone reform before the government 
decided to suspend conscription; therefore the reform should be discussed as part of the 
wider context of AVF transformation. Defence reform in Sweden since the end of Cold 
War has come a long way after an initial decade of slow pace of change. The peculiar 
historical and geostrategic background prevented Swedish armed forces from immediate 
transformation during the early post-Cold War era. It waited ten years for the 1999 
government bill (1999/2000:30) to shift its defence concept from an invasion-based to a 
mission-based expeditionary defence.  
After the September 11th attack in 2001, the Swedish government further realised that 
the threats of terrorism and intra-state conflicts had replaced the conventional Cold-War 
type of confrontation and the concept of what Sir Rupert Smith calls ‘industrial war’.138 
Missions in the past decade also show that there have been fewer traditional state on 
state wars but more multi-national operations, thus underline the importance of 
international military co-operation. To deal with new types of war, the old territorial 
defence concept thus needed to be shifted to an expeditionary, flexible and usable force 
concept. In fact, the reform was within the framework of conscription; while still based 
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on conscription, the defence reform since late 1990s has seen significant development in 
terms of outward strategy and less territorial defence.  
Since 1901, the conscription system in Sweden not only staffed the armed forces, but 
also functioned as a manpower pool for Swedish armed forces to acquire quality 
contract soldiers (other states call them volunteers or professionals). This was similar to 
Germany where conscription was seen as an ideal way to obtain quality volunteer 
soldiers after they had served. With proper training and selection, on average the 
contract soldiers recruited from conscripts were better than those recruited from the 
open market. However, Sweden’s outward strategic focus has made conscription 
inefficient and less useful to acquire a large number of soldiers who can be deployed for 
international operations on short notice. In addition, when less than 20% of male youth 
cohorts were actually drafted, the fairness of conscription thus faced increasing pressure 
and could no longer be achieved.  
As the defence orientation shifted towards a more expeditionary posture, more 
volunteers were needed so they could be efficiently deployed abroad. Therefore a mixed, 
two-tier system had gradually formed composed of one tier of conscripts for territorial 
defence and another tier of volunteers to be deployed for international missions. 
Another benefit of the two-tier system was that volunteers could be recruited from the 
conscript pool. This two-tier system along with the military downsizing has gradually 
transformed the de jure general conscription into a de facto volunteer force system.  
In the domestic context, western armed forces have faced increasing budget pressures 
amid the downward trend of military establishment. Swedish armed forces have 
encountered the same situation. The economic calculation has also played a role in the 
Swedish AVF decision, although this issue was not as prominently discussed as those of 
the international and security factors. By the same token, from a wider societal 
perspective, the value for money (or opportunity costs) of the individual young men 
who were selected for service should be considered. Therefore, the issue of economic 







The Non Commissioned Officer (NCO) corps is the backbone of the armed forces and is 
crucial in executing military orders and training soldiers. Before discussing the NCO 
issue it is important to identify the role of NCO. While the commissioned officer leads, 
commands, directs and sets the strategy, the NCO organises and administers and the 
soldier executes. The NCOs carry out the middle management of the armed forces and 
increasingly take on an executive management function.139 
Sweden abolished the NCO system in 1983 and is now bringing this system back along 
with its AVF implementation. In the 1970s the Swedish government decided to reform 
the officer corps because the class system in the officer corps did not conform to the 
egalitarian concept which was deeply rooted in the Swedish society.140 In addition, due 
to the pressure from the union movement, which aimed to merge its organisations in the 
public sector, in 1983 the Swedish government combined two categories of officer 
systems into one unified officer corps, and disbanded the NCO corps. Swedish armed 
forces thus became the first military in the world without an NCO corps. 
The result was not so successful. Without NCOs, officers were required to carry out the 
NCO’s tasks - detailed management in training and organising. The confusion of officer 
and NCO tasks had compromised the capability of the armed forces. Aselius identified 
that officers who command and lead operations are not necessarily qualified to be 
instructors or technical specialists; lack of professional specialisation among command 
personnel has eroded the quality and efficiency at all levels of the Swedish armed 
forces.141 In addition to performing mixed roles, Swedish officers are also required to 
absorb a very diverse spectrum of knowledge. The former Commandant of the Swedish 
National Defence College Karlis Neretnieks observes that there has been a wider range 
of military and non-military specialised knowledge provided for the professional officer 
in which he refers to as the ‘tree of knowledge’.142 With so much to learn, officers 
therefore do not have time to develop experience in leadership and simultaneously to 
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deal with middle management and further to specialize in a specific military skill. 
Especially under the AVF context, the mixing of roles has prevented both officers and 
NCOs from carrying out their roles properly. This problem can also be observed in 
Taiwan; the difference is that it was not an egalitarian ideology that led to the 
development. 
The consequence is that training and many of the command functions have to be 
entrusted to soldiers themselves. Dandeker suggests that, for officers to focus on their 
field of professional competence, in an AVF it is essential that a cadre of NCOs is 
created who are able to supervise other ranks and deliver sub-tactical effects.143 A new 
category of military personnel called ‘specialist officers’ similar to NCOs has thus been 
planned in its personnel reform. Since July, 2011, the newly created specialist officers 
are trained in the Military Academy in Halmstad rather than the Swedish National 
Defence College. 
 2009 Government bill: a significant personnel reform in recent decades 
Two decades after the end of Cold War, in 2009, Sweden eventually decided to suspend 
conscription. It was also the first Scandinavian country to shift its armed forces to an 
AVF system. The new personnel system was described in the Government Bill 
2008/09:140 titled ‘A Functional Defence’, which was announced in March 2009. The 
2009 bill was based on broad agreement reached by the Defence Commission which 
extend across seven political parties. When Defence Minister Sten Tolgfors presented 
this bill, he described the bill as ‘the largest renewal of the Swedish armed forces in 
many decades’.144 
The 2009 bill sets two phases to complete the military personnel reform. The first phase 
started in 2009 and will be completed by 2014. During this phase, conscription ended in 
July 2010. The second phase will start from 2015 and end in 2019; one important task 
will be accomplished by the end of this phase. The overseas missions will be conducted 
by 1,700 personnel for continuous engagement. The other goal is focused on territorial 
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defence, in which the Home Guard plays a greater role.145 Of the planned 22,000 Home 
Guard soldiers, 16,600 will receive advanced training and equipment and be required to 
carry out tours of duty even in peacetime. 
In terms of the restructuring of personnel, the fundamental change was to suspend 
conscription. The two-century old compulsory military service was suspended and 
replaced by personnel recruited on voluntary basis. The abolition of NCOs in the 1980s 
caused problems in training and competence due to a lack of experienced leadership 
available at a lower level. In the new reform plan, the officer corps will be restructured 
by reintroducing NCOs (based on restructured specialist officers); with more specialist 
officers who train and command troops and fewer people in staff and command 
functions.146 The current military force structure will remain intact until 2014, after 
which there would be a gradual shift until the final completion of transformation in 
2019.  
2.3 Taiwan 
2.3.1 Historical background  
Not in full-fledged international status 
Before discussing the context and background of Taiwan, it is necessary to explain that 
the fundamental difference between Sweden and Taiwan lies in the nature of their 
statehood. While Sweden is a normal sovereign state, the international status of Taiwan 
has been controversial for decades. Neither the United Nations nor the international 
community recognises Taiwan as an independent state, but rather as a part of the PRC. 
Also, because the ‘One China’ policy is accepted and abided by most of the countries in 
the world, Taiwan has thus been isolated from the international community and banned 
from participating in most international organisations including defence alliances. 
Therefore, Taiwan struggles to gain access to the international community. Chinese 
opposition is based on the following reasons: ‘1. there is only one China and Taiwan is 
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a part of China; 2. PRC is the sole legal government representing all China; 3. and 
membership in international organisations is confined to sovereign states’.147 
Taiwan's problematic international status was highlighted in 1971 when its UN 
membership was taken away, and since then the statehood of the ROC was collectively 
denied by the international community. Immediately after the withdrawal of UN 
membership, Taiwan experienced relative isolation. To date, Taiwan only maintains 
formal diplomatic relations with some twenty countries; most of them are small states in 
Africa, Latin America and Pacific Islands. Given these circumstances, the relationship 
with the US is thus vital to Taiwan’s security. Although official diplomatic relations 
between US and Taiwan were terminated in 1979 when the Carter administration 
formally recognised PRC as the legitimate China, the US has been a firm ally of Taiwan 
and played an important role in both defending the security of the island and 
maintaining cross-strait peace. Taiwan’s de facto alliance with the US is based on 
Taiwan Relations Act, which serves as a legal foundation requiring the US to provide 
Taiwan defensive weapons, and to resist any resort to force or coercion that would 
jeopardise the security of Taiwan.  
Against all odds, Taiwan has been effectively self-governed by the government of the 
Republic of China (ROC) as a de facto small island state since 1949. In terms of the 
relations with China, Taiwan currently maintains the status quo, meaning that neither 
independence nor unification will be pursued in near future. The status quo serves as an 
equilibrium which allows for much flexibility, however, it also restricts Taiwan’s 
possibilities in becoming a full-fledged international actor.148 
The Retreat of the Nationalist Party to Taiwan in 1949 
The history of the Republic of China was preceded by the Qing Dynasty. During the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, the corruption of this Dynasty caused its downfall, 
weakened its state power, and led to invasions by western countries. After the Qing 
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Dynasty was toppled in 1911, the formation of ROC in 1912 announced an end to over 
two thousand years of imperial rule in China. Between 1912 and 1949 the ROC was 
governed by the Nationalist government. During this period, the ROC history was one 
of turmoil characterised by war lord occupations, the Sino-Japanese War, Japanese 
occupation, and the Chinese Civil War. After the eight-year Sino-Japanese war ended in 
1945, the Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-Shek lost the Chinese Civil War on 
the mainland to Communist forces led by Mao Zedong. In 1949 Mao’s Communist 
government took control of the mainland and founded the People's Republic of China 
(PRC), thus the ROC government retreated to Taiwan.  
The victory of Mao and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had not only forced 
Chiang and the Nationalist Party (KMT) to withdraw to Taiwan, but also created 
complicated and hostile cross-strait relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. 
Military, diplomatic, and political tensions between two sides have been at a high level 
since 1949. Saving face is an important issue in Chinese culture. After the defeat of the 
KMT, Chiang adopted the ‘Three No’s Policy’ towards China: ‘no contact, no 
negotiation, and no compromise.’ There was neither communication nor negotiation 
between Beijing and Taiwan during the presidencies of Chiang Kai-Shek and his 
successor, Chiang Ching-kuo (his son). Most importantly, the strategic objective during 
Chiang’s era was not only to defend the territory, but also seek to re-take China. The 
structure of the armed forces was based on this ambitious ideology and therefore 
maintained a large quantity of active-duty personnel (600,000) and offensive 
capabilities. During the 1950s and 60s Taiwan’s military was always kept on high alert 
and readiness in order to respond the Chinese military invasions. Military assistance 
from the US was vital and successfully helped Taiwan counter the Chinese invasions, 
including the first and second Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s.149 
To defend and establish what it considers to be its full territorial integrity, China has 
never given up claiming Taiwan as its territory and at various times has launched 
military invasions of Taiwan.150 With a strong determination to protect the homeland 
and military assistance from the US, Taiwan’s conscript-based armed forces effectively 
deterred these Chinese invasions (or efforts at ‘liberation’). Under Chiang’s strategic 
                                                     
149
 During 1960s and 70s, military tie with the US was close and Taiwan air force even carried out secret 
reconnaissance missions for the US by flying U-2 spy plane over PRC. 
150




thinking and political ambition, the high readiness of Taiwan’s armed forces was not 
just to defend the island, but even aimed to counter-attack and re-take the mainland. In 
order to do so, maintaining a large standing armed forces based on conscription was 
necessary.151 During the early years of a re-established ROC on such a small island 
with a relatively low population, conscription was an optimal method for filling the 
ranks of the armed forces.  
After almost four decades of military stand-off, the hostile situation started to thaw in 
the past two decades. Since 2008, an open and peaceful policy toward China was 
adopted with the aim of stabilising and normalising relations across the Taiwan Strait. 
Owing to this open policy, cross-strait trade and exchange relations have been 
substantially increased and tensions between two sides have been reduced, which 
somewhat reflect a reduced possibility of military conflict with China. 
Legal basis of conscription 
In order to acquire sufficient soldiers to safeguard the island, every male reaching the 
age of 18 was required to serve the compulsory military service. In terms of legal 
context, the Constitution of ROC and the Military Service Act serve as the legal 
foundation of conscription, stipulating that all males from age 18 to 40 are obligated to 
perform military service. As prescribed in Article 12 of the Constitution and Article 1 of 
the Military Service Act, ‘male citizens of the ROC are obligated to undergo military 
service’. In 1954 Taiwan government further amended both the ‘Military Service Act’ 
and ‘Military Service Enforcement Rules’ to ensure that the military service system 
kept ‘conscripts as the mainstay and volunteer soldiers and national militia as the 
supplement’.152 
From an historical perspective, Martin Edmonds points out that conscription remains 
the primary mechanism in Taiwan by which important elements of military culture are 
transmitted to the population. On the other hand, he stresses that conscription also 
presents a restraint on change and reform within the armed forces because the concept 
of mass army could prevent or slow down the incentive for the armed forces to pursue 
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hi-tech transformation and professionalisation.153 Based on Edmonds’ argument, 
conscription impedes innovation and sound change-management. This is because only 
until the AVF decision was taken was thought given as to what would be the real roles 
and responsibilities of officers, NCOs, and soldiers. Nevertheless, conscription has been 
an important element in the strategic posture of Taiwan vis-à-vis a potential invasion 
from China.154 
Unlike Sweden, where in the 2000s only as few as 20% of male youth cohorts were 
actually drafted, conscription has been strictly enforced by law in Taiwan, thus making 
it an equal and universal duty. All men were required to serve in the military when they 
reached draft age, no matter what their family background was. They underwent a 
collective life experience which strengthened their sense of responsibility. Draft-aged 
men can only be exempt from service if they are severely unfit or disabled. 
Conscientious objectors can choose to undertake alternative service. Alternative 
services are available for conscripts whose physical condition makes them unfit for 
military training. Therefore, recalling Haltiner’s MAF definitions, the strict execution of 
conscription in Taiwan is similar to the situation of what he calls the ‘hard-core’ 
European states such as Turkey and Finland.155 
However, the conscription system delayed many gifted young men from investing their 
time in social and economic development, and had an impact on Taiwan’s economic 
competitiveness. Although inequality has not been a problem in Taiwan’s conscription, 
the legitimacy of conscription in Taiwan, similar to that of Sweden, has been questioned 
since the 2000s, but in a different way. Taiwan has not fought a war or performed 
military operations for four decades. From the perspective of economic efficiency, 
conscription has often been considered a waste of time for the youth cohorts. Thus, a 
question has been raised in the past decade: ‘Has conscription fulfilled its mission and 
had its day in Taiwan?’ The transition to AVF system is thus believed potentially to 
enable more human effort to be devoted toward Taiwan’s economic development. 
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Given the history of Taiwan and its geopolitical context since 1949, conscription was 
the only available option for staffing the armed forces during its early years, especially 
when confronting a great and hostile power. Conscription was immediately 
implemented in an effort to uphold military leverage with the PRC, and it has 
underpinned national security and effectively deterred against Chinese invasion since 
then. Thanks to the rapprochement between the two sides in the past two decades, 
especially the fast pace of détente since 2008, the cross-strait tension has been gradually 
reduced; however, a lower level of military confrontation still cannot be ruled out. Akin 
to western states, before carrying out a full-fledged AVF transformation, Taiwan has 
been recruiting volunteer soldiers since 2003 and a two-tier system has developed in 
Taiwan’s armed forces. The legal basis for recruiting volunteer soldiers is based on 
Article 3 of the Act of Military Service for Volunteer Enlisted Men passed in 1959; it 
was amended in 2003 to incorporate the recruitment of women. On the other hand, the 
length of compulsory service had been shortened four times during the 2000s, which 
required the Ministry of National Defense (MND) to recruit more volunteer soldiers in 
order to keep up with the required force level. Since then, the MND had been 
embarking upon the professionalisation of armed forces through the recruitment of 
volunteers.  
2.3.2 Strategic context 
Chinese military threat 
Territorial integrity and sovereignty is the key principle for Beijing in terms of foreign 
and defence policies. In the past, the majority of instances where China has resorted to 
force have mainly been to defend its territory and sovereignty, such as several territorial 
disputes along the border with India, and the armed conflict with Vietnam in 1979.156 A 
recent case of Chinese military intimidation of Taiwan was the 1996 Chinese missile 
exercise dubbed as the third Taiwan Strait crisis, aiming to coerce Taiwan not to opt for 
de jure independence. Before 2008 Taiwan had been under the rule of pro-independence 
governments for almost 20 years.157 Even though no formal moves claiming 
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independence were taken, the frequent use of what the PRC regarded as provocative 
language had led to a deterioration in the already tense cross-strait relations and 
exchange between two sides was thus limited. In terms of a current military threat, the 
most imminent and evident is that the number of missiles aimed at Taiwan has 
continued to increase from 500 in 2004 to more than 1,100 in 2013.158 In addition, the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) frequently conducts military exercises simulating an 
invasion across the Taiwan Strait. 
According to the decline of MAF literature, one of the key factors motivating the 
western states to abolish conscription was the disappearance or reduced level of threat 
following the end of the Cold War. However, the same cannot be said for Taiwan, 
where the military threat remains. Since 1949, Beijing has continued to claim 
sovereignty over self-ruled Taiwan as part of its territory, and keeps threatening to use 
force if Taiwan declares independence. The two sides of the Taiwan Straits have been at 
‘armed peace’ in past decades and therefore cross-strait relations have been crucial in 
mitigating the status of a military stand-off.  
Cross-Strait relations 
Cross-Strait relations have always been a vital issue between the two sides, and this 
theme significantly influences Taiwan’s politics, economy and security. Since 2008, 
Taiwan has made great progress in improving relations with China. The new ‘Three 
No's policy’: no unification, no independence, and no use of force, clearly describes 
Taiwan’s future vision of cross-strait relations under Ma’s presidency. Most importantly, 
Ma firmly endorses the ‘1992 Consensus’ which is interpreted as both sides of Taiwan 
Strait agreeing that there is only one China, with each side having their own 
interpretations over what constitutes this ‘One China’. Beijing welcomes Ma’s 
cross-Strait policy especially the recognition and upholding of the ‘1992 Consensus’; 
and these peaceful moves have contributed to an unprecedented cross-strait détente and 
significantly boosted exchanges between two sides. In terms of security, the 
rapprochement has somewhat eased the tension over Taiwan Strait and to some extent 
can be interpreted in terms of substantially reduced possibility of military conflict. With 
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this less hostile situation, it can be considered a ‘golden time’ for Taiwan to carry out 
defence reform and consider building an AVF.159 
Nevertheless, given that a PRC threat still exists, defence reform in Taiwan is not to 
compromise or reduce military capability but rather to build a smaller AVF with 
modern technology and defence concept in order to effectively deter Chinese threat and 
defend homeland. In general, the new AVF reflects three government objectives: 1. The 
AVF is a way of creating good value of money; 2. the voluntary military is more in tune 
with the wider society, especially popular to the ‘strawberry generation’;160 and 3. it 
does not necessarily signal greater or lesser threat from PRC and it is rather neutral in 
its effects. Therefore, it is a good time for Taiwan to respond a combination of factors 
including economy, politics, society and strategy. In addition, the concept of Taiwan’s 
defence is quite different from Sweden’s expeditionary orientation, and this difference 
makes it significant in the comparison between the two cases. 
Despite all positive moves and situations, however, a cross-strait détente does not 
necessarily mean the disappearance of the military threat, and it should be realised that 
the military threat from China still exists alongside closer cross-strait ties. The 
Taiwanese government has several times appealed to Beijing to withdraw the missiles 
aimed at Taiwan but has still received no positive response. The steadily increased 
defence spending reflects another potential threat from China. The annual growth rate of 
the Chinese defence budget has reached double digits for consecutive two years.161 
Amid the worldwide trend of shrinking defence spending, China’s ambition in defence 
affairs has deepened Taiwan’s concerns.  
Strategic objectives 
Due to the rapid modernisation of the PLA in the past decade, the relative military 
strength between China and Taiwan has tilted to Beijing’s advantage. Facing such 
military power, Taiwan has adopted the defence policy of ‘Hard ROC’ through the 
strategies of: ‘war prevention, homeland defence, contingency response, conflict 
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avoidance, and regional stability.’162 The military strategy in supporting ‘Hard ROC’ 
underlines ‘credible deterrence and resolute defence’ as core strategic concepts. The 
main foci of military strategy are to maintain the security of Taiwan’s national 
territories, and to improve the armed forces’ war-fighting capabilities. In addition, in the 
aftermath of the 2009 typhoon disaster, disaster relief missions have been recently 
included as one of the core tasks of the armed forces. Apart from regular military 
training, the armed forces are required to deploy troops, equipment and resources 
quickly in response to natural disasters.  
In short, Taiwan’s strategic objectives aim at and are confined to territorial defence, 
which differ from Sweden’s ‘functional defence’ emphasising expeditionary operations. 
A similarity between two countries can be compared in terms of the de facto military 
alliance. While Sweden collaborates with NATO mandate missions without official 
membership, Taiwan based on the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), maintains informal but 
strong military alliance with the US to counterbalance the Chinese threat. This has 
significantly influenced Taiwan’s defence and security thinking in recent years. 
Therefore, in a wider regional security context, the strong alliance with the US makes 
Taiwan involved in the international security mechanism in East Asia. The US plays a 
pivotal role in the region and has developed a new operational concept of ‘air-sea battle’ 
believed aiming to check and deter the Chinese growing military power.163 
Defence industry 
The neutrality policy has made Sweden rely on its own DIB for its arms supply. For 
Taiwan, according to TRA, the US is obligated to sell defensive weapons, and thus 
becomes Taiwan’s largest arms supplier. Nevertheless, according to the National 
Defence Act, the priority of weapons acquisition should be given to domestic 
manufacturers. Therefore, similar to Sweden, Taiwan has also developed a credible DIB 
which designs and produces fighter jets (Indigenous Defense Fighter), missile systems, 
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combat vehicles and radar systems. However, Taiwan’s defence industry is state-run, 
and mainly serves one customer: the ROC armed forces.164 
Increasing international visibility has been the goal of Taiwan’s DIB. Despite its 
state-run nature, Taiwan’s DIB has sought to internationalise and expand its global 
market. Other than producing military jets, Taiwan’s Aerospace Industrial Development 
Corporation (AIDC) also receives foreign orders to produce parts and sections of 
commercial aircraft. Selling assault rifles to Jordan is another example of its arms 
exports.165 To achieve ‘Hard ROC’ with strategies of credible deterrence and resolute 
defence, the DIB should play a role and be integrated into the implementation of AVF 
in order to build a more professional and hi-tech armed forces.  
Having a core domestic defence industry is crucial for both Taiwan and Sweden, and 
the DIB in both countries in the context of AVF can generate an interesting question: 
what is the motive for them to keep their DIB? For Sweden, even though it is moving 
away from non-alignment and engaging in more peace missions, the DIB still plays an 
important role in its defence. As for Taiwan, developing a credible domestic industry is 
necessary in order to enhance its defence and deterrence capability.166 For both 
countries, one issue needs to be addressed –the AVF impact on their DIB. 
2.3.3 Defence reform  
Military downsizing 
In light of western experience, the transformation of the military into an AVF has 
usually been the consequence of a series of defence reforms; this section briefly 
discusses the reform of Taiwan’s armed forces since the mid-1990s. Reviewing defence 
reform can help understand how AVF is formulated, including the size, shape, type and 
missions. As mentioned earlier, under the rule of Chiang Kai-Shek (1949-1975), the key 
defence objective was to recover the mainland by force. Given such an asymmetrical 
difference in military size and power, Taiwan realised that it did not seem possible to 
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achieve such ambitious objective. Therefore, after martial law was lifted by former 
president Chiang Ching-Kuo in 1987, Taiwan officially abolished this decades-long 
unrealistic ambition. Military strategy then shifted from retaking the mainland to 
maintaining integrated defence and offense capabilities, and eventually to its current key 
focus on territorial defence. Under the post-Chiang strategic posture, the old forms of 
resource allocation, force deployment, and personnel structures had all become obsolete. 
Thus in 1996, the (MND) began to streamline military structures and manpower, and a 
large downsizing in military establishment was undertaken. Over the past 15 years, the 
total number of military personnel has been reduced from 450,000 in 1997 to 275,000 in 
2009.  
Eroding the role of conscription 
During the 2000s under the Chen administration, the MND shortened the service length 
of compulsory service.167 This resulted in a decreasing number of conscripts; the 
immediate effect was a sudden reduction in Conscript Ratio (CR) and subsequent 
reduction in the Military Participation Ratio (MPR). Reduction of the CR and MPR due 
to shortening the length of compulsory military service are important dimensions of the 
decline of mass armed forces and have often been adopted as a transition move before 
states fully embrace AVF. These factors also have eroded the role of conscription.  
Shortening the service length on its own, however, is merely a ‘cosmetic’ approach and 
does not reinforce defence capability because it increases the personnel turnover rate. 
Continuing moves to shorten service length were considered as an attempt to gain 
support from young voters in elections. The (then) opposition party KMT understood 
that conscription was not popular in society and a shortened period of service was 
welcomed by most youth cohorts and their parents, who considered military service as a 
barrier for career planning. Eventually, the bi-partisan consensus allowed this legislation 
to pass smoothly without major resistance.  
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Defence reform under Ma’s administration 
Even though the idea of abolishing conscription was proposed and discussed 10 years 
ago, it did not become a government policy until 2008 when President Ma took office. 
To make the AVF financially affordable, the government decided that the overall force 
size needed a significant reduction and restructuring. In line with the planned force 
downsizing project, the total number of personnel will be reduced from 275,000 to 
215,000. Ending conscription is an important defence policy which entails budget 
consequences and requires political will. To reassure his election promise and the 
resolution to fulfil this policy, in May 2011, President Ma stated that:  
‘Taiwan has the resolve to defend itself. My administration wants to enhance Taiwan’s defence 
capability on a newly designed volunteer military system. This is a huge undertaking, as we need to 
overcome difficulties in training, organisation, finance and military doctrines. However, we are 
confident that we will succeed in building a small but strong military force.’168 
 
2.3.4 Reasons to end conscription in Taiwan 
The suspension of conscription in Taiwan did not result solely from the President’s own 
decision, nor was cross-strait détente the only justification for the change. It was based 
on a set of factors: 1. domestic political, economic and social factors, and 2. and 
improved cross-strait relations. The peculiar international status of Taiwan and the ‘One 
China policy’ abided by international community prevents Taiwan from conducting 
international operations, thus has made international factors relatively less evident.  
From the perspective of value for money, labour costs in a conscription system are low. 
But the budget can hardly represent the true opportunity cost of labour in terms of its 
alternative use value elsewhere in the private sector. Taiwanese military officials and 
commanders have long been used to a sufficient amount of cheap labour (conscripts). 
Thus, they tend to favour labour-intensive tasks and concepts. This is why, as 
mentioned earlier, Martin Edmonds argues that conscription is also a sort of restriction 
for Taiwan’s armed forces in terms of thinking about innovative solutions to personnel 
issues in the defence setting. Due to a lack of real combat missions in the past four 
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decades, non-military tasks and menial jobs, inter alia, cleaning, often dominated 
conscripts’ daily lives. It is no surprise that most youth cohorts view compulsory service 
as a waste of time.  
Due to rapid economic growth, the labour structure in Taiwan has shifted from labour 
intensive to high-tech and high value-added oriented industries such as IT and bio-tech 
industries, which require longer periods of time for people to acquire the necessary 
education and training. On the other hand, the human resource cost for compulsory 
military service is enormous as it interrupts the education and career planning of youth 
cohorts.169 President Ma agrees with this point and in fact it influenced his decision.170 
These problems have been publicly discussed since the last decade, yet they were dealt 
with differently by both Chen’s and the current Ma administration, as both recognised 
that conscription is an inefficient and costly method in terms of utilisation of labour. 
From the social perspective, according to Edmonds, there is an anti-militaristic 
preference among the majority of the Taiwanese population, based on their experience 
under Japanese occupation and traditional Confucian values.171 The military’s public 
image was further tarnished by the autocratic regime of Chiang.172 Therefore, the social 
status of military personnel in traditional Taiwanese society has been deemed inferior to 
other professions such as teachers, civil servants, and policemen. In addition, the output 
of defence, security is an abstract concept that can only with difficulty be felt and 
recognised by people, especially during peace time. Another important issue is that, 
compared with the earlier generations who did not have abundant material welfare, the 
post-1980’s youth cohorts are often called the ‘strawberry generation’, in that they have 
nominal experience with hardship and thus lack endurance and firmness.173 Therefore, 
people in Taiwan start to question whether these unmotivated young conscripts are able 
to defend the country.  
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To sum up, from domestic social and economic perspectives, due to changes in 
traditional values, unpopularity of conscription, rapid economic development, 
consideration of opportunity costs, and shortened service terms, conscription in Taiwan 
has gradually lost its value and support. From the international strategic perspective, the 
détente in cross-strait relations creates a good opportunity and a suitable environment 
for the armed forces to transform. In the political context, ending conscription can be 
manipulated as an election instrument to gain votes without encountering too much 
resistance from the opposition. When Ma announced this decision during the 
presidential election, there was only minor criticism from the opposition party 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). 
Political consensus over conscription  
Military service issues such as shortening of service length and abolition of conscription 
usually attracts public attention. In Taiwan’s politics, it is not easy for two major 
political parties, KMT and DPP to reach an agreement; ending conscription and shifting 
to an AVF is one of the few exceptions. Why is it that two political parties who tend to 
disagree with each other on almost every political issue have both reached a consensus 
on the AVF issue? It is not difficult to answer: political attempts to gain votes. This 
could explain why Jehn et al. argued that ending conscription is a politically popular 
move.174 In brief, reaching consensus over conscription and AVF issues in Taiwan did 
not encounter major resistance. 
2.4 Emerging themes 
The background and contexts of the two cases have been reviewed; they generate 
several emerging themes. The reform of NCOs has been cited in both countries’ AVF 
plans. In the historical context, the NCO corps has been proved by recent wars as a 
mainstay in terms of war-fighting and training of soldiers. Therefore the quality of 
NCOs could influence the overall quality of AVF. Reintroducing NCOs in Sweden is 
beneficial to the officer corps. Since Sweden is planning to reintroduce NCOs, two 
questions have been raised in the Swedish Armed Forces amid this personnel reform: 
What makes the best junior officers and should Sweden adopt foreign models such as 
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the British or American models of junior officer cultivation programmes? Or should 
they keep the current Swedish model (starting from private soldier)? There is a debate 
between reformers and traditionalists; the former argue that if the NCO corps is 
competent, a one year training programme is enough to cultivate competent junior 
officers. Traditionalists, on the other hand, believe that due to the absence of proper 
NCOs, one year of training can only produce amateur or incompetent officers. 
Nevertheless, both views all agree on the necessity of NCOs. Similar questions can be 
raised for Taiwan too. How to cultivate young officers and NCOs in responding to the 
new AVF structure? It is also worthwhile for Taiwan’s military elites to think through 
what kind of NCOs they need and what tasks should be carried out by NCOs in order to 
build a competent volunteer force.  
A crucial issue needing to be addressed regarding Taiwan’s NCOs is that Taiwanese 
officers have focused too much on NCO roles in terms of detailed management of 
troops, which is similar to Swedish ‘specialist officers’ who combine officer and NCO 
roles. However, unlike Sweden,175 Taiwanese NCOs are sergeants, and their main jobs 
before the reform were basically to run the conscript system, whereas the officer’s job 
was to lead the NCOs. Therefore a change in the division of labour and readjustment of 
roles are required in order to fit into the new AVF system. It is important to explore this 
emerging theme as the NCO reforms in both countries are very different.176 
Another question is that whether the Swedish armed forces should shift the personnel 
structure to a smaller number of professional regular soldiers, with the remaining ranks 
to be filled with reservists available for call up for international missions. Although 
stereotyped reservists seem to be less professional and less useful, after repetitive 
annual call-ups and trainings, they can be competent for missions. The British army is a 
good example and some reservists even transfer to full-time status.177 However, from a 
traditionalist’s perspective, standing units should always be the priority.178 Similar 
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issues are debated in Taiwan too, including NCOs reform and professional military 
education for officers.179 
During his election campaign Putin promised to build up Russia’s military capability 
and planned to modernise Russia’s armed forces over the next decade to deal with 
global uncertainty and the US military power.180 Further, particularly concerning Syria, 
Russia has been seen to be more aggressive in asserting its perceived interests. Putin’s 
behaviour somewhat reflects his hegemonic thinking; it is thus worthwhile for Swedes 
to consider whether the Swedish armed forces are capable of dealing with Russia’s 
military threat to its territory; and whether changes in metrics in terms of size, structure 
and mission are necessary to make AVF adequate to meet all contingencies? As for 
China, recent evidence suggests that its ambition for control of the South China Sea 
could lead to potential military confrontations. It is therefore a good time for both 
Sweden and Taiwan to rethink and reassess the perception and level of threat from 
Russia and China respectively, then incorporate their reassessment into their AVF 
implementation plans. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Differences and similarities in history, politics, and defence strategy between the two 
cases have been identified through the review of their background and respective 
contexts. From a theoretical point of view, the reasons for Sweden and Taiwan to 
pursue AVF transformation show both differences and similarities. They set out the 
foundation and context of their on-going AVF implementation, which will be discussed 
in the following chapters. 
Compared with other West European countries, the defence structure of Sweden is 
distinctive. The four pillars of the Swedish defence model during the Cold War had 
underpinned Sweden’s military capability to avoid war for two centuries. However, this 
model faced increasing pressure after 1989 and the pillars began to shake. Being the 
first and the only country to suspend conscription formally, Swedish defence is unusual 
compared with other countries in the Nordic region - Finland, Denmark and Norway.  
                                                                                                                                                           
drivers-reserves-and-foreign-armies.html>, accessed 10 June 2012. 
179
 Professional Military Education Forum held in ROC National Defnese University, November 2011, 
Taiwan. 
180




By reviewing the causes of change in the Swedish armed forces, it fits quite easily into 
Haltiner’s approach. His three arguments on the decline of MAF stand firmly in the 
Swedish case: 1. Due to frequent contributions to international missions, it appears that 
Sweden has been under the protection umbrella of EU and UN, and potentially NATO; 
2. The military threat from Russia has been greatly reduced since 1990; 3. Sweden has 
constantly participated in international missions, and the mission itself plays a vital role 
in the reform in terms of strategic concept, doctrine and personnel structure. However, 
social factors and economic efficiency cannot be overlooked; one evident problem - 
inequality of compulsory service which has seriously eroded the legitimacy of 
conscription, may not be solely explained by Haltiner’s theories. Some more 
comprehensive methods such as Burk and Van Doorn are needed to better explain that 
social fact. 
As for Taiwan, although international factors did not play a key role in its decision to 
end conscription, the détente in cross-strait relations - a quasi-international factor - 
helped facilitate the decision by creating an opportunity and favourable strategic 
environment for the armed forces to reform. However, the primary causes were 
domestic ones, such as political considerations during election campaigns, an eroded 
military capability due to shortened length of conscription service, the unpopularity of 
conscription and economic factors. By and large, when echoing the decline of MAF 
theory, whilst Haltiner and Burk’s arguments are complementary and fit well in a 
European context which includes Sweden, it is difficult to use Haltiner’s arguments to 
explain Taiwan’s case. Burk’s combined political realist and social dominance approach 
better explains the case of Taiwan. 
Chapter two has described the background and contexts of two selected cases, and 
identified the causes of their AVF decision. The second phase of the thesis, empirical 
analysis, will comprise forthcoming chapters. Based on evidence gathered through 
expert interviews and documents, the next chapter will examine the goals and specific 
objectives of AVF implementation in both countries. Each comparative variable will be 







Strategic Goals and Objectives of the AVF in Sweden and 
Taiwan 
3.1 Introduction 
The second part of this thesis consists of four chapters focusing on the empirical 
analysis of AVF implementation in both countries. The main purposes of these chapters  
are to: 1. identify the strategic goals and specific objectives of AVF implementation and 
defence reform in Sweden and Taiwan; 2. examine the metrics, criteria, and current 
status of AVF implementation and personnel reform; 3. discuss why the process of AVF 
implementation and defence reform is more or less successful and identify the 
facilitating factors, conditions or constraints that could have influenced their 
transformations; and 4, compare both transformations through an assessment of 
individual issues and criteria, then concluding with a discussion of which country’s 
defence transformation is easier or more difficult than the other. These four major 
themes are respectively discussed and analysed in four chapters from chapter three to 
six. 
This chapter discusses the strategic goals and objectives of AVF and defence reform in 
both countries. Petersson argues that, in order to understand the logic of defence reform 
and organisational change, it is important to study how the central actors of the reform 
process justify change in terms of goals, strategies, and the structure of the 
organisation.181 To compare defence transformations in two very different countries, 
first of all their primary goals and the specific objectives of the transformations must be 
identified. The chapter consists of two sections: 3.2 and 3.3, which discuss the 
objectives of AVF implementation and defence reform in Sweden and Taiwan. In 
addition, it explains how and why these objectives were shaped, and how they fit into 
the wider context of defence reform. 
It is not possible to closely examine and compare every transition detail; key criteria 
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related to defence reform, for example, the size and shape of the armed forces, must 
therefore be selected for comparison. According to many western countries that have 
undergone AVF transitions, the concepts for AVF implementation and defence reform 
share several characteristics. It is thus feasible to borrow these concepts and adapt them 
to the major issues of the two AVF transformations studied here. To this end, seven 
criteria based on this approach are used to analyse the objectives of AVF and defence 
reform in two cases.  
First of all, the strategic concepts that underpin and guide the defence reforms are 
examined in order to understand the rationale and context of how and why their specific 
objectives were formulated. Although the two countries, as discussed in chapter one, 
share several similarities in terms of strategic contexts and timeline of implementation, 
their strategic goals and objectives are quite different. In Sweden, the ultimate goal is to 
transform Swedish defence into a ‘usable and available defence’ in which the AVF is 
one of the major components of the overall defence reform. For Taiwan, although the 
government aims to produce a smaller but smarter force, the AVF itself is the ultimate 
goal. 
Having identified the strategic goals and concepts for reform, the discussion turns to 
examining what size and structure of AVF both countries desire to build. After the 
format of AVF is decided, how to staff the AVF is discussed next, which relates to the 
quantity and quality of recruitment. The NCO and reservist reforms play important roles 
in defence transformation in both countries; therefore they are discussed separately 
following recruitment. This is followed by an examination of the public image and 
support of the armed forces, as both armed forces seek to create an image of an 
attractive employer. The last factor is about when the objectives will be achieved, viz.: 
transition timeline. The discussion of both cases follows this format in order to make 
systematic comparisons. The last section of this chapter summarises their objectives of 
AVF transition and personnel reform, and draws out the implications. 
3.2 Sweden 
Shift in strategic concept 




the Cold War, the conscription-based defence system was designed for territorial 
defence, which was difficult to adapt to the post Cold War strategic environment, in that 
it requires higher competence and readiness to respond quickly and effectively to 
various kinds of threats. According to the 1999 Defence Commission Report, 
threat-based defence was no longer practical and the SAF should be restructured to 
respond to a more complex threat perception.182 The change in defence concept resulted 
in significant reductions both in defence expenditure and the size of the military 
establishment, demanded by the 1999/2000 Defence Bill.183 Frequent peace operations 
have made the SAF realise that conscription had become a constraint on its goal to 
develop a more expeditionary force. Former defence minister Tolgfors identified the 
structural limitations of the SAF as:184 
 ‘The Armed Forces cannot adapt to the concept “operating here and now”. 
 Only one third of the force structure is required to have a readiness up to one year. The rest of the 
units have lower readiness. 
 Two separate organisations co-exist: one for national operations and one for international 
missions.  
 An inadequate and antiquated personnel organisation.’ 
These limitations and weaknesses had affected and compromised the competence of the 
SAF. Therefore, a call for defence organisational reform and professionalisation of the 
SAF emerged.  
Since the turn of the 21st century, the SAF has been transforming into a mission and 
capability-based force that is usable, available and flexible for both national and 
international missions. The radical reform on the personnel system was officially 
demanded by the 2008 Defence Report ‘Defence in Use’ (Ds 2008:48) to develop a 
useable defence with enhanced operational competence.185 In short, the process of 
defence transformation from 2000 until 2014 can be divided into three phases.186 Each 
phase features its own strategic concept and focus. Downsizings in military 
establishments have been substantially carried out across all phases. The three phases 
are briefly described below: 
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Phase 1: 2000-2004 
International tasks started to play a greater role in the Swedish defence. The SAF 
has sought to enhance internationalisation and interoperability. Joining NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace was the key for the transformation at this stage. In order to 
adapt to the new strategic environment, significant force reduction was carried out 
during this period: the Army was reduced by 70 percent, while Navy and Air Force 
were reduced by half and 25 percent respectively.  
Phase 2: 2005-2009 
Multinational operations and territorial defence were two main tasks during this 
phase. The SAF aimed to further improve the interoperability in order to better 
collaborate with allied forces. The strategic goals emphasised rapid response and 
success in missions. The concept of the EU Battle Group was crucial because 
Sweden was the framework country for the Nordic Battle Group 2008. Force 
reduction continued during this period: the Army and Navy were both reduced by 
half, while Air Force by a quarter. 
Phase 3: 2010-2014  
In the present phase, enhancing the availability and usability of the armed forces 
are the priority. Conscription was suspended and replaced by new personnel system 
based on voluntary participation. To enhance the competence of the officer corps, a 
two-tier officer system has been introduced by creating the rank of ‘specialist 
officer’. All personnel of the SAF are obliged to take part in missions abroad. A 
new type of operational organisation staffed mainly by reservists is to be 
established. The Nordic Defence Cooperation plays a key role during current 
transformation. The planned force reductions during this period are 25 percent 
across all services.187 
Strategic objectives for transformation  
The objectives for the personnel transformation are set in accordance with the 2009 
Defence Bill titled ‘A Functional Defence’. The personnel department of the SAF 
Headquarters outlines the strategic objectives for the transformation as to:188 
‘1. Increase capability to act with others.  
2. Increase units’ accessibility. 
3. Streamline administration and logistics.  
4. Transform manpower management system. 
5. Increase attraction as employer. 
6. Strengthen values by action with focus on gender, equality and working conditions.’ 
These strategic objectives underpin the ultimate success of the defence transformation; 
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they are categorised into seven criteria and discussed next. 
Objectives of Swedish defence reform 
1. Strategic concept for the defence reforms 
Without an understanding of current Swedish defence policy and strategic concepts, it is 
difficult to grasp the rationales and contexts for the objectives of AVF and defence 
reform. In contrast to military non-alignment during the Cold War, since the accession 
to the EU Swedish security has been increasingly associated with that of the EU and its 
neighbouring Nordic and Baltic states. After the 1999 strategic shift, the perspective 
based on Declaration of Solidarity with neighbours has been pivotal to the Swedish 
defence. The threat-based defence focusing on production and training of conscripts has 
gradually been phased out and replaced by a mission and capability-based defence. 
Consequently, to promote the efficiency of the operational units for international 
operations, the division between a territorial-oriented organisation and the ad-hoc 
international force was discarded. 
Having transformed the armed forces for nearly a decade since 1999, Sweden finally 
decided to pursue a radical shift in the personnel system by establishing an AVF. Based 
on the 2008 Report ‘Defence in Use’ as a blueprint, in March 2009 the Ministry of 
Defence proposed the Defence Bill 2008/2009:140 with the aim to transform the 
structure of personnel and operational organisations. Most of the objectives set in the 
third phase of defence reform are based on the 2009 Bill as it gave a clear strategic 
guidance and objectives on personnel reform and restructuring of operational 
organisations. Suspending conscription and shifting to AVF was one of the major 
objectives of the 2009 Bill, demanding the suspension of conscription by 1 July 2010. 
Thereafter all military personnel, including professional and reservist officers, NCOs 
and soldiers, must be recruited based on voluntary participation. 
The ultimate goal of the 2009 Bill was to meet the operational requirements demanded 
by Parliament to enhance the usability and flexibility of the armed force, so it could be 
deployed ‘here and now.’ The capability of the armed forces was expected to be 




Swedish border. Lodin summarised the capability of the SAF as to strengthen:189 
‘1. Availability: today’s armed forces must be available to perform national and international tasks, 
with operational and strategic mobility;  
2. Usability: using single set of forces to perform national and international missions; 
3. Flexibility: restructuring the armed forces into modular operational organisations to deal with all 
levels of conflicts;  
4. Cooperation: Cooperating with other countries and organisations, other Swedish governmental 
actors, with improved civil-military relations.’  
The AVF transformation was one component of the 2009 Bill; other components 
included an obligation for all personnel to serve on international missions, recruiting 
reserve soldiers and structuring reserve units, and building a two-tier officer system 
with the introduction of a new cadre of officers called ‘specialist officer’.190 In short, 
the government requires the SAF to be volunteer-based, and be able to initiate, maintain, 
enhance and complete operations both at home and abroad in various levels of conflict 
from peace support to full-scale war. 
The purpose of Swedish defence 
According to the 2008 Defence Report and the 2009 Bill, the purpose of the Swedish 
defence was to safeguard its basic values and interests in order to: prevent and manage 
conflicts and war, guarantee the sovereignty of Sweden and protect society and its 
ability to function. To attain these objectives, the SAF must be able to: 
‘1. Defend Sweden and maintain its basic values and interests. This involves operations in the global 
arena, Europe, Swedish territory and its immediate region. 
2. Detect and repel invasions of Swedish territory. 
3. Use existing capabilities and resources to assist society at large and other government agencies 
when needed.’191 
In the midst of transformation, the third task ‘using the existing capabilities and 
resources’ is of significance because, financially speaking, the SAF is required by the 
government to fund the AVF and defence reform by freeing the existing defence budget 
and resources as the government only guarantees a flat defence budget until 2014.192 
Whilst an increase in defence expenditure is unlikely, it is thus crucial that the SAF 
ensure good utilisation of existing and available resources.193 With the goals for both 
the overall national defence and objectives for the reform identified, the subsequent 
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criteria are examined individually. It starts with the restructuring of defence 
organisation.  
2. Restructuring of operational organisation  
Defence personnel reform has often been associated with organisational restructuring, 
ranging from small-scale personnel reductions to large-scale organisational overhaul. 
The 2009 defence reform featured a large restructuring of operational units. The 
disbandment of the existing international units replaced by both regular and reserve 
units is an important initial task. The objective is to establish a standing force with a 
staff of 1,700 that is always ready for rotation of international deployment, with an 
additional 300 personnel on stand-by for reinforcement and evacuation efforts. This 
objective has doubled the current personnel capacity for international operations and is 
expected to be achieved by 2019. 
Other than the standing regular units, contracted reserve units will be established in the 
future organisation. This is dictated by the 2008 Defence Commission Report that the 
SAF should establish the reserve (or contracted) units to operate in line with the regular 
standing units, which is an unprecedented and untested attempt in Swedish defence. The 
third type is the Home Guard, which only deals with territorial defence and domestic 
contingencies. The terms ‘regular and reserve’ are only used to differentiate and 
describe the personnel composition of the units, and are not utilised to actually name the 
operational units.  
According to the reform plan, the number of reserve personnel, especially soldiers, will 
be increased significantly to fill the newly structured operational units; regular soldiers 
and NCOs will be relatively fewer. The principle for personnel allocation is based on 
the complexity of military tasks; labour-intensive units in the army and land forces will 
be primarily staffed by reserve officers, NCOs and soldiers. 
A. Regular (or permanent) units 
By definition, regular units are filled primarily by full-time regular personnel. It is 
stipulated that at least 65 percent of the staff in regular units are of full-time status.194 
                                                     




Regular units are designed with higher readiness and higher competence due to their 
higher percentage of full-time personnel. Most operational organisations in the Navy 
and Air Force are formed from these types of units. All regular units are expected to be 
available for international deployment within one week of notification. 
To strengthen the competence of regular units, the SAF has gained considerable 
experience from participating in EU and Nordic Battle Groups. The concept of battle 
group, including its organisational structure, size and function provides a favourable 
framework within which the SAF may achieve the deployability and flexibility of the 
operational organisation. The modular design indicates that the battle groups are 
organised to carry out missions independently or become a component in a larger 
multinational unit. The SAF have therefore borrowed this concept to transform its 
operational units, and by 2014, seven battle groups will be established in the form of 
modular manoeuvre battalions for tactical operations. These battle groups are affiliated 
with tanks, air defence, engineering corps, logistics and intelligence units. In addition, 
they are reinforced and supported by Navy and Air Force. On the other hand, the Army 
was required to deactivate several infantry and tank units, and replace its heavy 
mechanised forces with modular mechanised and light-manoeuvre battalions. For the 
Navy and Air Force, the aim of the operational units is to enhance the capability to take 
part in joint naval and air operations with foreign countries. The scale of downsizing on 
the establishments of Navy and Air Force is smaller; the Navy will keep its seven 
corvettes and four submarines, while the Air Force will keep all 100 Gripen C/D jets 
operating in four divisions together with helicopter and transport battalions. 
B. Reserve (or part-time contracted) units 
In contrast to the defence concept of the past, given the present low threat level, the 
SAF seeks to reduce significantly the number of regular personnel and replace them 
with volunteer reservists to form the reserve units. The purpose of reserve units is to 
complement and adjust defence manpower and resources in order to maintain adequate 
regular units at higher readiness. From an economic perspective, cost efficiency is an 
important consideration because, in the midst of downward trend in defence 
expenditures, it is financially impossible to maintain every operational unit at high 




constant operations, in western countries, voluntary reservists have increasingly played 
a bigger role in contemporary military operations.195 The British armed forces are a 
good example of this; they have seen an increased number of reservists deployed in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Since 1998, approximately 10 per cent of all British armed forces 
deployed on operations have been reservists.196 The other advantage is to link the 
armed forces with people who have desirable civilian skills. Keeping the armed forces 
connected with society in the AVF era is also an issue in Sweden;197 because good 
civil-military relationships can help improve the military’s public image affecting not 
just the reputation of the SAF but also its capacity to recruit and retain personnel. The 
personnel proportion in the reserve units requires at least 65 percent to be reserve 
personnel. Recruiting voluntary reserve soldiers is currently a challenge to the SAF 
because this type of personnel has not been recruited and tested before.198 
The majority of operational units in the army and land forces will be primarily 
composed of this type of unit. Granting legal rights for soldiers to temporarily leave 
their civilian jobs for military service and protecting soldiers’ civilian jobs are two vital 
issues to allow them perform part-time reserve services without being denied 
employment or penalised by their employers. The Employment Act was passed by 
Parliament in May 2012 and became effective in July 2012.199 Due to the delay of 
employment legislation, the recruitment of reserve soldiers has been two years behind 
schedule. The objective is to recruit some 9,500 reserve soldiers by 2019. In the 
meantime the SAF is focusing on the potential group of ex-conscripts as the manpower 
pool for recruitment.200 
Service term and international work obligation 
After being recruited, both regular and reserve soldiers are required to undergo three 
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months of basic military training (GMU) before they are qualified for employment.201 
Unlike officers and specialist officers, both regular and reserve soldiers and junior 
NCOs are not permanently employed, but are offered time-limited employment 
contracts. The normal service term is eight years with an option to extend for up to 16 
years. In contrast to the old territorial defence system, according to the new employment 
contract of the SAF, both types of soldiers are obliged to serve on international 
operations.202 As previously mentioned, this objective of international work obligation 
has been achieved ahead of schedule.203 
C. Home guard 
Soldiers of the Home Guard are reservists recruited locally on Home Guard contracts. 
Their tasks are to defend the Swedish territory and perform the following duties: 
territorial surveillance, base security, field work, escort duties, transport protection, 
target identification and artillery spotting.204 It also conducts civilian duties such as 
responding to forest fires, floods or searching for missing persons. Despite the number 
of Home Guard personnel being reduced to 22,000 and the battalions being reduced 
from 60 to 40 by 2014, its size still represents almost half of the entire SAF personnel 
and therefore the quality of Home Guard could potentially influence the overall 
competence of the SAF. To enhance its capability, the reform requires that as many as 
16,600 Home Guard personnel recruited and staffed by SAF receive more advanced 
training and equipment. Home Guard soldiers are obliged to serve during peacetime and 
are expected to be mobilised from standby preparedness to operations within 24 
hours.205 
In terms of service conditions, Home Guard officers serve approximately one week per 
year and are available for service during extreme national emergencies;206 soldiers 
serve a minimum 20 hours a year. They can choose to serve a certain number of days 
per year for military training. Although Home Guard personnel are employed on a 
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contract basis, they have the opportunity to seek positions in the regular and reserve 
units. Similarly, soldiers who have completed the basic training and served in 
operational units can also transfer to Home Guard contracts. From the human resource 
perspective, Home Guard and reserve personnel act as an ideal manpower pool. The 
qualification of training for Home Guard is similar to regular and reserve soldiers; all 
are required to undergo the basic training. 
Total size of force 
The total number of SAF personnel will be reduced to around 50,000 by 2019 (Figure 
3-1), which includes approximately 27,000 regular and reserve personnel serving in 
both regular and reserve units, and 22,000 personnel serving in Home Guard units. The 
Army will still be the largest service branch with personnel size of 18,500. The Navy 
will exclusively be composed of 1,500 regular personnel. By the same token, most of 
the 3,000 service personnel in the Air Force serve on full-time basis. Apart from 
personnel in the three-services, there are 4,000 personnel serving in central joint 
branches including intelligence, logistics and Special Forces (Table 3-1).207 
 
Figure 3-1 Personnel trend of the SAF 
 
Source: Compiled by author based on the data from the Pocket Guide to the Swedish 
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Table 3-1 The Personnel Structure of the SAF 
Branch 2006 2007 2008 2009 2014-2019 
Army 18000 21000 17500 16300 18500 Regular Officers: 4600 
Specialist Officers (SNCOs): 4600 
Reservist Officers & SNCOs: 2200 
Regular Soldiers: approx. 6600 
Reservist Soldiers: approx 9500 
Regular and Reserve Units: 28000 
Home Guard: 22000 
Total personnel in 2019: approx. 50000 
Navy 5000 5000 4600 3800 1500 
Air Force 10000 8000 3000 3200 3000 
Command 32000 7500 6900 5300 4000 
Logistics - 5500 5000 5400 - 
Home Guard 41000 41000 38000 38000 22000 
Total  106000 88000 75000 72000 Approx 
50000 
Source: Compiled by author based on the data from the Swedish Armed Forces website, 
Pocket Guide to the Swedish Armed Forces 2009, and document acquired from the 
Personnel Division of the SAF Headquarters.208 
 
3. Recruitment 
In the AVF era, it is up to young people to choose the military as an occupation and a 
place to work. Without conscripts as the source of manpower, the armed forces need to 
act more like a civilian employer and go to the labour market to recruit young men and 
women continuously.209 
Recruiting personnel for international operations is one of the most important and 
difficult tasks for the SAF.  
The 2009 Bill underlines four criteria for the SAF to focus on recruitment: number, skill, 
age and motivation. The government requires the SAF to become a correctly staffed 
organisation and be able to predict the personnel needs of the services. It must also 
recruit, develop, retain and reduce personnel in a way that balances needs and 
availability. 
In the past, people’s impression of the military was usually stereotypical focusing on 
conscripts and weapons with only few people perceiving the armed forces as an 
employer where they could pursue a career.210 The SAF needs to create an image to the 
public that it is not just an armed institution, but also a desirable workplace and a 
potential employer in the labour market. This is underlined as one of the six strategic 
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objectives for defence transformation.211 Targeting potential groups such as second 
generation immigrants in the youth cohorts could be an effective way to boost 
recruitment. However, the SAF should not just focus on those who are already 
interested in the military, but rather look at the broader part of the manpower base that 
consists of those who are at least initially, less interested.212 
The foremost recruitment target is to employ around 16,000 volunteer soldiers, in which 
the majority are reserve soldiers. The recruitment is to be fulfilled with step by step 
progress within the four-year timeline between 2011 and 2014; each year the SAF needs 
to recruit approximately 4,000 soldiers.213 Nevertheless, the SAF emphasises that 
setting the recruitment targets for part-time soldiers should wait until 2019. To become a 
soldier all applicants must be Swedish citizens with at least 18 years of age to be 
qualified. Other criteria include the minimum academic performance in high school and 
no criminal records in past five years.214 Unlike the American AVF transition in the 
1970s, the SAF does not compromise quality for quantity; according to a senior 
information official from the Headquarters, the recruiting standards in terms of 
intellectual and physical standards of applicants will not be lowered.215 Soldiers’ 
motivation is another vital issue as it not only influences recruitment, but is heavily 
associated with retention.216 The SAF has been improving and creating incentives to 
inspire and motivate the youth cohorts to join the military, and to retain the existing 
personnel. The recent pay raise for soldiers is a good example.217 
Diversity of personnel recruitment 
Generally speaking, the diversity of the military is an important issue in West Europe 
because the military as an organisation also has a social function to perform;218 Sweden 
                                                     
211 2009 Armed Forces Annual Report, Appendix 2, pp 6- 8. 
212 2011 Armed Forces Annual Report, p.7. 
213 Interview, participant SE-1. 
214 At least Grade G in math, English, Swedish and A in civics. 
215 Interview, participant SE-2. However, the SAF have not yet faced recruitment shortage. 
216 People who are not motivated by military life are less likely to join. If soldiers are not highly 
motivated or are not content with military life, they are more likely to leave or drop out, causing low 
retention and high turnover rates. 
217 Height pay for squad leaders, soldiers and sailors, 17 Oct, 2012.  
<http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/Aktuellt/centralanyheter/Hojd-lon-for-gruppbefal-soldater-och-sjoman
/>, accessed 22 Oct, 2012. 
218 Christopher Dandeker and David Mason, 2003,Diversifying the Uniform? The Participation of 
Minority Ethnic Personnel in the British Armed Services, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 29, No.4, 




is no exception. To fulfil social responsibility and to meet the recruitment target, 
functional, ethnic and gender homogeneity is not encouraged. The objective of diversity 
has two aspects in the SAF: gender and ethnicity, which is less to do with operational 
effectiveness, but rather associated more with social responsibility. Each service 
member in the SAF no matter what his or her ethnic origins, gender, skin colour, 
religion, sexual orientation, or service grade is, should be equally respected and treated. 
The SAF uphold a policy that every person should have the equal right to gender 
identity, therefore an objective is to represent the entire Swedish society with a broad 
representation of the population.219 Broadening recruitment target groups and 
increasing the proportion of women and people with other ethnic backgrounds are 
therefore an objective for the SAF.220 However, in the meantime women only account 
for five percent of the officer corps and 10 percent of soldiers and NCOs, which is 
considered by the supreme commander as a failure of the armed forces (Figure 3-2).221 
 
Figure 3-2 The proportion of women in the armed forces 
 
4. Reform of the NCO corps 
The NCO is the core of training and execution of operations. Throughout history the 
NCOs in the US armed forces have played roles as leaders, trainers, and technical 
experts. Garrett found that the professionalisation of American NCOs has given 
increasing levels of training, education, pay, power, prestige, and authority to those who 
accomplish their military missions while looking after soldiers.222 Dandeker also argues 
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that in order for officers to focus on their field of professional competence, it is essential 
for an AVF to create a cadre of NCOs who are able to supervise other ranks and deliver 
sub-tactical effects.223 
Before the reform of the officer’s rank structure in 1984,224 NCOs had already existed 
in the SAF and the ranking system of officer corps was similar to the US and British 
armed forces. It was due to government’s intention to enhance the integration of 
democratic and civil values in the armed forces, and to eliminate one of the last 
remnants of the old Swedish hierarchical society built on social classes.225 In addition, 
owing to the non-alignment policy during Cold War, in many aspects the SAF did not 
interoperate with allied forces, including military ranking structure. In the unified 
officer system, officers are recruited to be focused on pursuing higher, theoretical 
studies and career development favouring promotion to the senior level.226 After NCOs 
were abolished in 1984, the SAF lacked this important category of officer for more than 
two decades, resulting in shortage of specialists who have the specific knowledge and 
skills. A senior official from the information department of the Headquarters pointed 
out:227 
 
‘Now we are introducing a brand new idea, AVF, and going back to the NCO system because we need 
specialists and we need NCOs. (…) American advisors told us that we have excellent officers and 
soldiers, but we lack NCOs; we need to have an NCO system, we need to have professionals.’  
 
It has to identify what kind of NCOs that the SAF need? The new NCOs should possess 
the right specialised competence and skills, which can support and allow young officers 
to develop their military career. In the past, the SAF created many staff officers whose 
bureaucratic skills can presumably run the warfighting conscript organisation in 
peacetime. However, in the AVF era, this kind of staff officer has had a much reduced 
utility because skills such as the training of conscripts are not needed anymore. The 
SAF therefore need more NCOs but less bureaucratic staff officers. 
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Another consideration for officer rank reform is to enhance interoperability. For 
multinational missions, establishing an officer ranking system that is in accordance with 
the international system helps enhance interoperability. The objective of the specialist 
officer reform is based on the demand to have different types of skill-sets in the SAF, in 
order to meet the need for personnel working in the practical part of the military tasks. 
Therefore, to improve the effectiveness of the officer resource system and to increase 
the number of specialists with good knowledge and skills, the SAF decided to pursue 
the officer rank reform by creating the two-tier officer system and increasing the 
number of specialist officers.228 
The SAF started to embark on the specialist officer reform in 2009 to introduce different 
categories of ranks. Specialist officers are in fact equivalent to NCOs since the rank is 
below the officer level and the job functions centre on middle management which 
requires them to develop specialised techniques. Adopting two categories of officers 
means that the roles between officers and specialist officers need to be redefined: 
officers are leaders and managers, while specialist officers act as trainers and experts. 
These two types of officers will need to work complementarily with each other, where 
an officer is a generalist mainly dealing with higher levels for planning, the specialist 
officer is an expert concentrating on middle to lower activities. However, for a military 
culture that is rooted from the legacy of military non-alignment where interoperability 
was not essential, creating a competent specialist officer corps has faced obstacles. The 
main tasks of NCOs are to train, assist and support platoon commanders to run the 
platoon and higher levels. There is a cultural and organisational problem existing in the 
current relationship between officers and NCOs in terms of division of labour. The 
discrepancy lies at that NCOs think junior officers should focus more on the details of 
running the platoon, while officers wish to move on quickly without spending too much 
time in the platoon level.229 Another issue worth thinking about is that if an officer has 
special expertise, then he/she should be a specialist officer, which then serves as the 
deputy to the generalist officer. Could this affect the morale of the officer corps? 
In order to facilitate the transition and increase the number of specialist officer posts, it 
is considered that the terms of employment for specialist officers should be in 
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accordance with commissioned and reserve officers who are on permanent contracts.230 
Therefore, specialist officers are categorised as senior NCOs in order to distinguish 
them from junior NCOs who are on fixed-time contracts. The challenge lies in dealing 
with the imbalance between the number of officers and specialist officers as only a few 
officers will leave the armed forces before 2014 and there will be a substantial surplus 
of officers and a shortage of specialist officers. The approach is to fill the positions of 
specialist officers with the existing officers. In comparison with the officer corps in 
2009 (9,170 officers and 529 specialist officers)231, the number of officers will be 
reduced to 4,600 while the number of specialist officers will increase equally to 4,600 
(Table 3-2); nearly half of the officer corps will be affected.232 
Table 3-2 Number of Specialist Officer Positions 
Category 1 Jan 2012 1 Jan 2013 Difference 
Officers 8600 4600 -4000 
Specialist Officers 1000 4600 +3600 
Total number of Officers 9600 9200 -400 
Civilians 6600 6200 -400 
Source: Forsvarets Forum, number 6, 2012, p.9. 
According to the new personnel plan, the platoon commander serving as the first-line 
manager will be significantly empowered to have greater responsibility for setting 
salaries, employment and promotion for soldiers. Considering that experienced 
specialist officers can play the role as a mentor to assist young or less experienced 
officer to run the platoon, the SAF plans to assign the existing officers as deputy platoon 
commanders. Platoons can either be led by experienced officers with specialist officers 
as a deputy or by experienced specialist officers with less experienced specialist officers 
as a deputy.233 Another consideration for NCO reform is to enhance officer’s 
educational qualifications: the new personnel rules dictate that officers should have 
university degrees; existing officers without proper academic degrees are more likely to 
be assigned to the positions of specialist officer.234 
This is a dramatic change to the structure of the officer corps and also a great challenge 
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to the military culture of the SAF. The conversion in officer ranks is complicated and 
related to many personnel issues such as the seniority, pay grade, form of employment 
and military expertise which would have potential consequences to the usability and 
availability of the armed forces. Another important issue is that the imbalance in officer 
corps should not be assessed merely by numbers, it should also be judged by the 
competence of officers. According to a senior official in the personnel department of the 
SAF Headquarters:235 
‘The reform of the officer corps is not just a mathematical calculation and thus cannot be carried out 
based on wishful thinking or officers’ willingness. The skills and competence of officers in fitting 
the specialist officer positions must be considered and evaluated. Due to the difficulty in balancing 
competence, the armed forces have explained to the government that the goal of a two-tier officer 
system will need to wait until 2014 to be fully accomplished.’ 
New training and education programmes for officers and specialist officers have been 
separated since 2009. Compared with the longer period of officer training conducted in 
the National Defence College, the specialist officer training is a shorter three-term 
programme with practical-oriented courses. Most courses are held at the Armed Forces 
military Academy in Halmstad and also in the training units.236 
5. Reservist reform 
The present reform aims to significantly increase the number of volunteer reservists to 
form the contracted reserve units. The SAF has long history and substantial experience 
of recruiting and utilising reserve officers and NCOs. Reserve soldiers were excluded in 
this category because conscripts already supplied sufficient manpower to the SAF. 
These reservists were voluntary based rather than ex-regular service personnel. 
Danielsson et al. identify four roles played by Swedish reserve officers. First, they are 
required to fill vacancies, that is, a volume regulator. Second, the reserve officers are 
needed because they have unique competences other than military that are used by the 
armed forces. Third, reserve officers are needed from an economic point of view 
because the personnel costs are cheaper. Finally, reserve officers contribute to the 
civil–military relationship.237 These four roles underpin the importance of reservists in 
the Swedish defence. 
 
                                                     
235 Interview, participant SE-3. 
236 Pocket Guide to the Swedish Armed Forces 2009, p.47 




The SAF’s personnel structure is overhauled in the 2009 defence reform through 
significant utilisation of the new type of recruits: reserve soldier, seaman and squad 
leader. These types of soldiers serve on a part-time contract basis. Their designed 
pattern of work is similar to reserve officers, where soldiers spend 80 per cent of their 
time working in civilian jobs, with the remaining 20 per cent for the reservist service. 
Reserve soldiers can be called for full-time duty to be deployed for international 
missions, which could take up to six months. The reserve system will form an important 
component of personnel supply for SAF in the future. The advantage is that the SAF 
does not need to bear the large personnel cost; and it is expected to link people with 
desirable civilian skills to the armed forces without requiring them to serve 
continuously.  
 
Paired with full-time regular soldiers, reserve soldiers will gradually become the 
backbone of personnel those reserve units discussed above. It is an innovation, but also 
a challenge because the SAF has never recruited this type of soldier in the past. In 
addition, in the long-term, 75 per cent of the entire order of battle in the armed forces 
will serve on part-time basis.238 Legislation is the key to the success for recruiting 
reserve soldiers. The Act 2012 came in effect in July 2012. According to Article seven 
of the Act, the normal period of employment is between six and eight years, with the 
possibility to extend up to sixteen years. In addition, Article 27 stipulates that reserve 
soldiers shall inform their civilian employers about their military employment and are 
obliged to keep their civilian employers informed of scheduled military service.  
6. Public image of the SAF and support from society 
Previous experience has shown that without a positive image and public support, 
recruiting young men and women from the society could be difficult. The SAF 
acknowledge that public image is influential for the youth cohorts to perceive the SAF 
as a potential employer.239 Parliament’s defence committee stressed that it is crucial that 
the public has a good knowledge of the SAF and society’s crisis preparedness.240 
Despite efforts made to increase the exposure of the SAF to the public, studies and 
surveys conducted in recent years have shown a declining trend regarding public 
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awareness on security and defence issues.241 According to the SAF analysis, Swedes’ 
knowledge of and interest in the armed forces and defence affairs is low. Furthermore, 
the public image of the SAF as a working environment suffers from the impression of 
being obsolete, hierarchical, risky and unequal.242 
Since the end of the Cold War, while general support for the armed forces remains 
strong, defence issues have become somewhat insignificant, and defence affairs have 
been gradually neglected by the Swedish politics and society. Petersson observes that 
both internal and external legitimacy for the transformation process of the SAF has been 
in decline, as the reform is questioned and the external support for AVF only reaches 25 
percent.243 The SAF therefore need to regain public support and attention for AVF and 
personnel reform. 
Due to lack of a clear and immediate threat to the country, public debate on current 
defence reform has been overshadowed by other issues such as health and education. A 
senior information official from the Headquarters commented:244 
‘…[i]f general public support for the SAF and operations in Afghanistan, Libya was greater, the 
AVF transition would be much easier. Because when we talk about recruitment, regardless of the 
financial side, if general public, parents and relatives recognise the SAF, recruitment would be 
easier. It would be very hard if soldiers do not get support from their families, and they would be 
reluctant to join the service.’ 
From the media’s perspective, a Swedish defence journalist highlights that public 
support is the most important factor for a successful AVF transition. However, he gave a 
pessimistic view on the public support of the AVF transition as he believed that the 
general public do not understand this defence reform so support for it could be 
limited.245 Lack of wider public interest and debate on defence issues could also affect 
how decision makers formulate defence policies. The SAF needs to explain to its 
society its foreign missions in order to gain support. For example, in contrast to the 
mission in Libya where most Swedes understand and support the mission, support for 
ISAF missions have been in decline because the majority of Swedes do not know what 
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the SAF is doing in Afghanistan or why. Also, the shift of mission away from 
expeditionary and international missions with more focus on territorial defence in the 
past two years should also be addressed. 
Current public image and support for the SAF 
The current public image and support for the armed forces can be gathered from the 
recent defence psychological surveys on people’s perception, attitudes and willingness 
of defence toward the Sweden’s security. The results show that in the past decade the 
support for the Swedish defence and the armed forces remains strong and stable. About 
half of people strongly support it while more than one quarter fairly supports the 
Swedish armed forces. In general, the military defence is supported by 80 percent of 
Swedes.246 
Support for the armed forces can also be reflected by the people’s willingness to defend 
the country. Empathically, people who show robust and positive willingness to defend 
the country would more or less tend to support their armed forces. The figures are 
similar to those indicating support for military defence. The results show that more than 
70 percent of Swedes are willing (both strongly and fairly) to bear arms to resist in the 
event of military attack.247 Despite the SAF enjoying stable support from the public, 
and Swedes demonstrating a solid determination to defend the country, support for the 
all-volunteer force transition should not be taken for granted. Before the AVF decision 
was announced in 2009, only one quarter of Swedes favoured the AVF while nearly 40 
percent or higher preferred the conscription system.  
The government survey is also backed by the 2009 media poll conducted just days after 
the MOD announced the AVF decision: 63 percent of the entire population favouring 
conscription.248 A more recent survey in Austria showed similar results.249 Foghelin 
explains that it is psychologically difficult to change processes and culture which have 
served well for a long time.250 Nevertheless, the latest (2011) survey showed that, one 
year after the suspension of conscription, the support for AVF has increased from 29 
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percent in 2009 to 39 percent in 2011, for the first time exceeding the support for 
conscription.251 This dramatic change can probably be interpreted thus: one year after 
the adoption of AVF, Swedish people have started to accept and get used to the new 
system.  
The strong public support for the armed forces and the determination to defend the 
country confirm that the SAF is highly regarded in society. Blended with lower but 
increasing support for AVF, it can be deduced that Swedes tend to favour the form of 
military service based on voluntary participation which is more helpful for recruitment. 
However, it is still too early to say that the SAF has acquired the image of an attractive 
employer. It requires a longer-term observation to identify the trend in terms of support 
for the AVF. As one personnel staff from the SAF Headquarters commented: ‘We are 
still on Honeymoon!’252 
7. The timeline of defence reform 
Having examined various objectives of defence reform, the last issue is to identify when 
these objectives will be accomplished. It only took Sweden one year to end conscription 
after the bill was passed in June 2009, a relatively short transition period compared with 
other countries. The decision of a one-year AVF transition timeframe was taken mainly 
for political considerations as it was initiated and demanded by the Parliament and the 
government rather than driven internally by the military. In fact, when AVF reform was 
discussed within government in early 2009, the original timeline proposed by the armed 
forces was two years in order to spare sufficient time for implementation and correction. 
However, the government decided to hasten the transition by shortening the time to one 
year.253 A senior official of the SAF commented:  
‘From [a] military perspective, the transition period should be longer in order to be better 
prepared. What SAF originally proposed in 2008 and 2009 was to wait until July 2011 to end the 
conscription. However, in order to avoid the conscription issue being debated during the 
Parliamentary election campaign in October 2010, the former Liberal/Conservative government 
decided to make a quicker transition before the election. The Parliament and the government 
thus suspended conscription one year earlier in July 2010.’254 
The SAF followed the political decision and reached a zero draft on time. Nevertheless, 
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the opposition Social Democrats argued that the defence reforms and the legislative bills 
were rushed through parliament, and added ‘defence policy and the implementation of 
important reforms should not be handled in such a hasty way.’255 Overall defence 
reform should be looked at from a broader perspective; the one-year AVF 
transformation is not the only goal of the 2009 defence reform as it is part of a wider 
personnel and structural reform package. The entire defence reform is set to be achieved 
in two phases by 2014 and 2019 respectively.256 The Government demands the reform 
to be delivered in 2014, but the SAF argue that, due to budget constraints, 2014 will 
only be one step closer toward the end goal, which is estimated by SAF around 75 to 
80% of targets is expected to be achieved. The remaining 20-25% of tasks will have to 
wait until 2019 to be fully implemented.257 One senior personnel official of the SAF 
Head Quarters stressed:258 
‘The reform is a tremendous challenge; but I think so far at least if you look at 2018 or 2019, for 
sure we are going to be successful, but not in the short perspective.’ 
Depending on tasks, various objectives and proposed timelines are shown in Table 3-3. 
Two crucial objectives: imbalance in personnel and the formulation of operational units 
will take a longer time than the scheduled date of 2014. 
 
Table 3-3 Objectives of Defence Reform and Timelines 
Objectives Timelines 
Voluntary recruitment 2014 
Work obligation for all duties 2014 
Imbalance are corrected 2019 
Regular units and reserve units 2019 
Two-tier system – officers and other ranks 2014 
The international force is disbanded 2014 
Source: Personnel Department of the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, acquired 
and updated by author in September, 2011. 
One of the important breakthroughs is the obligation for all personnel to serve on 
international missions. The reforms require all levels of personnel employed by SAF 
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including soldiers, NCOs, officers and civilians to serve on international operations in 
accordance with their individual employment contracts.259 Important progress has been 
made in which all officers have agreed to the new work obligation to serve in 
international operations. This objective is to regularise international commitments to 
missions with a move away from ad hoc elements to proper rotation of regular and 
reserve components; it was achieved in 2010 and has been applied since then.260 Even 
though missions like KFOR and ISAF may not last long, the commitments are now 
performed by standing regular units rather than ad hoc units. Voluntary recruitment is 
aimed to be achieved in 2014; it includes three types of soldiers: full-time regular 
soldier, part-time reserve soldier, and Home Guard soldiers. As noted above the 
specialist officer reforms are expected to be rolled out by 2014.  
Summary  
Table 3-4 summarises Sweden’s AVF transformation and defence reform, which 
highlights the key differences between pre and post-reform of the Swedish defence. The 
strategic objective, military strategy, operational environment, missions, functions, and 
structure of the armed forces will have undergone significant transformation, which is a 
great challenge to the SAF. Although some objectives such as the zero draft have 
already been reached, others such as recruiting reserve soldiers and restructuring 
operational units need to take a longer time, up to 2019. It would be worthwhile to 
observe whether the reserve soldiers can be recruited in sufficient numbers and of the 
right quality or whether the specialist officer reform can be carried out smoothly. 
Whether or not the objectives of these tasks can be reached will affect the ultimate 
target: a functional defence. How Taiwan sets its strategic goal and individual objectives 
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Table 3-4 Transformation of the Swedish defence 
Before reform After reform 
Defence against invasion Actively used security policy tool 
Preventive approach Oriented towards involvement 
Defence against massive military invasion Continuously ongoing crisis management 
operations 
National perspective Multinational & International perspective 
Stored material/ mobilization system Frequently used military capabilities 
Opponents well defined Blurred picture of opponents 
Quantity based organisation Quality based organisation 
Focus: Plans, administration, training of 
conscripts 
Focus: Ongoing crisis management operations 
Fixed structures Modular structures 
Operational environment defined Variation of operational environment 
Military non-alignment Frequent participation of UN, EU and NATO 
based on solidarity declaration 
Source: Tommy Jeppsson, May 2009, Swedish Military transformation and the Nordic 
Battle Group – for what and towards what? p. 95. Modified by author. 
 
3.3 Taiwan 
Changes in strategic concept 
Strategic objectives of Taiwan’s defence reform 
The defence transformation and specific objectives of the Swedish AVF are strongly 
influenced by changes in strategic environment and concepts. On the contrary, for 
Taiwan as a quasi-sovereign state, much of its strategic contexts and background has 
been fixed and remained the same as before. No significant amendment in strategic 
concept has so far been made, despite some modest changes in military strategy in 
accordance with recent cross-strait detente. International operations and multinational 
military exercises are not foreseen in the near future. It was the primacy of domestic 
politics that triggered the change in the military manpower system. Therefore, in light of 
the fixed strategic concept, the objectives of Taiwan’s AVF are almost self-contained. As 
part of the 2008 presidential campaign platform and subsequent declarations, in terms of 
defence agenda, President Ma pledged to:  
 
‘1. Transform Taiwan’s conscription-based armed forces to an AVF within four to six years;  
2. Restructure the military to a smaller but smarter, and more competent force; and  
3. Maintain defence spending to the level of no less than three per cent of GDP.’261 
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Building a smaller volunteer force is the strategic goal that the president intends to 
achieve at the political level. Taiwan would like to show the region, not least PRC in the 
context of less strained cross-strait relations, that its small but capable AVF is able to 
deter any enemy and defend the country. After assuming the presidency in 2008, 
suspending conscription became the government’s policy and the Ministry of National 
Defense immediately embarked on AVF implementation. By the government’s 
calculation, it is expected to create a force that is capable to respond to invasions and to 
carry out humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions, while resolving 
the problem of insufficient supply of able-bodied men due to the low birth rate and an 
aging population. President Ma’s idea is to enhance the quality of the armed forces and 
create an effective deterrence capability through utilisation of fewer personnel and less 
resource,262 which is somewhat similar to Sweden’s approach by using existing 
resources to implement the reform.  
Taiwan’s armed forces have undergone two major military downsizings in the late 
1990s and mid 2000s.263 Although the number of personnel was dramatically reduced, 
the military manpower supply was still dependent on a mixed system comprising a 
majority of conscripts with an increasing number of volunteer soldiers. Compulsory 
service was still maintained and therefore fully suspending the conscription is more 
challenging than simply downsizing the size of military, in which former defence 
minister Kao admits that the AVF transition is the most important and challenging task. 
Most measures conceived by the MND, including an auxiliary military downsizing and 
restructuring project, legislation for relevant military service laws, adjustments in 
strategy and missions, and the creation of incentives, are ultimately aimed at building an 
AVF. At the political level, the government has expressed a firm commitment to push on 
with this reform and the President has stressed this issue on various occasions.  
Objectives of AVF transformation 
 
This section is focused on the objectives of Taiwan’s AVF in a structured discussion 
along lines similar to that followed earlier for Sweden. It starts with the description of 
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five overall objectives of AVF and four guiding principles for implementation. Based on 
these important guidelines from the MND, the next task is to discuss the criteria of 
achieving a successful transition one at a time. It first identifies the missions of the AVF, 
followed by force restructuring in which a significant part through downsizing. Then the 
recruitment issues, reform of the NCO corps and reserve force, and public support of the 
armed forces are examined. The last criterion is the timeframe for the transition. 
1. Strategic concept and objectives for Taiwan’s AVF transformation 
Even though Taiwan’s strategic environment and context has not radically changed, its 
defence policy and strategy have undergone some alterations, from offensive strategy 
with the intention of retaking the mainland in the early decades after 1949, to the current 
defensive strategy. The latest strategic shift was in 2008, as Taiwan revised its defence 
strategy from ‘active defence’ adopted by former DPP regime to current ‘pure defence’. 
Due to former President Chen’s pro-independence political stance, Taiwan’s defence 
posture upheld a more active element. Since 2008, the open policy towards the 
mainland under the current Ma administration has led to a slight thaw in the rigid 
military tension between the two sides and therefore a provocative military strategy was 
abandoned. All this notwithstanding, it does not mean that Taiwan has given up its 
determination to defend itself because the mainland Chinese military threat continues 
with its formidable and advanced capability.  
Taiwan’s current national defence strategy dubbed as ‘Hard ROC’ is meant to 
consolidate the defence of the Republic of China (Taiwan) as hard as rock, through the 
military strategy of ‘resolute defence and credible deterrence’. The Hard ROC is one of 
Taiwan’s recent changes in terms of military strategy and serves as a two-edged sword 
as it not only defends the territory of Taiwan, but also poses a credible threat to PRC 
without claiming the first use of force. Even though tensions still exist, the concept of 
Hard ROC is based on peaceful co-existence and is supposed to supplement easier 
cross-strait relations. The strategic objective of Hard ROC is not victory in war, but to 
deter the PRC by presenting the threat of inflicting significant damage and to maximize 
the cost to PRC through an enhanced deterrence capability. Taiwan’s approach to AVF 
contrasts with the expeditionary ambitions of Sweden and other western countries. The 




territorial defence.  
National strategic objectives 
Taiwan as a quasi-sovereign state is neither threat-free nor is it allowed to participate in 
international operations and joint military exercises; building an expeditionary AVF is 
therefore not feasible, at least in the near future. Without a significant change in the 
strategic environment and a reduction in the level of threat, Taiwan’s national defence 
strategy is still threat-based with focus on war prevention, homeland defence, 
contingency response, conflict avoidance and regional stability (Figure 3-3). It is 
obvious that Taiwan’s defence strategy is rather reactive and inward looking. In terms of 
missions and tasks, by upholding the military strategy of ‘resolute defence and credible 
deterrence’, the armed forces aim to:264 
 
‘1. Defend the territory to ensure national security;  
2. Deter the enemy and maintain strong warfighting capabilities;  
3. Counter blockade to maintain sea and aerial lines of communication;  
4. Pursue joint Interception to retard enemies from approaching the territory;  
5. Conduct ground defence to prevent enemy’s landing operation.’ 
The concept and principle underpinning these tasks is basically to engage with the 
enemy away from Taiwan’s territory in order to avoid war breaking out on the island. 
Aside from defence and deterrence, the first line of defence is counter blockade in order 
to keep Taiwan’s economy functioning. By combining the Navy, Air Force, and 
land-based air defence, joint interception is the second line of defence to prevent enemy 
landings on Taiwan’s soil. If an enemy is approaching and ready to land, ground defence 
based on the Army is the last resort to degrade or defeat the enemy before they land on 
the island. The armed forces need to build a high mobility within the territory of Taiwan 
to quickly engage the enemy. 
 
  
                                                     




National Defence Strategy: Hard ROC 































































Figure 3-3 Defence policy and military strategy of Taiwan 
Source: ROC Quadrennial Defense Review, 2009, p.17. 
 
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) - A new mission focus 
One of the most obvious shifts for Taiwan armed forces is to focus more on 
Humanitarian Assistance/ Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions. On top of the traditional 
military tasks, Taiwan armed forces since 2009 have incorporated these missions into its 
core responsibilities. The 2009 typhoon disaster caused political unrest as people lost 
trust in the government’s ability in handling disaster relief. Accordingly the HA/DR 
operation has since become one of the major focuses and priorities for the armed forces. 
In light of this shift, Dandeker points out that the underpinning concepts for the 
missions of Taiwan’s armed forces are to prevent the outbreak of war in the Taiwan 
Strait, to protect democracy and freedom in Taiwan, and to provide a context of the 
development of HA/DR missions.265 
To enhance the efficiency of HA/DR efforts, the government amended the Disaster 
Prevention and Rescue Act in 2010. An immediate effect has been the shift of the 
military’s operational focus towards active engagement in HA/DR missions. 
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Notwithstanding this development, some officers think that the shift may compromise 
regular training and combat readiness. However the government’s aim is for the armed 
forces to take on mission roles with focus specifically on HA/DR operations during 
peacetime, and carrying out war-fighting along with mobilised reservists when war or 
conflict breaks out.266 
The next task is to introduce what Taiwan armed forces intend to achieve in order to 
deliver the AVF transformation. The discussion is divided into two parts: first describing 
and discussing the overall objectives of Taiwan’s AVF transformation followed by 
introducing the guiding principles for the AVF implementation.  
Overall objectives of AVF implementation 
According to MND, general objectives for the implementation of AVF have been 
formulated.267 First of all, there is the aim of building an elite and professional AVF. 
Under the political guidance of building a ‘smaller but smarter force’, the AVF should 
be built through efficient utilisation of existing defence resources without compromising 
quality and competence. This is of significance especially when the government does 
not provide extra funds for the armed forces to implement the AVF. The MND has had 
to seek available resources to subsidise the transition, such as shifting operational 
maintenance expenditure to supplement personnel costs. However, by doing so the 
military competence of the armed forces could be compromised.  
Secondly, there is the matter of selecting an appropriate type of AVF that fits Taiwan’s 
special strategic situation. As mentioned above, the end of the Cold War did not trigger 
substantial strategic change in Taiwan. It is an unusual case to end conscription while 
still facing a military threat and not being part of a strategic defence alliance such as 
NATO.268 Taiwan’s AVF is therefore stand-alone with threat-based strategic objectives 
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and military tasks. Although some lessons from the West are worth learning, a purely 
western expeditionary-typed AVF may not fully function in Taiwan. The type and 
functions of Taiwan’s AVF need to be carefully tailored so it can fulfil its own security 
requirements, and can fit into its political, economic and social contexts. 
Thirdly, there is the issue of enhancing the competence of the regular force.269 For 
decades, the defence structure of Taiwan has been solely composed of active-duty 
regular forces, which have been the backbone of Taiwan’s armed forces since 1949. 
Without a significant change, this AVF transformation will still focus on active-duty 
regulars to fill all positions in the regular units. In light of political guidance, the MND 
expects to build a smaller but more capable AVF, which is to be reached through 
adoption of the auxiliary military downsizing project aiming to cut 60,000 personnel by 
the end of 2014. Important questions arise here: Does downsizing simply mean fewer 
regulars with better quality? The quality of the longer-serving volunteer regulars is 
expected to be better, so the Taiwan armed forces aim to have fewer regular soldiers 
who can play multiple roles and conduct various military tasks.  
Fourthly, there is the matter of establishing a reliable reserve force. Taiwan has been 
maintaining a 2.8 million strong force of reservists but only with a purely theoretical 
capability; therefore the MND aims to improve the reliability of the reserve force.270 
This is to be done in line with the compulsory four-month basic military training service. 
Because Taiwan will still be facing the PRC military threat, even after the AVF is fully 
implemented, compulsory service will still carry on but in a much reduced form through 
basic military training. The other consideration is that the legal basis of the AVF is an 
amendment of the Military Service Law; the constitution which requires all men liable 
for conscription service is untouched. Following the compulsory (constitutionally 
mandated) four months basic training, men are automatically registered into the reserve 
force until the age of 36. The purpose is to transform all draftees into the reserve 
manpower pool through a short period of infantry training. The operational guidance is 
to engage the enemy with regular forces in the frontline, while reservists are mobilised 
for homeland protection in the rear. Regular and periodical exercises are conducted to 
                                                     
269 It sounds like cliché, but this is the MND statement of the basis of the new AVF, despite the MND 
have been saying this for years, even before the AVF. 





refresh the combat skills of reservists and to improve the efficiency of mobilisation. In 
addition, if the need arises, reservists are required to perform HA/DR operation. The 
2010 Disaster Relief Act authorises the MND to mobilise reservists to supplement 
regular forces for HA/DR operations. 
Lastly, there is the issue of creating an attractive service environment. In traditional 
Taiwanese society, compared to other professions, the military is not highly regarded 
because it is believed that those who serve in the military perform poorly at schools. 
Therefore attracting young men and women to serve in military and retain them staying 
longer is a challenging task. A desirable working environment with attractive incentives 
is central for recruiting personnel. Various incentives including both monetary and 
in-kind schemes must be designed in order to attract young people to join.  
Principles for AVF implementation 
The AVF will be implemented based on the MND guiding principles.271 First, the stable 
growth of the numbers of volunteer soldiers must be maintained. The proportion and 
number of volunteer soldiers will grow incrementally each year over a four year period 
in the pattern of ‘initially fewer recruitment with increased volume later on’, which 
means that in the first half (2011-2012) of implementation, the recruiting volume target 
is lower than the second half (2013-2014). 
Second, relevant military service laws need further amendments. Laws and regulations 
regarding the following issues are to be legislated or amended: personnel management, 
cultivation, career planning, selection, alternative service, elimination and compensation. 
Most of the legal regulations have been in place. Third, the incentives will be gradually 
increased in coordination with financial resources in order to boost recruitment and 
retention. This is difficult because the MND has requested financial support from the 
central government (the Executive Yuan) to increase the base pay and bonus for 
volunteer soldiers, no positive response has yet been received. Unlike western militaries 
that can have adventure and challenges by going abroad, salary seems to be one of the 
few incentives that can attract the youth cohorts in Taiwan. Without proper incentives to 
attract young men and women, recruitment and retention will be difficult. Lastly, 
                                                     




conscription is not fully suspended by being converted to a shorter version of basic 
military training. This principle is vital and worth explaining in full. The most obvious 
characteristic of Taiwan’s AVF is that conscription is only partly suspended because 
draftees are still required by law to undergo four months of basic training. This is due to 
the obligations imposed by maintaining national security and conscription stipulated by 
the constitution.272 A senior legislator of the defence committee explained that:  
 
‘…[I] was one of the initiators of the four-month basic training. The initial thought was to put 
draftees in the boot camp for six weeks then deploy them to units performing simple tasks like 
guarding the barracks, in order for volunteer soldiers to operate sophisticated equipment and 
perform more difficult and complicated tasks.’
273
 
From a strictly military point of view, the short military training period is merely 
symbolic without contributing real competence. It is difficult to build up military 
competence with short service length, which is the main reason Taiwan decided to end 
conscription.274 People may argue that even though the one-year service is considered 
by many young men a waste of time, at least it serves its military purpose. Therefore 
people might doubt that why spending four months for basic training without fulfilling a 
military purpose. As a matter of fact, the existing military threat is another major 
concern for keeping the military training service because Taiwan’s armed forces adopt 
the approach of ‘maintaining a smaller force during peacetime, while expanding the size 
when war breaks out.’ The purpose of the basic training is to create a reservoir of 
qualified infantry soldiers, so they can be mobilised to expand the military size in case 
of war. The training will start with a two-month general infantry training in the boot 
camps, followed by another two months of specialist training; there will be no 
deployment to operational units. In fact, from a political perspective, it is difficult for 
Taiwan to totally abolish the compulsory service because the threshold and costs for 
amending the constitution are even higher. In facing the PRC military threat, once 
conscription is fully abolished from the constitution, it will be very difficult to retrieve it 
and this will leave Taiwan at a higher risk of military invasion.  
Both the overall objectives and guiding principles have shown that the success of basic 
                                                     
272 It is similar to the case of Germany; without amending the German Basic Law, conscription is 
suspended not abolished. 
273 Interview, participant TW-6. 
274 President Ma explains the shift to AVF is not to build a ‘posh’ army, but is due to the shortened length 
of conscription which has eroded the competence of the armed forces. Central News Agency, 26 June, 




training is influential to the entire AVF implementation. The armed forces need to sell 
themselves to the public and justify the purpose and legitimacy of basic training. 
Further questions can be raised on this issue: How will the four-month basic training be 
carried out? Will the quality of draftees through basic training satisfy the defence need? 
Will the armed forces face resistance and anticipate the four-month training to be a 
problem? The armed forces need to prepare and address these issues. 
In retrospect, both by law and by tradition, the Taiwanese people have been used to 
military service and most people abide by the law. The report rates for reservist 
mobilisation have always been very high; those who do not show up without proper 
reasons will face prosecution. In 2012 alone, 145,593 reservists were called up in 662 
batches for mobilisation training, and the average annual report rate reached 98.63 
percent.275 Therefore it can be assumed that Taiwanese people should be able to adapt 
to the new rule for the following reasons: 1. Traditionally, it is the long-enforced law for 
decades and Taiwanese people have been accustomed to it; 2. The new rule is shorter 
and easier than the previous one. People are less likely to resist a less tough law. In fact, 
many young men who were born after 1993 actually feel lucky as they do not have to 
serve one year but only four months instead. 3. Conscription is part of Taiwanese 
culture, even though most people do not like it, they simply accept it.276 It is 
worthwhile to observe and follow up whether the basic training can be carried out 
smoothly and problem free.277 
2. Restructuring of operational organisation and force size 
Downsizing the military establishment 
Taiwan's large military is a legacy of decades of tensions with PRC since 1949. After 
the abolition of the offensive strategy, significant downsizing has been carried out since 
mid-1990s; however, in order to make the AVF financially affordable, the overall 
number of military personnel needs to be further reduced. By the end of 2014 the 
                                                     
275 The ROC Executive Yuan administration report to the Legislature Yuan, session 3, February 2013, 
p.32. 
276 In fact, after leaving the conscription service, those who served in rigorous or physically demanding 
units such as the Marines Corps or Special Forces are usually proud of what they have done and like to 
show off to their colleagues and friends.   




overall number of positions will be reduced from the current 275,000 to 215,000. The 
MND aims to fill 90 percent of the positions so the number of total personnel will be 
reduced to 196,000, which includes 19,000 annual draftees for the four month training. 
In fact, the actual volunteer personnel only accounts for 176,000 and combat forces 
would constitute only147,000. The force level and organisation is adjusted through 
comprehensive assessment of the level of threats, national security situation, and 
financial resources. The size of the military establishment must be balanced between 
maintaining enough personnel for homeland defence and available financial resources. 
The magnitude of downsizing between 2011 and 2014 is shown in Table 3-5. 
 
Table 3-5 Estimated Personnel Target during the phase of Implementation and 
Validation 
Category/Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total Number of Billets 264,000 250,000 233,000 215,000 
Organisation Number of Personnel 239,000 226,000 211,000 196,000 
Increased Number of Volunteer soldiers 1,000 8,000 15,000 15,000 
Target of Total Volunteer Personnel 138,000 146,000 161,000 176,000 
Source: Gazette, Legislative Yuan, 2012, Vol. 101, No. 14. p.202. 
 
Organisational restructuring 
In addition to force reduction, efforts to restructure the defence organisation have been 
made. The principle is based on ‘streamlining high-level command and solidifying 
basic/lower level of units’, with the administrative and logistics personnel (tail force) 
being the priority to be cut.278 The complete force restructuring project is carried out by 
complying with AVF implementation and the military downsizing project. To reduce 
personnel costs, the total number of ranks of one-star and above and the proportion of 
non-combat personnel are being significantly reduced.279 Thus the MND has not saved 
higher ranking officers from reform and rationalisation.  
With regard to the command structure, the aim is to merge Logistics, Reserve, and 
Military Police commands into the existing tri-service system - Army, Navy and Air 
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Force command headquarters to streamline the effectiveness of joint operations. 
Defence resources will be mainly distributed to combat units; therefore most of the teeth 
forces will be maintained. Underperforming and redundant forces (for example, the 
corps for performing arts and the military police) unfitted to the operational 
requirements will be either merged or dismantled. The logistic organisation is one focus 
of reform: the present inefficient joint logistic system is to be replaced by service 
logistics in which the common logistics is under the command of the Army.280 
Regarding the type of personnel, the MND plans to increase the proportion of civilians 
in the MND headquarters as part of the civilian control of the military.281 In terms of 
non-combat tasks, administration and support works such as catering will be outsourced 
to civilian contractors so military personnel can focus on training and combat readiness. 
Reserve mobilisation and training will be centrally planned at the ministry level to 
incorporate ground operational needs.282 Generally speaking, the structure of 
operational units is not significantly modified in that the major forms of operational 
units are basically maintained: the Army is organised around combined arms brigades, 
the Navy in flotillas and the Air Force in fighter wings. All personnel in operational 
units are active-duty and volunteer-based. This can be interpreted from two perspectives: 
on one hand, Taiwan’s defence reform is conservative; on the other, it is rather realistic 
as it has recognised its limits regarding operating with other countries. 
3. Recruitment 
Recruiting volunteer soldiers is the foremost task of the AVF transformation.283 Under 
the current mixed system, the approach is to increase the number of volunteer soldiers 
while reducing conscripts in a gradual manner. Figure 3-4 shows the evolution of annual 
personnel targets set by MND in terms of the overall number of personnel and the 
number of volunteer personnel during the transition. The proportion of volunteer 
soldiers will grow by ten percent incrementally year by year over the four year period. 
As previously mentioned, the recruiting volumes in the first half of the third phase 
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(2011 and 2012) are fewer in order to allow a buffer period for modification. In the 
second half (2013 and 2014), the MND will greatly increase the recruiting volume in 
order to quickly fill the vacant posts left by conscripts before the last one leaving the 
military. It aims to recruit 23,000 volunteer soldiers in 2013 and 39,000 in 2014.284 An 
interesting question to ask is: based on the recruitment in the past few years, will 
Taiwan’s armed forces achieve these targets? The recruiting targets, especially in 2013 
and 2014, may be unrealistic. 
 
Figure 3-4 Implementation progress of AVF 
Source: Ministry of National Defense 
 
In terms of quality, in order to qualify to apply, all applicants must be at least 18 years 
old without a criminal record, receive high school or vocational school qualification, 
and pass the physical examination. They are then required to undergo a series of tests, 
including IQ, aptitude and physical tests, and interview. All these criteria must be met in 
order to be admitted to basic military training. Similar to Sweden, the qualification for 
entering the military has so far not been lowered, but the application procedure has been 
simplified to facilitate the intake flow. 
Creating incentives  
A way to overcome recruitment difficulties and employ the desired number and quality 
of people is to make it more attractive for young people to join the military than 
alternative employers. Incentives play a big role in enhancing attractiveness. Across all 
                                                     




phases, providing various incentives to boost recruitment and retention is an important 
objective dictated by the MND. The MND emphasises four motives that could attract 
young people: ‘1, the pay that is better than what is offered in the private sector; 2, 
providing a sound welfare and family care system; 3, a comprehensive retirement plan 
and veteran care system; and 4, taking soldier’s career and family into the consideration 
of the service regulations.’285 
Depending on the financial position, the MND aims to raise soldier’s basic salary to 
twice the legal minimum wage set by the government. Other objectives include offering 
service bonuses, streamlining career paths, increasing educational opportunities, 
improving working and living environments, revising the retirement scheme and 
veterans’ welfare, and enhancing family cares. Similar measures and schemes are also 
adopted to retain existing soldiers.  
Apart from operational effectiveness, the objective for the western AVF, including 
Sweden, also focuses on its social responsibility. From the political perspective, 
diversity of recruitment has been an important issue in Sweden (indeed in Western 
Europe as a whole), especially with respect to ethnic diversity. This is also an issue in 
Taiwan, nevertheless it involves a focus on gender rather than ethnicity as Taiwanese 
society is more culturally homogeneous. While western states can offer citizenship to 
immigrants as an incentive to join the military, Taiwan does not have such a broad 
immigrant base and therefore the way to diversify the recruitment pool is mainly to 
increase the number of women, which has been successful in recent years.  
4. Enhancing the quality and quantity of NCOs 
When it comes to NCO reform as part of the AVF implementation in Taiwan, several 
issues should be addressed: How did the NCO system work in the old conscript-based 
system? What do armed forces anticipate from the new NCO corps? What is the optimal 
size of the NCO corps? And do the armed forces need more NCOs but less officers and 
soldiers? What kind of specialised knowledge and skills do NCOs need so the overall 
competence of the armed forces can be enhanced? These questions should be answered 
before detailed reform measures are carried out.  
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Taiwan’s armed forces have been relying on NCOs ever since their foundation and the 
system has been consistently functioning in harmony with officers and soldiers. 
Compared with Sweden’s discontinuation of NCO system for over 25 years, Taiwanese 
NCOs as a central part of the three-tier personnel system have underpinned the 
competence of the armed forces in terms of execution of missions and tasks, training 
soldiers, and carrying out specialised tasks. Therefore, the quality of soldiers is to a 
great degree associated with the competence of the NCOs because they are in close 
contact with soldiers.   
Since 1990s, the modernisation process and acquisition of hi-tech weapon systems 
require high quality personnel, especially NCOs, as they are the main ones who actually 
operate and maintain the equipment. Nonetheless, as in Sweden the NCO also faces 
some problems, but in different ways. Although the competence of NCOs has developed, 
the three-tier system has not been running flawlessly in the entire personnel system as 
friction exists between the officer and NCO corps. Lack of autonomy and full 
authorisation due to detailed control of officers, and frequent turnover of conscripted 
NCOs due to shortened service length, have resulted in disharmony in the middle 
management of the armed forces and a lower proportion of NCOs related to officers and 
soldiers.286 These mismatches have affected the competence of the NCO corps. 
In fact, the fundamental problem of Taiwan’s NCOs is not the competence of NCOs per 
se; it is rather the relationship and coordination between officers and NCOs in terms of 
division of labour. The armed forces tend to attach more importance to the operational 
commanding officers and neglect technical officers and NCOs. Furthermore, the 
detailed management of officers has impeded and eroded the autonomy and authority of 
NCOs. One senior sergeant major identified the current problem for NCOs:287 
‘A serious issue of NCOs is that we are assigned too many responsibilities without having proper 
autonomy and authority in terms of the management and command of soldiers and NCOs. Until 
now, as a sergeant major [the highest NCO rank] and most senior NCO in the base, I do not have 
the authority to reward and punish soldiers and NCOs, and recommend their promotions. 
Besides, even though there is a NCO committee in every unit, the resolutions reached by the 
committee still need approval from the superior. The committee seems to be like a rubber 
stamp.’ 
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Former vice defence minister Michael Tsai et al pointed out that the priority in the 
modification of defence organisational structure is to change the proportions of different 
categories of personnel, enhance the technological skills of the personnel and the 
capabilities of the operational units. They went on and stressed that this should be done 
by professionalising and increasing the proportion of volunteer NCOs.288 The first 
NCO reform launched by MND in the late 1990s was aimed at improving the career 
planning, quality and welfare of NCOs; it also attempted to correct the ill-administered 
division of labour and increase the proportion of NCOs in the entire military personnel. 
Nevertheless, as a study conducted by the investigatory agency of Taiwanese 
government Control Yuan reveals that the proportion of NCO in recent years has not yet 
increased.289 
In coordination with the AVF implementation plan, the MND has initiated another NCO 
reform aiming to effectively utilise the functions of NCOs and to gain full authorisation 
and support from officers in order for them to dedicate to the middle-management, 
letting officers concentrate on planning and executive works. Schemes and targets for 
the professionalisation of NCOs have been developed and described below.290 
First, there has been a process of gradually reducing the number of conscripted NCOs as 
part of the effort in reducing the conscript ratio, and increasing the number of volunteer 
NCOs along with the recruitment progress of volunteer soldiers. The target is to raise 
the ratio of officer to NCO to soldiers from 1:1.88:1.95 in 2012 to 1: 2.12: 1.70,291 
which has confirmed that the armed forces need more NCOs but less officers and 
soldiers. Second, the military has been establishing and assigning senior positions for 
NCOs as Sergeant Major and NCO supervisors in command headquarters, corps, 
brigade, battalion, and company levels. This should not be just a position setting or 
window dressing, but rather they will be given full authorisation to command and 
manage soldiers and NCOs in their units.292 Third, reforming the division of labour in 
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terms of authority and responsibility between officers and NCOs. NCOs will not only be 
more autonomous in training and commanding, but are empowered to review and 
evaluate promotions, transfers, post assignments, trainings, and performance of 
personnel. Last is to promote overseas exchange programmes for NCOs. Similar to 
officers, NCOs will have more chances to be sent abroad for training, education and 
exchange visits.  
In addition to looking after and retaining NCOs, the MND will increase bonuses and 
improve the welfare and benefit of NCOs, and encourage them to acquire technical 
certifications and academic degrees. To cope with the increasing number of female 
volunteer soldiers, more female NCOs will be recruited, which is part of an effort to 
increase the participation of women in the military.  
5. Reforming reserve forces 
Promoting the capability and reliability of the reserve force is pledged as a major 
concern for the AVF implementation because the concept and practice of the ‘all-out 
defence’ demands a competent reserve force to operate in line with the regular 
component.293 A smaller regular force during peacetime requires a supplement of a 
large reserve force through mobilisation during war. While Sweden emulates the US and 
UK in recruiting voluntary reserve soldiers, due to differences in historical and strategic 
contexts, reserve forces in Taiwan only contain ex-regular personnel. Conscripts who 
have finished compulsory service are automatically registered as reservists until age of 
36. This is still applied to all draft-age men after they have done the four-month basic 
training.  
As for missions and tasks, the MND dictates that ‘the regular forces are deployed in the 
frontline to engage an enemy’s invasion, while the reservists deal with homeland 
defence in the rear.’ During peacetime, regular call-ups are practiced to sharpen 
reservists’ military skills and mobilisation efficiency. Non-traditional HA/DR missions 
have also been added to the responsibilities of the reservists. In principle, young and 
junior reservists are mainly assigned to combat units while senior and experienced 
personnel are allocated to technical and logistics units. 
                                                     




A question can be raised about how military training service can be carried out. 
According to statistics in past few years, the report rate for reservist recalls has always 
been high.294 With such short training, to ensure capability the reservists must rely on 
regular call-ups to refresh training and practice mobilisation. In general, reservists are 
mustered for training and exercise every two years. Another crucial part of reform is to 
enhance the combat readiness of reservists by incorporating them into the annual 
Han-Kuang military exercise. Within 24 hours, about 12,000 reservists are mobilised to 
perform various tasks in line with regular troops during exercises in order to validate the 
training results.295 This is a crucial step to test and demonstrate the training results of 
reservists, not just on paper. 
As part of the sixth National Defence Law, the administration and command structure of 
the reserve command has been amended from an independent command to sit directly 
under the Chief of General Staff. The basic military training regiments (the boot camps) 
which originally belonged to the reserve command have been shifted to the army. To 
allow a unified command, preparation and deployment of reserve units, ground reserve 
units are also reallocated under the jurisdiction of army. 
Although Taiwan’s reserve force is large in size (2.8 million), its competence has 
existed only on paper, and long been criticised as a symbolic force based on mass 
mobilisation. Taiwan adopts a rather traditional and conservative approach with the main 
focus on command structural change. Radical overhaul in the concept of reservists is 
limited as the function, mission and personnel type stay unchanged. In other words, 
reservists are still being treated as a symbolic backup force with on-paper competence. 
Many people worry about the quality of reserve forces as one officer from MND feels that 
once war breaks out and reservists are mobilised: ‘They will probably be the first ones to 
flee.’296 Without a considerable change in the personnel structure, the reserve force 
reform in Taiwan can only be considered as a pool of ex-regulars with those who have 
done the basic training. Therefore, it is important for Taiwan’s defence officials to think 
through what kind of reserve force it needs. If the definition of a competent reserve force 
is the western type which can be deployed overseas for real warfighting, Taiwan’s current 
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reserve system and structure needs an overhaul, otherwise it is still a window-dressing 
type of force. 
Horowitz has suggested that Taiwan should utilise volunteer part-time reservists who 
can be drawn on in an emergency on short notice to fill roles that do not require 
full-time peacetime attention. He stressed that greater reliance on post-mobilisation 
assets can reduce the need for active-duty recruits.297 A research project conducted by 
Taiwan’s Research, Development and Evaluation Commission backed Horowitz’s 
argument and suggested MND to consider recruiting volunteer reserve soldiers as part 
of the complementary measure for the proposed AVF project.298 
6. The Military’s public image and support 
Support for the Armed Forces 
Since the last major military conflict with PRC in the 1958 dubbed the ‘August 23rd 
Artillery Bombardment’ or ‘the second Taiwan Strait Crisis’ and sporadic minor 
conflicts during the 1960s, Taiwan’s armed forces have had no real military operations 
and international joint exercises. Thus the media tend to be harsh on the armed forces 
and often report the negative sides of the military such as notorious incidents or 
discipline issues. The death an Army conscripted corporal in July 2013 due to unlawful 
punishment has been reported on headlines for entire month, which has severely 
damaged military’s public image.299 In addition, Taiwanese society has a stereotyped 
impression of the military that tends to be authoritarian, dogmatic, and unproductive, 
and these views have discouraged most young people to join the military. It is further 
worsened by the soldier’s low social status. By advocating the importance of an all-out 
defence, the MND has strived to improve its public image with efforts to explain the 
mission of total defence to the public, strengthen civil-military relations, increase 
disaster relief efforts, open military bases to the public, and even make a TV drama 
series about life in boot camp.300 
In terms of military’s public image, a survey conducted by media in 2009 revealed that 
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the image of military personnel was viewed positively only by 44 percent of 
respondents, while 29 percent responded negatively. Comparing to the result of the 
same survey conducted in 1999, the majority (72 percent) of people showed much 
stronger support to the military, and only 12 percent of people had negative view on the 
military (Figure 3-5).301 
 
Figure 3-5 The public image of Taiwan’s military personnel (in %) 
 
The willingness to defend the country 
In terms of the willingness to defend Taiwan against Chinese invasion, the results 
indicate a complex picture. In 2011 the MND commissioned a civilian poll agency to 
conduct a survey on people’s willingness to defend the country. The result showed that 
76 percent of people are willing to fight if Taiwan is invaded.302 However, another 
survey conducted in the same year asking Taiwanese high school students about their 
willingness to fight for the country if it is under invasion: some 44 percent of 
respondents were not willing to do so, whereas only 39 percent answered yes.303 A 
2012 survey revealed that almost 60 percent of Taiwanese young people felt that people 
should have the right to refuse military conscription in the event of war against 
China.304 These results not only show that most Taiwanese young people do not intend 
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to sacrifice their lives fighting for the country if it is invaded, but also reflect the 
‘pragmatic attitudes’ of young people toward the cross-strait detente. In other words, 
amid the close economic tie with China, people’s attitudes toward China have started to 
shift from the traditional communist enemy and threat, to an open market where they 
have the opportunity to work, study, travel and do business. 
Support of AVF policy 
Unlike the shaky support for the armed forces, public support of Taiwan’s AVF policy 
has been relatively strong and stable. This can be seen from several surveys conducted 
by various institutes in the last decade. In July 2004, a media survey showed that a 
slight majority (52%) supported the AVF, with 33 percent opposed it; 15 percent had no 
comment or did not know.305 Between 2008 and 2010, four polls on the support of AVF 
policy were conducted by the MND, which showed that on average 70 percent of 
Taiwanese people support this policy.306 
The relatively low support for the armed forces, the unwillingness to defend the country 
and strong support for the AVF, to some extent reflects people’s traditional view of the 
military. Thus, based on survey results, it can be interpreted that most Taiwanese people 
have a limited desire to work in the military and prefer someone else to do the service. 
In light of these results, recruiting personnel might be foreseen to become more difficult 
if the military does not improve its public image. 
7. Timeline for zero draft: three phases by end of 2014 
The last objective to be discussed is the timeline for AVF implementation. Taiwan’s 
current threat-based defence, a relatively large conscript based military, and constraints 
on defence expenditure have prevented it from a swift shift in its personnel system. 
Taiwan government has thus spared more than five years to implement the AVF. The 
timeline was adopted by MND based on the President’s campaign promise ‘suspending 
conscription within four to six years’ through phased approach with overall 
implementation of AVF to be divided into three phases.307 
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Phase I (from May 2008 to June 2009) concentrates on planning and preparation works 
for AVF implementation. The main tasks include restructuring in defence organisation, 
boosting personnel recruitment, planning mobilisation mechanisms, benefits for service 
personnel, and a retirement scheme.  
Phase II (from July 2009 to end of 2010) focuses on AVF project formulation. 
Completing and amending relevant legislations and adjusting the organisational 
structure were the key efforts. Planning for incentives to boost recruitment was another 
focus. The Conscript Ratio (CR) was reduced to 40 percent during this stage. 
Phase III (from January 2011 to end of 2014): focuses on implementation and validation 
of the AVF. The AVF will be fully established in the final phase of transition. To 
measure and regulate the implementation progress, targets are to reduce CR by 10 
percent each year from 40 percent in 2010, 30 percent in 2011, 20 percent in 2012, 10 
percent in 2013, then finally reaches zero draft by the end of 2014. An important 
breakthrough during this phase is the passage of the amendment of the Military Service 
Law which dictates the cut-off time for conscription. Table 3-6 shows the planned three 
phases of implementation timeframe. 
Table 3-6 Three phases of AVF Implementation 





Implementation and Validation 


























The third reading of the amendment of the 
military service law passed. 
Conscript Ratio:  
2011: 30% (recruiting target:15,000) 
2012: 20% (recruiting target: 17,000) 
2013: 10% (recruiting target: 23,000) 
The last draftee entering conscription service.  
2014: 0 (recruiting target: 39,000) 
The last draftee entering one-year conscription in 
end of 2013, and last draftee leaving the service 
in end of 2014. 







Table 3-7 summarises the features of Taiwan’s AVF transformation. Due to the existing 
threat level and international constraints, Taiwan’s AVF goal and objectives are based on 
its constant strategic needs and therefore, no significant shift in strategic concepts is 
being made. Although Taiwan armed forces will shift to an AVF in 2015, compulsory 
service is not 100 percent suspended, but in a much reduced form. Taking the military 
threat and constitutional requirement into account, draft-age men still need to go to 
short military training but no deployment. Other than a cut in the overall establishment 
of the armed forces and some organisational changes in the chain of command, the basic 
structure of the armed forces and reserve force is not overhauled. Recruitment is to be 
enhanced by creating incentives and employing more women; nevertheless, recruitment 
target has been difficult to achieve. The competence of NCOs has already developed but 
the officer-NCO relationship needs to be coordinated and the quality and number of 
NCOs will be increased. The reservists are ex-regular service personnel with the 
addition of the draft-age men after they have finished basic training. The public image 
of the military is mediocre, but support for AVF is relatively high. This does not 
necessarily mean that people are interested in joining the military. 
Table 3-7 Transformation of Taiwanese Defence 
Before Reform After Reform 
Threat-based defence Threat-based AVF 
Hard ROC with Resolute defence and 
effective deterrence  
Hard ROC with Resolute defence and 
effective deterrence with emphasis on 
improved HADR capability 
Reactive  Reactive and pre-emptive for HA/DR with 
enhanced mobility 
Opponent well defined: PRC Opponent well defined: PRC with improved 
cross-strait relations and slightly mitigated 
military threat 
One year compulsory service AVF, draft men need to receive 4-month basic 
military training 
Fixed structure regular force 275,000 Fixed structure regular force 215,000 
Ex-regular reserve forces, no volunteer 
reservists and National Guard  
Expanded ex-regular reserve forces to 
accommodate the draftees, with modified 
command structure. No volunteer reservists 
and National Guard 
Operational environment defined: National 
perspective 
Operational environment defined: National 
perspective 
NCOs already existed Coordinated officer-NCO relationship. 
Increasing proportion of NCO, quality 
enhanced with more responsibility, autonomy 
and authority.  




Source: compiled by author. 
3.4 Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter has identified and analysed the strategic goals and specific objectives of 
the AVF transformation set by both countries and discussed the rationales behind those 
objectives. Both countries only suspended conscription with an eye to re-launch it in 
case of necessity. Sweden has acquired a pure AVF, whereas Taiwan is a quasi-AVF 
because all draft-age men are still liable for basic training, and this is difficult and 
unlikely to change due to constitutional regulation and Taiwan’s strategic posture. Both 
countries treat the goal of AVF differently in the overall defence reform context. The 
AVF is included in the broader defence reform project in Sweden; it nevertheless is the 
nexus and ultimate goal for Taiwan with other auxiliary reform projects affixed to it. 
By comparing the goals and objectives of AVF transition and defence reform of the two 
countries, it is evident that the way Sweden is transforming its armed forces is relatively 
radical and innovative in terms of personnel types and organisational structure, which 
can be observed from its significant utilisation of part-time reserve personnel, and 
formulation of contracted reserve units. The timeline for defence reform is set up to 
2019, which gives the armed forces relatively longer time to implement the changes 
required. The recruitment pool is more diversified as the SAF focuses on women, 
immigrants, and other ethnic groups. To fill the skill gap caused by lack of NCOs, 
Sweden has reintroduced the two-tier officer system by reassigning existing officers to 
new specialist officer positions while they develop a new cohort. Having abolished 
NCOs for a long period of time, the reform is challenging as problems come from both 
officers and specialist officers. Cultural resistance is seen among existing specialist 
officers. It is a rare example of AVF transition in which some parts of the officer corps 
are told to be reassigned as specialist officers or NCOs (with the NATO ranking of OR). 
The Swedes generally support the SAF, but this cannot be said of the AVF. 
Taiwan’s AVF transformation, on the other hand, is implemented in a somewhat 
conservative manner. This is mainly due to its current strategic posture and threat level 
that still would not allow significant shift in strategic concepts to be made. In other 
words, it can only build a territorial AVF which is also a rare example of AVF transition. 




downsizing, but the structure has not been substantially reformed. While the NCO 
system has functioned steadily in Taiwan armed forces, problem and friction exists in 
the relationship between officer and NCO corps mainly due to officers’ detailed control. 
In contrast to Sweden, the Taiwanese people support AVF, but not the armed forces per 
se and the military’s public image is mediocre, which could affect young people’s 
intention to join the military. 
Table 3-8 illustrates the similarities and differences of AVF and defence reform between 
the two countries. Based on the criteria discussed above, a question can be raised about 
this two-case comparison: given Sweden’s lower military participate ratio MPR 
(0.0055), longer transition timeframe (2019) and higher support of the military, 
comparing with Taiwan’s higher MPR (0.0092) and relatively shorter transition time 
(end of 2014) and lower support of the military, it seems easier for Sweden to transform 
its armed forces to a Functional Defence.308 This question will be answered in the 
following chapters. Having identified the strategic goals and objectives of AVF and 
defence reform, the next chapter will embark on criteria, metrics and strategies for AVF 
implementation.  
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Table 3-8. Comparisons of AVF implementation between Sweden and Taiwan 
Category Sweden Taiwan 
Legal status of 
conscription 
Suspension of conscription.  
 
Suspension of Conscription; all able 
draft-age men are liable for 4-month 
basic training. 
Goal The strategic goal is to build a 
‘Functional Defence’ which is usable 
and available force for national and 
international missions. 
AVF is part of the overall defence 
reform 
The strategic goal is to build a smaller, 
smarter and more competent AVF 
focusing on resolute defence and 
effective deterrence.  
AVF is the ultimate goal 
Level of Threat:  Unlikely to be attacked in foreseeable 
future. Recently focus more on 
territorial defence due to Georgia War 
and Russia’s increasing military 
spending 
Constant military threat from PRC, 
slightly lower since 2008 due to 
mitigated cross-strait relations 
Military Participation 
Ratio 
0.0055 (50,000/9,103,788) 0.0092 (215,000/23,234,936) 
Size and structure 28000 regular and reserve personnel, 
22000 Home Guard personnel. 3 types 
of operational units: regular, reserve, 
and Home Guard units 
215,000 active-duty posts, which 
includes 4-month training draftees. 




Quality not compromised.  
Attractive employer 
Diversity both in gender and ethnic 
fronts 
Quantity not reached in past few 
years. 
Increasing incentives to attract young 
people 




Two-tier officer system by introducing 
specialist officer. 
Placing existing officers to Specialist 
Officer positions. More challenging 
due to lack of this category for long 
time and no previous cases can be 
learned.  
 
NCO Corps already exists but 
undergoing reform to enhance 
competence and division of labour so 
NCO can focus on middle 
management. The proportion of NCO 
will increase and will be empowered 
to have more responsibility and 
authority 
Reserve Force Significant and innovative by 
recruiting voluntary reserve soldiers. 
Reservists have same duty as regulars. 
 
Draftees register to reserve pool after 
finishing 4-month basic training. 
Traditional and conservative thinking 
of ex-regulars.  
 
Public image and 
support  
Soldiers are regarded in the society 
Support for military: high 
Will to defend the country: high 
Support for AVF: first time exceeds 
conscription in 2011 
Soldiers are not highly regarded in the 
society 
Support for armed forces is not high, 
but support for AVF reform is. 
Timeline Suspended conscription within one 
year; the overall defence reform will 
be finished in 2019 
Will take more than 5 years to reach 
zero-draft through gradually reducing 
CR in phased approach; transition will 
finish by end of 2014 






Metrics and Criteria of AVF Implementation in Sweden and 
Taiwan 
4.1 Introduction 
Sweden and Taiwan have set a diverse set of strategic goals and objectives in carrying 
out their personnel reform and shift to an AVF. Based on the objectives set by both 
countries, the second part of the empirical trilogy aims to explore how both armed 
forces have been implementing these changes and what is their current status against 
their goals and objectives. The intention is to bridge the gap in the literature of decline 
of mass armed forces outlined in chapter one by looking at these two concurrent 
implementation processes.  
The framework of this chapter is somewhat similar to the arrangement of chapter three, 
with a slight alteration to suit the purpose of examination of the metrics. It is divided 
into two major country sections; sections 4.2 and 4.3 investigate the status of AVF 
implementation and personnel reform in Sweden and Taiwan respectively. To keep the 
implementation results as up-to-date as possible, the metrics of each country are based 
on data and information gathered from interviews conducted in both countries,309 and 
documents such as recent armed forces annual reports, defence white papers, research 
projects, archives and conference papers from European Research Group on Military 
and Society (ERGOMAS) Amsterdam 2011 and Madrid 2013, and IUS/Canada 2012. It 
first examines the recruitment of volunteer soldiers in each country in terms of quantity, 
quality and retention. It is followed by exploring the NCO and reservist reforms in each 
country as they also played an essential role in the transformation. Besides, important 
country-specific issues, such as the abolition of the ad-hoc international unit in Sweden 
and carrying out the four-month basic training for all male draftees in Taiwan, are also 
discussed in the individual country sections.  
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In terms of sources written in Swedish, on-line translation software was used to conduct 
preliminary translation; it was then followed by face-to-face consultation with a 
professional Swedish translator to ensure accuracy of translation.310 On the other hand, 
documents and articles written in Chinese and interviews conducted in Taiwan were 
translated to English by the author. Section 4.4 summarises the implementation statuses 
in both countries before proceeding to the next chapter – factors and conditions. 
4.2 Government policy makers’ metrics and criteria for personnel 
reforms in Sweden 
After 1999, Sweden started to embark on significant defence reform with a considerable 
reduction in both the size of the military establishment and defence expenditure. The 
fundamental reforms to the personnel system did not start until the government decided 
to shift to an all-volunteer force in 2009. Currently in the midst of dynamic 
transformation, Sweden now has a smaller, modern and expeditionary type of armed 
forces that is quite different from its previous Cold War-type military that focused 
mainly on territorial defence. The transition from a conscription-based military to an 
AVF was quickly made within one year. Starting in July 2010, all personnel have been 
employed by the SAF on a voluntary basis. However, the transformation of the 
personnel system is still on-going; objectives such as recruiting regular and reserve 
soldiers have not been fully met. Recruiting volunteer soldiers has thus become a 
crucial task for the SAF. Another radical change on the personnel system is the 
specialist officer (NCO) reform in which more than half of the existing officers will be 
transformed into the positions of specialist officers.311 
With several challenging tasks being conducted simultaneously, this section seeks to 
investigate the current implementation status of AVF in terms of the quantity and quality 
of recruitment, the reform of the two-tier officer corps with regard to the increasing 
number and the competence of the new specialist officers’ cadre (also called senior 
NCOs). To provide a picture of the current implementation of the personnel reform that 
is as up-to-date as possible, in addition to expert interviews conducted in Sweden, 
evidence is drawn from recent annual reports of the Swedish armed forces, defence 
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budget proposals, recruitment reports, and also internal documents collected from the 
SAF Headquarters. 
Recruitment 
As explained in the previous chapter, volunteer soldiers in the post-reform personnel 
system of the SAF are divided into three categories, full-time regular soldiers, part-time 
reserve soldiers, and the Home Guard. They are recruited from two main sources: 1. 
Three-months basic training, meaning recruiting from youth cohorts to basic training 
and employing them upon finish of training. 2. Ex-conscripts who have previously 
served their compulsory military service and can be employed directly into positions. 
Recruiting soldiers from ex-conscripts is currently an effective and cost-efficient way to 
fill the rank and file because they have already built up military competence from 
previous service. Nevertheless, unlike the general youth cohorts, the supply of 
ex-conscripts is limited and shrinking. Therefore the SAF has sought to increase the 
number of regular soldiers through the basic training programmes. 
Recruitment from basic military training 
In order to be qualified for employment, basic military training is a newly designed 
mechanism for admitted candidates for regular service to receive fundamental military 
training and education. Basic training lasts three months; it was first introduced in 2011 
with three batches conducted that year. It aims to train three categories of personnel: 
officer candidates, regular soldiers, and Home Guard soldiers. The training for reserve 
soldiers has not yet been introduced and will start in 2013.  
The results of basic training recruitment in the first two years have been successful: in 
the first year a total of 22,425 applications received for 1,578 places with 1, 556 
eventually admitted. In the second year, among 19,486 received applications, 2,823 
were admitted for a planned target of 3,008 positions. The recruitment results in both 
years were satisfactory. However, Jonsson et al. considered that the recruiting outcome 
in 2012 was not as good as the previous year because the number of applicants was 




were fewer applicants per position.312 With a successful start in 2011, the number of 
batches and new recruits for the basic training was increased to five in 2012 with 
increased vacancies for new recruits. Figure 4-1 shows the gradual increase in the 
annual volume of the basic training from 1,578 in 2011, 3,008 in 2012 to 5,500 in 
2016.313 
 
Figure 4-1 Recruitment targets of the basic training 
Source: Drawn by author based on several sources (2013 data unavailable).314 
Successful recruitment requires a well-prepared recruiting strategy focused on the 
groups of potential recruits. Three groups of young people have been identified and 
targeted by the SAF for potential recruitment. The first consists of those who have an 
interest in the armed forces but have not decided whether they really want to commit to 
military careers in the longer term. The second group comprises those who have 
previously shown interest in specific posts within the armed forces. The third specific 
group is more specific – those who are only interested in jobs within the Home Guard. 
Based on these target groups, the SAF has thus adapted its marketing strategy 
accordingly.315 Demographically speaking, the SAF is targeting men between ages 18 
and 27, and women between ages 18 and 35.316 In addition, according to the personnel 
department of the Headquarters, the SAF is aiming at recruiting two groups of 
population: ‘one is unemployed young people living in the country side, the other is 
those who are older but ambitious, and would like to go abroad for peace missions to 
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National Defence College, p.8. 
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make a difference for the world.’317 
Recruitment of regular soldiers (GSS/K) 
To discuss AVF recruitment in Sweden, apart from the division of the three 
abovementioned categories of soldiers, the terms of recruitment and employment need 
to be defined. Recruitment means the number of new recruits that the SAF aims to 
acquire to join basic training, while employment refers to those who have successfully 
completed the training and signed employment contracts with the armed forces. 
Roughly speaking, each year the SAF aims to recruit 4,000 soldiers to basic training, 
and among them to employ 2,500 soldiers to the units; of which 1,500 are regular 
soldiers and 1,000 as reserve soldiers. The discrepancy between recruitment and 
employment is mainly due to drop outs during basic training, some seeking positions in 
the Home Guard, and some transferring to officer and reserve officer training. In fact, it 
is also common that people join basic training without being employed, because they 
want to have the experience of military training in order to ‘add a line or two on their 
CVs’.318 
The initial recruitment of regular soldiers was successful. According to the Personnel 
Department of the SAF Headquarters, approximately 7,000 applications were received 
for the first batch of regular soldier positions. After selection and screening, a total of 
738 entered basic training in January 2011 with665 completing the training. Of those 
who completed basic training, 434 were employed as full-time regular soldiers, 106 
chose to work in the Home guard, and 89 progressed to officer training.319 Another fact 
worth mentioning is that there were around 6,000 conscripts serving in the last tier of 
compulsory service at the end of June 2010; in principle they could have left by July 
because conscription was officially suspended. Beyond expectation, 93% of the last tier 
of conscripts chose to stay with the SAF.320 Therefore, the SAF managed to avoid the 
‘personnel vacuum’ during the transition. For those recruited from the youth cohorts, on 
average 85% were employed after the basic training.321 
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In contrast to many Western countries, which had faced poor recruitment at the initial 
stage of AVF transition, the recruitment of regular soldiers during the first two years 
transformation was rather satisfactory in Sweden. In the first year of transition, a total of 
3,287 regular soldiers were recruited in 2011, achieving 88% of the annual recruitment 
target.322 The number of regular soldiers had grown to 4,148 by the end of 2011, which 
was 3.7% over the numerical target for the year. The SAF thus raised the target by 
recruiting additional 200 regular soldiers during the year. By the end of 2012, the SAF 
had employed 4,487 regular soldiers, of which 2,685 (including 244 females) were 
recruited in 2012. Among them, 937 soldiers were recruited from basic training.323 
Therefore, it would appear that the ex-conscripts played a key role in the fulfilment of 
recruitment. Eventually, the SAF aims to employ 6,600 regular soldiers by 2019,324 see 
Table 4-1. Apart from good intakes, it is also important to analyse the personnel outflow. 
The departure of regular soldiers is mainly due to three reasons: termination of 
employment contracts, soldiers’ dropping out at their own request, and transferring to 
officer training programme.325 Compared to 2011, although fewer people applied which 
reduced average number of applications per position from 6.5 in 2011 to 4.5 in 2012 
(Table 4-2),326 the recruitment result in 2012 was even better than the first year as 96% 
of the annual recruitment target of regular soldiers was met.327 
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Table 4-1 Overall Current and Forecasted Size of SAF Personnel (as of 31 December 
2012) and Planned Recruitment 








Home Guard Civilian 
Current size  8,424 1,116 7,029 (103 
active duty) 





4,050 5,050 2,000 6,600 8,800 15,650 5,100 
Ultimate size 4,100 5,100 2,000 6,600 9,500 16,600 5,100 
2013 inflow 100 200 100 1,150 1,700 1,600 250 
2014 inflow 80/80* 300/300* 250/200* 1,400/1,300* 1,200/1,600* 1,600/1,450* 250/350* 
2015 inflow 70/85* 350/350* 250/200* 2,150/2,150* 1,000/1,500* 1,600/1,450* 400/400* 
2016 inflow 85* 350* 250* 1,900* 1,800* 1,550* 400* 
Source: Compiled by author based on several sources.328 
 
 
Table 4-2 Recruitment of volunteer soldiers in 2011 and 2012 
 2011 2012 Difference 
Recruitment test 15,180 13,809 -1,471 
Initial selection 8,039 10,968 2,930 
Achievement test 4,711 6,871 2,160 
Selection 2,041 2,823 782 
Available positions 2,318 3,057 739 
Application per position 6.5 4.5 -2.0 




Regardless of the successful recruitment of regular soldiers, the high drop-out rate has 
so far been a major concern for the SAF as it has been higher than anticipated. Lack of 
physical fitness was the most common reason causing high drop outs, as many new 
recruits could not cope with the physical strain that military service demands. In 2011, 
in comparison with 4,148 employed regular soldiers, 546 new recruits dropped out 
during basic training,330 this made the drop-out rate rise to 13%. The SAF estimated a 
10% drop-out rate in 2012; however, the rate increased to 19% by the end of year, 
almost double the estimate. The SAF predicted 400 drop outs in 2012, but the actual 
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includes those recruited from voluntary defence organisations. 
329 Emma Jonsson, ERGOMAS Madrid conference, 4-7 June, 2013. *: Note that the fulfilment in 2012 
was 92%, slightly different from the data published by the 2012 annual report of the armed forces (96%). 
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number reached 750 by the end of year, see Table 4-3.331 Most drop outs occurred 
during August when various schools and training started. The drop-out rate for regular 
soldiers employed through basic training is found to be lower, around 10%.332 The SAF 
considered that the high dropout rate was due to inadequate selection and physical 
screening process conducted by the national service administration. A defence journalist 
noticed the drop-out rate: 
‘I went down to a Marine regiment and talked to officers, it turned out that 30% drop out rate 
during the basic training for medical reasons. According to officers, new solders are more 
motivated than conscripts. But there is one worry, 141 volunteer soldiers came here in April 2011, 





Table 4-3 Causes for regular soldiers drop outs as of 31 December 2012 
Reasons for Drop-out Prediction Actual results 
At their own request 300 665 
Failure in training 100 85 
Total 400 750 
Source: Armed Forces 2011 Annual Report, p. 21 
One of the measures the SAF has adopted to tackle the high drop-out rate was to 
intentionally set a higher recruitment target, roughly 15% more than the actual need. For 
example, despite only 944 regular soldiers being needed from basic training in 2012, the 
SAF decided to raise the annual recruitment target to 1,211. It turned out 937 graduates 
who completed the training, barely sufficient to meet the annual demand.334 
Quality of Soldiers (GSS/K) 
Similar to the quantity of recruitment, another favourable situation for the SAF in the 
first two years of transition has been the high quality of volunteer soldiers. Compared 
with conscripts, the level of motivation and quality of volunteer soldiers is higher. The 
armed forces value soldiers’ satisfaction in basic training; to this end the SAF conducted 
interviews with recruits in the final stage of training in order to identify their motivation, 
and what were the incentives or obstacles for them to join the armed forces. Despite the 
fact that there was still room for improvement in certain areas, the result from 
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interviews showed that the majority of new recruits were very satisfied with the quality 
of training and education in the basic training.335 Due to the favourable quantity and 
quality of volunteer soldiers, the selection standards of soldiers were not lowered. 
New recruits during basic training requested their training officers to let them repeat 
drills and practices because they know this would become a required skill for their 
career. According to reports from platoon leaders in the operational units, volunteer 
soldiers are competent and willing to accept more training than conscripts. The Navy is 
especially satisfied with the quality of seamen because the voluntary system allows 
seamen to serve longer on board.336 Through quantitative measurements, Jonsson et al. 
compared the quality of male volunteer soldiers recruited in 2012 with conscripts; they 
discovered that the quality of volunteer soldiers was better than conscripts in five out of 
the six criteria, namely: general intelligence, psychological ability, leadership potential, 
muscular performance and BMI.337 For female soldiers, improvements were found in 
three criteria and unchanged for the other three. A comment from a FOI researcher 
partly explained this phenomenon: 
‘… women have always been underestimated, and men were overestimated in terms of how 
well-trained and how good they are. Women are much better than they said, because they were 
underestimated about their ability.’338 
Using the same criteria to measure the quality of those recruited in 2012 and compared 
with 2011 recruits, it seems that there is no significant difference between two male 
groups, see Table 4-4. 
 
Table 4-4 Comparison of quality between conscripts and volunteer soldiers 
  AVF 2012 compared with Conscripts AVF 2012 vs AVF 2011 
 Men Women Men Women 
General Intelligence  Improved Improved Unchanged Improved 
Psychological ability Improved Unchanged Impaired Impaired 
Leader potential Improved Unchanged Unchanged Impaired 
Physical capability Impaired/Improved Unchanged Improved Unchanged 
Muscular performance Improved Improved Unchanged Unchanged 
BMI Improved Improved Improved Unchanged 
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Physical strength is the only factor that has not seen improvement. This is due to the 
fact that the average physical strength of young people nowadays at the national level 
has been lower compared with those in one or two decades ago. One senior MoD 
official explained that 
‘most people nowadays in Sweden are not used to physical works and training as those who 
were 15 years ago.’340 
Qualitatively, most comments from the armed forces about the quality of volunteer 
soldiers were positive. Officers from operational units acknowledged that both the 
quality and motivation of volunteer soldiers are higher than conscripts. From the 
perspective of training, the quality of soldiers has gone up. One Lieutenant Colonel 
from the Air Defence Regiment pointed out:  
‘When it comes to material and technology, they (volunteer soldiers) become much better than I 
started 30 years ago. (…) so the training at the soldier’s level becomes better.’341 
Despite the satisfactory quality of soldiers, the armed forces are cautious, and suggest 
that current favourable results cannot be taken for granted for the future. One senior 
official of the SAF Headquarters emphasised: 
‘Up to now! It is very important to say up to now! We can face difficulties next month, or six 
months, or one year. But up to now it has been successful. From my perspective it has been more 
successful than I anticipated. The poor quality and quantity of recruitment has not happened 
yet.’342 
A similar view was expressed by a Lieutenant Colonel from the Land Warfare Centre of 
Army:  
‘Right now there is no problem for quality. (But) I am afraid if we don’t make it (military service) 
so attractive, it will become a problem.’343 
Despite the fact that, overall, the SAF are satisfied with the quality of volunteer soldiers, 
negative comments were also expressed on the quality of soldiers. One defence 
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researcher from the Swedish National Defence College observed that: 
‘I went down to units; I actually met people there. My impression is that when I actually talked 
to them (volunteer soldiers), some of them should not be in the armed forces because the 
standard was too low. I met some soldiers who did not pass the test to go to the conscription, but 
they manage to get in here. (…) I worry a little bit about the quality. I think I have met many 
enough to see that some of them should not be there.’344 
In addition, a defence journalist observed both bright and dark sides of the quality of 
soldiers, he said:  
‘They (volunteer soldiers) are doing much better jobs. Also in Sicily the NATO operation in 
Libya, Canadians told Swedes that you are embarrassing the Americans, so they (Swedes) are 
doing very well.’  
Then he observed that: 
‘One lieutenant told me one example about the shooting range; if conscripts missed and 
performed poorly then they were asked to do it again. He told the volunteers the same way he 
told conscripts that this is not good enough, you have to do it again, but volunteer soldiers started 
to cry. It never happened in the conscript system.’
345 
 
Diversity of recruitment: women and minority ethnic communities in Sweden 
Promoting the diversity of personnel has been a task for the SAF in terms of recruitment; 
this can be divided into two parts: gender and ethnicity. The SAF continue to enhance 
the proportion of women and people with diversified cultural background and multiple 
linguistic competences. Despite Supreme Commander Goranson’s dissatisfaction with 
the low proportion of female personnel in the SAF,346 since 2010 recruiting female 
soldiers has improved as the proportion of females among regular soldiers has gradually 
increased from 9.8% in 2010, to 10.1% in 2011, and then 10.8% in 2012.347 Many 
efforts have been made, for example, if one man and one woman who are equally good 
in quality to compete for one position, the SAF usually select the woman.348 
Nevertheless, with regard to ethnic diversity, efforts are still needed to make favourable 
progress. For those recruited to basic training in 2012, people who were born in Sweden 
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accounted for 95.3%, 2.4% were born in other European countries, and only 2.3% were 
born outside European countries.349 In other words, citizens with non-EU background 
were under represented. To improve this situation, the SAF co-operated with the 
National Employment Agency and launched a preparatory military training programme 
dubbed as the ‘Open Door Programme’ aiming to promote minority people’s interest 
and knowledge about the SAF as a potential employer. For the Employment Agency, it 
increased the chance for young people from minority groups to find a job. The 
programme provided 500 unemployed young people with non-European backgrounds 
an opportunity to experience a 10-week preparatory course for those aspiring to a 
military career. The objective is to recruit 300 individuals to start the official basic 
training. It has led to successful dialogue with the target group during various activities. 
A total of 392 young people (with 19% female) applied and started the preparatory 
training in November, 2012.350 One lesson from this programme is that the SAF have 
learned where, how and when to contact and interact with the public especially with 
minority youth.  
Retention 
For the success of the ongoing defence transformation, a senior official from the MoD 
dealing with military capability underlined two major issues that needed to be addressed: 
‘recruitment, and how long these soldiers will stay with the Armed Forces.’351 Along 
with the unexpectedly high drop-out rates, the other major concern is whether the SAF 
can retain soldiers long enough within the armed forces. According to Swedish labour 
law, voluntary military service is based on employment rather than bound by fixed-term 
contract, meaning that soldiers can quit/resign whenever they decide. The contract 
favours the employees as there are no sanctions when personnel decide to terminate 
their employment contracts, which is unusual because it affects retention and force 
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planning.352 A Member of Parliament from the Defence Committee therefore concerned 
about the retention: ‘I think the real challenges lies ahead, keeping soldiers in service is 
important as they can leave whenever they want.’353 
In fact, in 2010 the Swedish government had foreseen this issue and pointed out that 
retaining personnel for their full period of employment is reportedly the greatest 
problem.354 According to an analysis made by the Personnel Department of the 
Headquarters, an optimal situation is that volunteer soldiers should serve for at least six 
years, which is calculated on the basis of on annual recruitment of 4,500 after 2014. If 
soldiers stay just four years, the turnaround will be increased to approximately 6,000 
recruitments per year.355 This can cause problems for the SAF because not only the 
recruitment target is difficult to achieve, but the training capacity would be unable to 
cope with the throughput. Based on a similar calculation made by MOD, a senior 
official in charge of military capabilities and operations estimated that the SAF need to 
retain soldiers for five to eight years; but he emphasised that it will take at least five 
years to see how the system works.356 As a matter of fact, not every soldier is interested 
in serving for six or even eight years. Dandeker and Yden observed that one soldier 
from the Air Defence Regiment seemed only like to stay two to three years instead of 
eight years. However, if there were a chance to transfer to a junior NCO, he would be 
happy to stay.357 A Lieutenant Colonel from the Air Defence Regiment held a 
conservative view towards the retention: 
‘I think there is fairly large number of people who will quit when they realise that this is not 
what I (they) expected, or for other reasons. So without knowing any detail, I would say that we 
have to be careful in the long run.’
358
 
In Sweden, many young men and women join the military because they want to be sent 
abroad for peace missions. However, their motivation starts to fade after they have done 
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the mission.359 An Army officer from the Land Warfare Centre observed this 
phenomenon and commented: 
‘Retention could be a problem; the other day we had a lecture by a platoon leader who had been 
in Afghanistan. His platoon was one of the first (unit) with volunteer soldiers went down to 
Afghanistan; (…) he said 50% (of soldiers) had claimed to quit when they came home. Because 





Recruitment of reserve soldiers (GSS/T) 
Although Sweden has abundant experience in the employment of reserve officers, the 
most important and challenging part of personnel reform is to recruit part-time reserve 
soldiers, which has been neither practiced nor tested in the past. In contrast to the 
successful recruitment of regular soldiers, recruiting reserve soldiers (GSS/T) has been 
not easy. Not only is the proposed number of reserve soldiers larger than their regular 
counterparts, but the recruitment of reserve soldiers has been two years behind schedule. 
A Member of Parliament from the Defence Committee regretted that the government 
did not have the legislation for part time soldiers in place when the decision for shifting 
to AVF was taken.361 
Officially, recruitment of reserve soldiers commenced in the summer of 2012 after the 
legislation for employment of reserve soldiers was passed in May and came into effect 
in July. The enactment of the employment law is a major step forward for Sweden’s 
AVF transition as it protects the civilian employment of reserve soldiers and legalises 
the right for soldiers to temporarily leave their jobs and report to military duties. During 
the two years of vacuum,362 the SAF had sought non-binding interim agreements from 
youth cohorts and ex-conscripts. By mid 2012, a total of 4,736 non-binding agreements 
to apply for reserve soldiers were gathered.363 
The initial target was to recruit 2,400 reserve soldiers by the end of 2012.364 As 
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mentioned earlier, currently the SAF is relying on ex-conscripts as an important 
manpower source. This is especially true in respect of recruitment of reserve soldiers. 
By the end of 2012, a total of 1,582 reserve soldiers were employed, indicating that 
66% of the target figure had been achieved.365 The SAF conceded that this outcome 
was unsuccessful.366 According to the SAF’s assessment, the recruitment failure was 
due to an over-favourable assumption concerning those non-binding interim agreements, 
as it turned out that many who signed did not show up. Moreover, among those who 
applied, many did not meet the qualification standard during the selection process. 
Some were thus offered Home Guard contracts instead. Another cause was the lengthy 
selection process, which has led to hesitation among young people to join the military. 
The SAF facilitated the selection process in the fourth quarter of 2012 by offering target 
groups a more frequent and flexible way to apply. Ex-conscripts employed in the first 
year as reserve soldiers were directly deployed into positions without undergoing basic 
training as they had served in the military and possessed required competence. 
Recruitment of reserve soldiers from youth cohorts through basic training starts in 2013. 
In light of the uneasy beginning, the target for employing 9,500 reserve soldiers by 2018 
has been postponed to 2023 and the numbers in employment in the first few years have 
also been lowered accordingly, see Table 4-5.367 The outflow includes dropping out at 
the soldier’s own request, termination of employment and transfer to officer training 
programme. 
 
Table 4-5 Personnel flow and Targets of reserve soldiers  
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Current number of soldiers 1,582     
Calculated inflow 2,400 1,700 1,600 1,500 1,800 
Calculated outflow N/A 200 300 350 450 
Total number of reserve soldiers 2,400 3,900 3,800 4,950 6,300 
Source:368 
Recruitment of Home Guard 
The Home Guard is now a significant and growing element of the military. It plays an 
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essential role in terms of territorial defence as it deals with domestic operations and 
contingencies, therefore the Defence Committee of Parliament greatly concerns about 
the recruitment of the Home Guard.369 Of the proposed 22,000 Home Guard personnel, 
the SAF is responsible for filling 16,600 soldiers’ positions and 250 officers’, along with 
training assignments. The remaining 5,100 positions are employed from local voluntary 
defence organisations.370 The personnel intake is based on recruitment from basic 
training, renewed Home Guard contracts, and transfer from regular and reserve soldiers. 
The outflow contains those whose contracts end and those who resign. 
Akin to the recruitment of reserve soldiers, filling positions for the Home Guard has 
also been tricky, as only 69% of the allocated positions were filled in 2012. According 
to SAF, the figure only showed part of the result as the recruitment process was 
extended to 2013.371 By mid 2012, a total of 20,427 were employed by the Home 
Guard;372 the SAF has estimated that the final personnel target will be achieved in 
2022.373 
The poor public image of the Home Guard is the key to the difficulty in meeting 
recruitment targets. The Home Guard has been long perceived and described as ‘old 
men running around with homemade guns.’374 Therefore, compared with other 
categories of volunteer soldiers, the Home Guard is perhaps perceived as secondary or 
‘Team B’. In 2012, there were many available positions in the Home Guard for those 
who completed basic training; nonetheless, good quality applicants were less interested 
in serving in the Home Guard.375 Rebranding the Home Guard is crucial in order for 
young people to eliminate their stereotyped impression. Enhancing the combat 
capability of the Home Guard is also essential; to this end the SAF has strengthened the 
competence of the 16,600 staff as they are obliged to participate in more training and 
exercises, and also receive better equipment. A dramatic change has seen at the decrease 
of the average age of Home Guard staff. Most importantly, Home Guard has built good 
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relationships with local governments so it operates well in local operations, which is 
important for territorial defence. 
International units and work obligation 
To build an expeditionary force, the SAF has abolished the previous ad hoc unit for 
international operations and instead established a standing force dedicated to such 
operations with the rotation of regular personnel. The other objective was to demand all 
SAF personnel, including civilians to accept the new employment term to work/deploy 
for the international operations.  
Compared to other reform tasks, the international work obligation has been 
accomplished at a rather early stage of transformation. By 20 September 2010, every 
person employed by the SAF, including civilians, should have signed a written 
agreement to take a position of employment including international work obligation. 
Those who do not accept the obligation could face the risk of being placed on the 
redundancy list.376 The SAF have reached consensus with all staff and the international 
work obligation for all SAF personnel came into force on 1 September 2012.377 
However, according to the SAF’s analysis, this new employment regulation has not led 
to any major change in terms of filling the vacancies in the international units due to 
lack of available personnel who have the right skills. Regular soldiers recruited through 
the three-month basic training are less experienced than those who have been directly 
recruited from ex-conscripts because either civilian work experience or previous 
military competence of ex-conscripts is better than those recruited straight from the high 
street. At the time of writing (September 2013), only a few individuals have been 
ordered to serve on or in international missions. Therefore, it is too early to jump to 
conclusions from the preliminary results of the execution of the international work 
obligation because neither individual soldiers nor operational units have built up enough 
competence to carry out tasks for international missions.378 
The objective of establishing an international force with 1,700 regular personnel has not 
yet been accomplished. An important issue connected with the scaling down of 
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international missions needs to be addressed, especially after the withdrawal of ISAF 
troops from Afghanistan. According to Parliament’s decision, the number of troops 
deployed in Afghanistan will be gradually reduced to around 200 in 2014; after 2014 the 
objective of the operation will focus on the continued support to the Afghan National 
Security Forces on education and training.379 It will have a potential impact on the 
development of the international force in that no overseas mission in the foreseeable 
future will match the size of ISAF. The SAF thus has to deal with the smaller scale of 
missions and modify the force size accordingly. From the perspective of the SAF, the 
originally planned size of 1,700 therefore needs to be modified.380 
Specialist officer (NCO) reform 
The Specialist Officer reform is worth explaining in full because, although the progress 
is on schedule in terms of quantity of personnel, the reform itself has so far been 
controversial and encountered some problems. While there is a substantial surplus of 
officers and a shortage of specialist officers, the approach adopted by the SAF is, along 
with new recruitment of young specialist officers, to fill these new specialist officer 
positions with existing officers who possess appropriate skills and competence. To 
thoroughly carry out the reform, in September 2012, all officers received a notification 
letter from the SAF Headquarters asking them to choose either accept their new position 
or otherwise leave the armed forces. A senior staff officer in charge of the reform from 
the personnel division of the Headquarters described how specialist officer reform is 
implemented: 
‘The Second Lieutenant becomes the platoon leader, the captain becomes the deputy platoon 
leader. That is the result of the reform to introduce officers and senior NCOs.’
381
 
With such determination, similar to the implementation of international work obligation, 
the NCO reform has been carried out on schedule in terms of the growth in the 
specialist officers’ cadre. In contrast to only 8% of officers placed on specialist officer 
positions in 2010, the proportion increased to 45% in 2012 (Table 4-6). During the year, 
                                                     
379 Speech by the Supreme Commander Sverker Goranson, Lunds Akademiska Officerssallskap, 10 April 
2012, p.2. 
380 Interview, participant SE-4, second interview. In the meantime the target of 1,700 personnel is still 
valid; the SAF has to wait for the next defence review. 




around 3,500 officers were reassigned to the specialist officer positions.382 Starting in 
2013, the number of specialist officers will be further increased to 4,600 which will 
result in an equal number of officers and specialist officers.  
 
Table 4-6 Officers set to be placed in Specialist Officer positions 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
Proportion of Specialist Officers in Officer Corps 8% 40% 45% 
Source: 383 
After a rapid and dramatic change of the officer corps in the first three years, the SAF 
will gradually reduce the number of tactical officers to 4,100 while eventually 
increasing the number of specialist officers to 5,100 by 2020.384 As of the end of 2012, 
the officer corps comprised 8,424 officers and 1,116 specialist officers. In 2013, the 
interim target of increasing the proportion of specialist officers to 50% will be 
achieved.385 Table 4-7 shows the planned number of officers and specialist officers 
from 2013 to 2016 with gradual increase in the fulfilment of specialist officer positions 
and decrease in number of officers.  
 
Table 4-7 Planned numbers of officers and specialist officers 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Category Officer SO Officer SO Officer SO Officer SO 
Total  4,600 4,600 4,200 4,800 4,100 4,850 4,000 4,900 
Source: Armed Forces budget proposal for 2014, special reports, 2013, p.27. 
Notwithstanding that the majority of the SAF employees have been offered and 
accepted a continued employment in the wake of the initial stage of the specialist officer 
reform, it was not possible to avoid layoffs. The officers without the necessary 
competence, who therefore cannot be placed in specialist officer positions, have been 
placed on the redundancy list and asked to leave the military. In February 2012 
approximately 1,200 commissioned officers, with more than four years left to normal 
retirement, were offered the opportunity to apply for premature retirement benefits. 
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Approximately 450 officers applied and 350 were granted early retirement.386 
According to the SAF’s assessment, the restructuring efforts seem to have created a 
better environment in the operational organisation than before. However, several 
important issues need to be addressed. First of all, one of the fundamental problems 
remains as the SAF still have problems in finding appropriate officers to fill the existing 
specialist officer vacancies in operational units. Since many officers only have 
bureaucratic or essentially irrelevant skills, such as training conscripts, they do not fit 
into the specialist officer positions that require specific competence. One personnel 
official from the SAF Headquarters evaluated the NCO reform: 
‘If we are manning these 5,500 positions (specialist officer) just with these guys, we cannot fulfil 
our missions because they don’t have the right competence.’387 
In fact, the newly recruited young specialist officers have demonstrated high quality and 
motivation, as a researcher from the Swedish National Defence College described: 
‘When I talked to the (young) specialist officers, I would say they are 100% motivated and that they 
want to be specialist officers. They want to be the king on certain things. They don’t want to be 
regular officers because they are too general.’388 
While, quantitatively speaking, the specialist officer reform has progressed on schedule, 
it has also ignited discontent and complaints among officers. Another approach adopted 
is based on so-called ‘credentialism’,389 meaning that all officers should have a 
university degree. Those without a degree are more likely to be assigned to specialist 
officer positions; and they must either accept it or they will be forced to leave the armed 
forces. Despite the fact that pay and rank were not affected for those who were assigned 
to specialist officer positions, they felt upset and angry about the decision because that 
was rather a demotion.390 One Lieutenant Colonel from Air Defence Regiment 
criticised that: 
‘A lot of my colleagues used to be officers, like captains and majors. Two weeks ago (September 
2012), their positions were transformed to NCO positions. Quite a lot of them chose to leave. (…) 
Dignity is an important factor to consider; for example, asking a senior captain to take on the 
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position of deputy platoon leader under the command of a Second Lieutenant could hurt his self 
esteem. What do soldiers in this platoon think? Because they now see that this young 20 year-old 
second lieutenant is now in command of this 40 year-old captain. This second lieutenant has no 
experience at all, and we might be going abroad where people shoot at us under his command.’391 
A similar view was made by an FOI researcher who noticed that the NCO reform is 
related to a controversial change in leadership, as she commented: 
‘Because the person who is in charge is always the best. But now it would be different when these 
younger officers come out from officer academy, and then the NCOs who are older, got lots of 
experience and know the specific things so much more. But he will still be under the command of 
younger officers. (…) I mean to shift people’s mind is the most difficult thing to do and it will take 
time.’392 
Similar disappointment among officer cadres was observed by an SNDC researcher. 
Being one of the first researchers studying the specialist officer reform, he pointed out 
the problem of the specialist officer reform: 
‘I make a study with the first ones who became NCOs, and they were very disappointed. Many of 
them already think to quit. (…) They (the SAF) are in big trouble because commissioned officers 
don’t want to be specialist officers, and the ones who are specialist officers maybe want to quit. 
That’s very difficult situation.’  
He went on and explained: 
‘…they (the SAF) haven’t done anything for these specialist officers yet; the normal routine should 
be to talk with the unions to decide how the salary steps look like. So I don’t know why they 
haven’t done it, because that cannot be that difficult. So for the moment you can have soldiers that 
earn more than the specialist officers. And then they got really angry.’393 
The SAF consider that the most difficult task is to ensure that officers understand, 
accept and adapt to this cultural shift, and then change their mindset. It is easier for 
young officers and NCOs to understand and accept, but rather difficult for older or 
senior officers to hold the similar views because many of them do not understand or 
accept this transformation.394 In fact, most officers understand the importance of the 
NCO reform and are not against a mixed type of officer and NCO system, but the 
question is whether there is a better way to implement it.395 One officer suggested that: 
‘Let’s start with generals; let’s take Swedish generals I would say, that you will now to be the 
highest NCO in the army, change your rank to become the highest NCO, I don’t know, the master 
sergeant of army or something. And he will do that and in that way he will send the message that 
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even I can do this. You start from the top.’396 
Having lost the category of NCO for a quarter of century, the SAF is keen to retrieve 
this type of personnel and their competence. However, it is indeed challenging for the 
SAF as on one hand a competent specialist corps needs to be established, and on the 
other those who spent decades serving the country deserve a basic respect. More 
negotiations and communications with the officer corps should be conducted in order to 
make a smoother reform of the NCO system. Discontent among the ranks cannot be 
ignored as it could potentially compromise the morale of officers and their trust in their 
leadership. 
In short, the personnel reform of the SAF significantly relies on the part-time reservists 
to fill the rank and file, which has not been done or tested before. Although the 
recruitment of reserve soldiers and Home Guard soldiers has been slightly behind 
schedule, it has been satisfactory in terms of the quantity and quality of the regular 
soldiers. Nevertheless, while personnel reforms in Sweden have, for the most part, been 
carried out to schedule and are generally in a healthy shape, there are concerns that a 
retention problem will loom after withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. Extra attention 
is needed to be paid on the NCO reform as the results should not be looked merely at 
the numbers but the competence of the newly introduced specialist officers. Having 
examined the status of the SAF personnel reform, the AVF implementation in Taiwan 
under a very different strategic context, is examined in the next section. 
4.3 Government policy makers’ metrics and criteria for personnel 
reforms in Taiwan 
Ever since Taiwan decided to shift to an AVF system, it has been facing major issues 
such as whether the armed forces are able to recruit and retain enough people of 
sufficiently high quality, and whether the AVF system can strengthen Taiwan’s defence 
capability in order to cope with potential threats from the PRC. Before examining the 
current status of AVF implementation, it is essential to highlight that, unlike most 
western AVFs where conscription was either abolished or suspended, Taiwan’s AVF is a 
quasi-AVF in that all male citizens are still obliged to perform four-months of military 
training. In addition, the strategic purpose of Taiwan’s AVF is also different from the 





western expeditionary AVFs, by focusing as it does on territorial defence. Therefore, its 
implementation process and experience presents a new field of study on how an AVF 
focusing on territorial defence can be successfully implemented.397 
Implementing an AVF in Taiwan is more challenging because, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, traditionally the public support of the military is not strong in 
Taiwanese society. Taiwanese politicians rarely mention military service during election 
campaigns, as ‘if it were a badge of shame.’398 In a society that does not appreciate and 
value military service, it is more difficult for the armed forces to acquire sufficient 
volunteer personnel of the right quality. Since the MND started to recruit volunteers in 
2003, attracting young people to join the military and retaining them to stay longer has 
not been easy. The situation has become more difficult since 2010 after the MND 
carried out a fully-fledged implementation of AVF. Although the demand for volunteer 
soldiers has increased significantly, the supply has failed to keep up. This section 
examines how efficiently Taiwan’s armed forces have implemented the AVF in terms of 
the proportion of volunteer personnel in the armed forces, the status of the four-month 
basic training, the quantity of recruitment, the quality of volunteer soldiers, the retention 
rate, NCO reform and reservist reform. It follows the similar pattern discussed in the 
previous Swedish section with slight alterations to suit the specific circumstances in 
Taiwan.  
Evaluation of performance 
As described in chapter one, according to the AVF implementation plan, the MND set 
an annual 10 per cent year-on-year decreasing rate in the conscript ratio at the final 
phase of a three-phased AVF implementation. However, currently the MND seldom 
focuses on a gradual decrease in the conscript ratio but rather tends to examine the 
indicators with regard to the annual recruitment rate, and the annual increase in the 
percentage of volunteer personnel. Although the planned force size of 215,000 billets 
(overall number of personnel positions) is the ultimate goal, the MND only plans to fill 
90% of the billets with a total of 196,000 active-duty officers, NCOs and soldiers.399 
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<http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/13/3394726/taiwan-short-of-volunteers-for.html#storylink=cpy>, 
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The performance of the personnel reform and AVF implementation is evaluated by the 
MND from two important perspectives: the progress of military downsizing and the 
increase in the proportion of volunteer personnel. In terms of downsizing, the ‘Jingtsui 
Downsizing Programme’ with reduction of 60,000 personnel has been carried out on 
schedule with all targets reached since its outset in 2010, see Table 4-8.400 
 
Table 4-8 Implementation of Military Downsizing 
Year 2010 2011 2012 











Achieving rate 100% 100% 100% 
Source: MND Performance Reports, 2010, 2011, 2012 
As identified in chapter three, attaining a total of 176,000 volunteer personnel by the 
end of 2014 is a crucial objective for the implementation of the AVF. According to the 
MND’s plan, during the transition the proportion of volunteer personnel (including 
officers, NCOs and soldiers) will gradually increase to 176,000, whereas the rest 
(around 19,000 positions) will be filled by draftees receiving four-month basic training. 
The annual increase in the number of volunteer personnel was set at 8,000 in 2012 and 
15,000 in both 2013 and 2014, which is conducted in line with the gradual reduction in 
the number of conscripts.401 Since 2009, the number of volunteer personnel has 
increased steadily and the targets were met in 2010 and 2011. In 2012, although the total 
number of volunteer personnel (including soldiers, NCOs and officers) reached 136,000, 
which accounted for 70.09% of the 196,000 billets, it still fell 10,000 short of the annual 
target of 146,000 and left a 93.15% of achieving rate, see Table 4-9.402 Compared with 
2011, the actual number of volunteer personnel in 2012 had not increased but rather 
decreased; the government (Executive Yuan) thus considered that the MND had failed 
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Table 4-9 Performance Index: Increase of volunteer personnel 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Target (% of volunteer personnel) 60% 60% 70% 
To reach 146,000 
volunteer personnel 
Actual percentage of volunteer 
personnel 
55.6% 64.76% 70.46% 70.09% 
Actual number of volunteer 
personnel 
133,000 136,000 138,103 136,000 
Annual achieving rate  92.7% 100% 100% 93.15% 
Source: MND Performance Reports 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 
Recruitment 
Heavily reliant on active-duty regulars, the military personnel in Taiwan’s armed forces 
and its recruitment are relatively homogeneous compared with armed forces in the West. 
The volunteer reservists and the National Guard (or Home Guard), working on a 
part-time basis, have not yet been planned for or considered by the MND. During the 
amendment of the Act of Military Service System, the MND had reserved the 
possibility of reinstating conscription in case of PRC military invasion. The recruitment 
of volunteer soldiers made amendments of several laws and regulations necessary. As 
discussed in Chapter three, in order to underpin the personnel transformation, 
appropriate legislation is one of the important tasks that need to be done during the 
initial phase of AVF implementation. According to the MND’s mid-term (2013-2016) 
plan, legislation of relevant laws for AVF implementation has been listed as a priority.404 
After it had been rejected by the Executive Yuan several times, finally the amendment 
of the ‘Act of Military Service System’ came into effective on 30 December 2012.405 
Four-month basic military training 
The peculiarity of Taiwan’s AVF lies in its upholding of mandatory basic military 
training for all male citizens, which was due to two considerations: maintaining the 
Constitution and the military threats from the PRC. Without amending the Constitution 
and to cope with the potential conflict with PRC, the Act has not only underpinned the 
legal status of AVF in Taiwan, but created the four-month basic training for all draft-age 
male citizens. Based on the Act, starting from 2013, all male citizens born after 1 
January 1994 are no longer required to serve one year of military service, but instead 
they are only obliged to undergo four months of basic military training. With the 
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necessary legislation in place, the MND started to make a significant move towards an 
AVF in 2013 by executing the four-month basic training.  
The first batch of draftees for four-month training was processed in February 2013, with 
a total of around 2,800 draftees born after 1994.406 They became the first individuals in 
Taiwan’s history subject to the new military service regulation. According to the 
National Conscription Agency of the Ministry of Interior, approximately 160,000 men 
will reach drafting age in 2013, among them around 70% will qualify for the 
four-month training and will therefore benefit from the new regulation.407 Nevertheless, 
the shortened military training is by no means easy-going. The MND claims that the 
new training regimen requires those drafted as servicemen to meet higher physical 
standards than those required during the one-year conscription system.408 
The content of basic training comprises eight weeks of boot camp followed by eight 
weeks of specialist training. The boot camp is conducted in Army’s basic training 
regiments with the objective to train draftees to be qualified as infantry soldiers. The 
specialty training is carried out in the following specialised schools in the Army: 
infantry, artillery, armour, communication, chemical warfare and engineering; within 
eight weeks, draftees are expected to learn different kinds of military specialities. The 
training capacity of these schools has been expanded and strengthened to accommodate 
the draftees.409 Although one of the main purposes of the four-month training is to train 
draftees with combat skills in order to supplement the manpower of the reserve force, an 
increasing effort is to focus on the competence for conducting Humanitarian 
Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions.410 
Since there are still many draftees who were born before 1994 and are liable for 
one-year service, those who have not been called up for duty by the time conscription 
terminates (end of 2014) will still have to serve for one year, but in a non-military 
capacity to perform alternative service during the transitional period. Within eight years 
after discharge, all draftees are subject to periodic reservist recalls once every two years 
                                                     
406 Defense News, 23 February 2013, Ministry of National Defense. 
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407 Taiwan's shift to volunteer military passes new milestone, Central News Agency, 21 February, 2013. 
408 This is what the MND aims for, but the results are unknown yet. 
409 Interview, participant TW-1. 




for refresher training to maintain their combat skills and to strengthen mobilisation 
efficiency.  
Although the MND stresses that four-month training will be tougher in the physical 
context, questions and doubts have been raised about how draftees can be qualified as 
competent soldiers within such short period? Defence scholars have not been optimistic 
about the quality and competence of draftees as one suspected that whether these 
draftees are able to fight.411 There are also voices suggesting that the contents of basic 
training should be altered from the conventional war fighting to stress more on social 
functions. The training could be divided into another two parts, with one part focusing 
on strict military training, the other highlighting the maintenance of domestic 
(homeland) security and conducting disaster relief. Through efficient use of the 
four-month draftees, one defence analyst commented: 
‘I think four months is enough; especially the main mission of reservists is to protect our homeland, 
which they will be willing to do so. This will generate better effect for the country.’412 
 
Quantity 
Types of manpower sources 
Before examining the recruitment results, the sources of manpower for volunteer 
soldiers need to be identified. The intakes of volunteer soldiers in Taiwan are mainly 
from four origins; the first and also the largest is the group of high school and college 
students and youth cohorts from the society. The other three groups, similar to Sweden, 
are to take advantage of conscripts who: 1. are currently receiving basic training in the 
boot camps, 2. are currently deployed and serving in operational units, and 3. have 
discharged and registered as reservists. In fact, from a career perspective, those who 
choose to serve as volunteer soldiers can be categorised into two groups: ‘one treats the 
military as a long-term career, the other considers military service as a temporary job 
option and a stepping-stone before finding a civilian job.’413 
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To recruit students from high schools and universities, the military training instructors 
who serve in civilian high schools and universities play an important role in that they 
act as the intermediary between students and the military which facilitate the efficiency 
of recruitment.414 With military background and good relations with civilian education 
systems, these military training instructors co-operate well with the armed forces 
recruitment centre to hold various events in schools to attract students. According to 
their experiences of the armed forces recruitment centre, recruitment resulting from 
participation in civilian job fairs or career events to recruit youth cohorts from society is 
less successful than recruiting directly from schools. Using tuition fees as an incentive, 
recruiters often explain to students how they can both earn and save money by serving 
in the military to: 1. pay their student debts for those have acquired college degrees, or 2. 
save money to pay their tuition fees for those who want to pursue college degrees in the 
future. Recruiting from student cohorts has therefore become a priority for the armed 
forces recruitment centre, as the director of recruitment centre identified and explained 
why they could recruit effectively from schools. 
‘My role is to keep good relationships with schools. (…) Recruitment is judged by the academic 
reputation of schools. For well-known high schools, we recommend their students to apply for 
officer programmes such as service academies or Medical College; they will not welcome us if we 
target their students to become soldiers or sergeants. As for recruiting soldiers, we aim at those high 
schools and vocational schools that are less well-known in academics. We recommend their 
students to consider entering job market first by serving as volunteer soldiers. The headteachers and 
military training instructors of these schools understand the academic performance of their students 
so they normally welcomed us and were quite co-operative.’415 
Despite various efforts and measures that have been taken, in the past few years 
Taiwan’s armed forces have faced difficulty in meeting the annual recruiting targets. 
Figure 2 shows the recruitment results for volunteer soldiers since 2008. It is clear that, 
the results for recruiting youth cohorts from society and schools were unsuccessful, with 
exceptions in 2008 and 2009 due to the high unemployment rate caused by the global 
economic downturn. In 2010 only 64.5% of the recruiting target was reached; whilst in 
2011 and 2012 the recruitment rates further dropped to 50% and 47% respectively.416 
Given the fact that recruiting from youth cohorts has been difficult, to supplement the 
insufficiency of recruitment an alternative but crucial approach is to focus on existing 
conscripts who are currently serving the compulsory service or ex-conscripts who have 
                                                     
414 Currently there are more than 4,000 active-duty military training officers in schools to teach defence 
related courses and are in charge of campus and students’ safety.  
415 Interview, participant TW-5. 




recently discharged from military.417 Adding recruited conscripts to the youth cohorts, 
the overall recruitment rate in 2012 was substantially raised from 47% to 74%, see 
Figure 4-3. Nevertheless, it still fell approximately 4,000 short of its 15,311 annual 
target. The difficult situation has not improved in 2013; during the first half of 2013 the 
armed forces only managed to recruit 1,847 out of an annual total of 17,447 soldiers 
with the achieving rate for the first half of 2013 only reached 31% (see Figures 4-2 and 
4-3 respectively).418 
 
Figure 4-2 Recruitment results of volunteer soldiers from youth cohorts 
Source: Personnel Division, Ministry of National Defense.419 
*: indicating recruitment from both youth cohorts and conscripts. 
 
                                                     
417 Sweden has taken the similar move by recruiting ex-conscripts. 
418 MND press release, 21 July 2013. <http://www.mnd.gov.tw/Publish.aspx?cnid=65&p=58166>, 
accessed 22 July 2013. 
419 *: Recruiting from youth cohorts and current conscripts, 



























































Figure 4-3 Recruitment Rate of volunteer soldiers from the youth cohorts 
Source:420 
When recruitment is divided by gender, the recruitment rate for male soldiers was even 
lower; the only favourable situation is the recruitment of women, which has been better 
than anticipated. Applications from female cohorts substantially exceeded the annual 
targets and the armed forces have over-recruited female soldiers for several years. 
Analysing by military branches, given applicants can choose preferable military 
branches and locations to serve, it has been found hard to attract young people to serve 
in physically demanding and rigorous branches such as the Army and the Marine Corps, 
and units located in remote areas or off-shore islands. In 2012, the Army only fulfilled 
54% of its annual recruitment target, while the figures were even lower for the Marines 
Corps and Military Police, with both only achieving 45% of their recruitment targets.421 
Furthermore, combat positions were difficult to fill as well. For example, in 2012 the 
Army recruited only 1,452 soldiers to staff its 3,124 vacant combat positions in the 
frontline. The Marine Corps faced the similar dilemma as only 304 soldiers were 
recruited to fill 784 vacancies.422 The non-combat positions in the Army, on the 
contrary, were much more popular among youth cohorts and easier to recruit. In 2012 
for example, while there were only 599 available non-combat positions, the Army 
eventually recruited 828 soldiers.423 In contrast to less than half (46.4%) of combat 
positions in the Army were able to be filled in 2012, non-combat positions were over 
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recruited with 138.2% of recruitment rate.424 
Young men and women and especially their parents understand that serving in 
combat-units demands more physical endurance and implies the need to cope with 
isolation, remoteness, and a more risky environment without a significant gain in extra 
salary or compensation.425 A more important consideration is, given that those who 
serve in logistics or engineering units can learn specialised skills which are useful in the 
private sector, combat skills are less practical for soldiers’ post-military careers and thus 
discourage people from pursuing them. The lower recruitment rate in combat units has 
affected the proportion of volunteer soldiers, as there is a clear distinction in the 
conscript ratio between combat and non-combat units. Combat units have a lower share 
of volunteer soldiers (57%) whereas it is higher in non-combat units (73%). It is 
apparent that young people prefer not to serve in combat units and it has become a 
concern for the MND. Through the assessment on AVF capability, a senior MND staff 
from the Integrated Assessment Office identified the seriousness of the problem and 
commented: 
‘…in an investigation report I underlined the problems I found. For example, some units have lower 
share of volunteer soldiers such as the Marines, which has shown that tougher units are more 
difficult to recruit volunteer soldiers. These units usually have better combat capability, but 
currently they mainly rely on conscripted manpower so it does not cause a big problem at the 
moment. However, if the conscripted manpower is gradually reduced in the future, I will start to 
worry. Monetary incentives must be given in order to solve the problem. J-1 (Personnel Division of 
MND) is planning to offer combat bonus to those who serve in combat units, which is included in 
MND’s AVF implementation plan. I personally think it will still be difficult (to offer combat bonus) 
due to the financial constraint.’426 
Recruitment is also associated with geographic areas, which is similar to the situation in 
Sweden. Recruitment has been found to be more difficult in northern Taiwan where job 
opportunities are better; youth cohorts from central and southern Taiwan, on the other 
hand, are more likely to join the armed forces due to a scarcity of available jobs.427 
There is a tendency for the majority of volunteer soldiers to come from minority 
families in the non-metropolitan areas, and it is difficult to recruit youth cohorts from 
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metropolitan areas where people are richer and have higher educational level. One 
important point is that, in general, there are two types of high-school graduates who 
choose AVF: the first is comprised of those coming from poor families; the second is 
composed of those who perform poorly at schools.428 Based on her own case, a female 
sergeant explained: 
‘Most volunteer soldiers’ families had economic problems so they want to help their families; that 
is why they join the armed forces. Also, I think the welfare in the military is better than those 
offered in private sectors.’429 
Owing to the failure of MND to achieve recruitment targets, without compromising the 
selection standards, the Executive Yuan has demanded amendments in recruitment by 
simplifying recruitment rules and application process; they include: 
1. ‘Loosening the restrictions on age and lowering the height limit.  
2. Starting February 2013, applications can be accepted on daily basis, and the process for selection 
and basic training is conducted monthly. 
3. Starting from 2013, the IQ test can be exempted for those who had taken the armed forces IQ 
test before with scores higher than 90. 
4. Those who passed physical fitness test within one year can be exempted from the test.  
5. The specialty options are increased from current five to ten. 
6. The reservists are allowed to re-enter the service and choose different branches of armed service, 
however they will need to undergo specialty training.’430 
Apart from those measures, the MND has also been working on improvements in the 
following fields: career development, salary and benefits, educational opportunities, 
living and working facilities, and veterans’ assistance. Although a pay increase for 
soldiers, planned to be twice the minimum national legal wage, has not yet been granted, 
the MND is not giving up on this objective. The MND also aims to provide combat 
bonuses to those who serve in combat positions and to keep volunteer soldiers serving 
longer. These proposals have been budgeted in 2014 annual expenditure; however, at the 
time of writing (September 2013), it is still uncertain whether the Executive Yuan will 
approve these incentive programmes.  
Quality, satisfaction and motivation 
The quality of Taiwanese volunteer soldiers is a key to the ‘smaller but smarter force’; 
these issues have been assessed through several surveys on soldiers’ performance, 
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satisfaction and motivation. Overall, drawing from the judgements and experiences of 
soldiers’ superiors, the quality of Taiwanese volunteer soldiers is acceptable in terms of 
training and working performance. However, when it comes to soldiers’ satisfaction and 
motivation with their service, the general approval rates have dropped, especially after 
they have served for a certain time. Since Taiwan adopted a two-tier mixed system, the 
average educational level of volunteer soldiers has been lower than that of conscripts. 
For example, less than 10% of volunteer soldiers recruited in 2005 held university 
degrees; most volunteer soldiers (83.6%) were senior high school or vocational school 
graduated.431 The educational level of recruits has not greatly improved since the armed 
forces started to recruit volunteer soldiers, as only 16% of volunteer soldiers recruited in 
2008 had university degrees, much lower than the national average 42.6% (See Table 
4-10).  
Table 4-10 Percentage of the overall draftees with university and college degrees 
Year 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
% of conscripts with University or College 
degrees 
48.4% 47.3% 46.4% 45.4% 45.6% 42.6% 
Source: Calculated by author based on data from the Conscription Agency, Ministry of 
Interior, ROC 
Soldiers’ educational levels may not directly affect the capability of combat units; it has 
however affected the competence of the specialised units which required a higher 
quality of personnel. A senior sergeant major from the communication equipment base 
depot addressed this issue: 
‘It is difficult to find a conscript without a university degree; it is also difficult to find a volunteer 
soldier who has a university degree. Most volunteer soldiers with high school education are difficult 
to train. Although they studied information or electric engineering in vocational school, after these 
soldiers were deployed to the repair line, I found they are incompetent. In our communication repair 
depot, the quality of conscripted soldiers is better than volunteer soldiers because they have 
university degree in the electric engineering or electronic fields. I don’t even have to teach them.’432 
The fact that conscripts’ quality is better than that of volunteers is also acknowledged by 
volunteer soldiers. According to their self-assessments, many volunteer soldiers felt that 
the quality of volunteers is lower than that of conscripts. A female Army corporal who 
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was promoted from the enlisted ranks pointed out:  
‘I feel the quality of conscripts is better. Most of volunteer soldiers are only high school graduated. 
Most conscripts have university degrees and they are assigned in the regiment headquarters doing 
administration works. After they are discharged, they might teach or become civil servants...’433 
She further explained 
‘… many volunteer soldiers are quite lazy but because they have served for a long time and know 
the tricks to truant without getting caught. Conscripts know their time is strictly controlled and they 
have to one-year obligation so they work diligently.’434 
A similar view was expressed by a female volunteer soldier: 
‘The quality of conscripts is better because I feel they work harder than volunteer soldiers. 
Conscripts are more junior in the unit so there are many senior soldiers and superiorities watching 
them. They are afraid of being blamed or punished so they basically work quite hard.’435 
Analysing from the perspectives of seniority and mind-set, a defence journalist 
observed that the working attitudes of volunteer soldiers could affect the capability of 
the armed forces, as he elaborated: 
‘I am worried about the capability and readiness of the AVF. I think the steadiness of the armed 
forces will start to deteriorate. These volunteer soldiers may not fully obey their superiorities. They 
might think that I am a career soldier and I have to face an incompetent squad or platoon 
commander. Why should I listen to them? They will become passive, as they think superiors will be 
rotated and so will they. Volunteer soldiers will become what I called “defence civil servants”; like 
those civil servants. Their mentality is: if I do more, it is more likely to make mistakes; therefore it 
is better doing nothing.’436 
In fact, the initial mediocre quality of volunteer soldiers can be improved and enhanced 
through continued training, education, and on-the-job studying for civilian degrees. 
According to his investigation and assessment, a member of MND staff in charge of 
AVF capability assessment was thus optimistic about the quality of volunteer soldiers:  
 
‘According to my interviews, volunteer soldiers are more mature in operating weapon systems, and 
they perform better than conscripts. With regard to professional knowledge and skills, volunteer 
soldiers are also better than conscripts. (…) I am positive about the capability of the AVF.’437 
 
Subjective judgments on the quality of volunteer soldiers may show one side of the fact 
but may not be able to present a whole picture of volunteer soldiers’ quality. Thus, the 
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MND recently conducted a comprehensive assessment of the satisfaction and quality on 
training and working performance of volunteer soldiers through both questionnaires and 
interviews with soldiers’ superiors. Nine variables were evaluated with regard to 
volunteer soldiers’ performance, for example, discipline, knowledge, efficiency, 
comparison with conscripts, and preference in assigning tasks to volunteers, see Figure 
4-4.438 The results showed that both male and female superiors were satisfied with the 
general performance of volunteer soldiers (means>3). They acknowledged that 
volunteer soldiers were disciplined, had good knowledge in handling jobs, and could 
accomplish tasks on time. In comparison with conscripts, superiors felt that volunteer 
soldiers’ performance was better and would first assign tasks to them. Currently, 
volunteer soldiers and conscripts are mixed in the same unit, which has sometimes 
caused discrepancies in management of soldiers due to complaints about inequality.439 
Therefore, superiors preferred that volunteer soldiers and conscripts should be assigned 
separately in different companies or battalions. Overall, male superiors tended to be 
more satisfied with the performance of volunteers. 
 
Figure 4-4 Performance of volunteer soldiers assessed by superiors (median=3) 
                                                     
438 Study on the satisfaction and training and working performance of volunteer soldiers. May 2013. 
Comptroller Bureau, Ministry of National Defense. It surveyed 6,271 male volunteer soldiers and 658 
female soldiers with five-scaled questions (median=3). 
<http://www.mnd.gov.tw/UserFiles/File/%E4%B8%BB%E8%A8%88%E5%B1%80/Governmen_troops
_rsc.doc.>, accessed 25 May 2013. 





































































Source: Comptroller Bureau, MND, May 2013. 
 
To identify how satisfied volunteer soldiers were, surveyed soldiers were further 
requested to assess 12 variables in respect of salary and welfares, interaction among 
colleagues, organisational culture, leadership, work challenges, self-development, and 
opportunity for promotion and further studying. The mean of volunteer soldiers’ overall 
(male and female soldiers) satisfaction was 3.22 (median=3), indicating that generally 
volunteer soldiers were satisfied with these variables, see Figure 4-5.440 It is worth noting 
that there were significant differences (P-values < 0.01.) in the satisfactions between male 
and female soldiers, in which female soldiers showed higher satisfaction than males in all 
12 variables (all results>3). The variable ‘interaction among colleagues’ was defined in 
terms of most satisfied with, while salary and welfare were least satisfied, despite 
soldier’s pay on average is higher than what is offered in the private sector. This is 
partially due to the heavy workload in comparison with the fixed pay.441 In addition, male 
soldiers tended to be discontented with salary and welfare (mean=2.98) and the situation 
of facilities in barracks (mean=2.95). 
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Figure 4-5 Volunteer soldiers’ satisfaction toward jobs and the armed forces 
Source: Comptroller Bureau, MND, May 2013. 
 
 
The Management of gender issues in the armed forces has been emphasised since the 
number of female soldiers, NCOs and officers has increased over the past decade. The 
survey further examined the perceptions of superiors on whether there were differences 
between male and female soldiers in terms of performance, coordination, workloads, 
norms and physical standards. According to results there was no difference but female 
superiors felt that the physical training standard for female soldiers should be slightly 
lowered. An interesting finding was that the majority of superiors agreed that male 
soldiers performed better than females (mean=3.34), as both male (mean=3.37) and 
female superiors (mean=3.08) acknowledged that male volunteer soldiers performed 





























Figure 4-6 Superiors’ perception on the performance between male and female soldiers 
(median=3) 




Retention of soldiers is highly associated with the recruitment and is key factor in the 
success of transition. If the armed forces are able to retain more soldiers, recruitment 
will be a lot easier.442 From the management perspective, an important factor for a 
successful AVF is the retention of soldiers; otherwise the personnel turnover would be 
high and could not achieve cost efficiency in terms of manpower costs.443 A senior staff 
member from MND in charge of the implementation of AVF took the view that 
retention is in fact a more serious problem than recruitment, and in his opinion retention 
is related to the characteristics of individual units.’444 That is to say, if a unit is able to 
create a favourable working environment, including leadership and morale, soldiers are 
more likely to stay. 
 
Nevertheless, retention is one of the big problems in Taiwan’s AVF transition, as the 
armed forces have been losing half of their mature and trained soldiers every year and it 
is difficult to keep them. Retention rates have rarely reached 50% since transition 
started - from 44% in 2010 then dropped to 33.5% in 2011.445 Improvement was 
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443 Interview, participant TW-7. 
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445 United Evening News, 21 Oct, 2012. Insufficient recruitment incentives, 70% volunteers leave after 















































observed in 2012 as the rate rose to 53%.446 Many reasons contribute to the low 
retention rate, but soldiers’ dissatisfaction with the military service, poor working 
environment and leadership were particularly influential. A female Army corporal who 
served as a qualified interim recruiter for the regiment echoed this point as she 
described and criticised the working situation in the military: 
 
‘In fact, recruitment is fine, the problem is retention. For example, if we recruit 10 people, but there 
are 15 (existing volunteer soldiers) who want to leave, the efforts are in vain. No matter how many 
have we recruited, there are even more soldiers want to leave the military.’447 
 
Discontent with the excessive workload and internal management are the main reasons; 
she explained: 
 
‘(…) there is no recreation in the barracks, so who is willing to stay in barracks? No body! The 
daily routine is to work during the day, and then work overtime in the evening, day after day. No 
extra leaves or bonus were given to offset our overtime work. During inventory or equipment 
inspection, everyone must stand-by and no leave could be granted, and we only had two hours of 
sleep a day. If you calculate the salary, it is about the same as private sector because they get paid 
for working overtime but we don’t, which has seriously impacted on soldier’s willingness to stay.’ 
 
With no intention to stay in the military, a female soldier from the Army agreed with the 
above comment, as she argued: 
 
‘This is the main reason (workloads). As for myself, I do not plan to stay in the military. Work 
seems to be endless which can never be finished, no matter how hard and how long we have 
worked; it never ends. I don’t understand why they (superiors) want to force us to do this…’448 
 
A defence analyst denied that salary is an important reason to retain soldiers but instead 
the military should make soldiers feel a sense of honour: 
 
‘Why is retention still low? I think you (soldiers) should treat the military as a career instead of a 
job. The armed forces need to make soldiers feel a sense of honour; then they are willing to stay and 
contribute to the organisation. This is crucial, but how do you create these? I think strict training is 
the key. I believe only strict training can cultivate the sense of honour, then they (soldiers) are 
willing to stay. For example, conscripts all complained when they were discharged because 
everything was easygoing. But in the past, although conscripts experienced a more rigorous training, 
they cherished the hardship during their compulsory service; that was the reason for them to have 
the sense of honour.’449 
 
A more important reason that affects soldiers’ willingness to stay is a lack of freedom. 
 
‘In my interviews, the last question I asked volunteer soldiers: what was the biggest reason for your 
                                                                                                                                                           
Accessed 20December, 2012. 
446 Figure is acquired from Manpower Division, MND, unpublished with permission to use, 2013. 
447 Interview, participant TW-12. 
448 Interview, participant TW-13. 




former colleagues not to stay in the military? I summarise: 1. Many soldiers feel that there is no 
freedom in the armed forces. 2. frequent turnover of leaderships so soldiers have to re-adapt 
themselves to new superiors, and even new rules and regulations, therefore causing them to leave 
the military.’450 
 
With further analysis, it has been found from the MND’s 2013 survey that male soldiers 
were less likely to retain in service if they were not transferred/promoted to NCO, which 
is in accordance with the findings discussed in the previous Sweden section. They also 
tended to disbelieve that being a volunteer is a sound career option, and most importantly, 
male soldiers tended not to recommend their friends and colleagues to join the military 
(mean=2.79). A similar factor was also found amongst female soldiers; notwithstanding 
that they in general were more satisfied with the armed forces, they hesitated to 
recommend that to their colleagues that they join the military (mean=3), (see Figure 4-7). 
This has given a warning sign to the armed forces that even volunteer soldiers themselves 
might not strongly recommend this job to their friends and colleagues. 
 
Figure 4-7 Volunteer soldiers’ satisfaction with the military service (median=3) 
Source: Comptroller Bureau, MND, May 2013 
 
A case study on volunteer soldiers’ willingness of retention and work satisfaction 
conducted in 2010 discovered that a high proportion of volunteer soldiers were not 
content with service and working environment in the military.451 Some implications can 
                                                     
450 Interview, participant TW-1. 






























































be drawn from these results. Over 60% of soldiers felt that actual service conditions 
were different from the advertisements. Less than half (43.8%) of respondents were 
willing to stay in the armed forces. The survey concluded that the following groups 
were more likely to stay in the armed forces: sergeants (who were promoted from 
privates),452 those who served in non-combat units, females, soldiers and sergeants who 
are older and more senior, those who were recruited during their conscription service, 
and those who were more satisfied with the service (Table 4-11).  
 





retain in service 
Percentage 
Overall 
All volunteer soldiers and volunteer 
NCOs 
5,254 2,299 43.8% 
Rank 
Sergeant 1,753 944 53.9% 
Private 3,501 1,355 38.7% 
Type of Serving 
Organisation  
Administration (e.g. HQ) 3 2 66.7% 
Operational Units 2,669 1,053 39.5% 
Schools (e.g. Logistics School) 71 44 62% 
Repair & Maintenance Base Depots 2,511 1,200 47.8% 
Sex 
Male 4,233 1,766 41.7% 
Female 1,021 533 52.2% 
Age 
Under 20 1,454 611 42% 
21-25 3,352 1,434 42.8% 
26-30 417 227 54.4% 
31-35 31 27 87.1% 
Year of service 
Under 1 year 1,668 688 41.2% 
1-2 years 2,437 1,016 41.7% 
3 years 730 356 48.8% 
4 years 271 128 47.2% 
5 years or more 148 111 75% 
Source of 
recruitment 
Youth cohorts from society 2,933 1,356 46.2% 
Boot camps 1,591 567 35.6% 
Conscripts from operational units 597 311 52.1% 
Reservists 133 65 48.9% 
Education 
Junior High School 74 33 44.6% 
Senior High School 3,677 1,608 43.7% 
2-year College 781 348 44.6% 
University 704 302 42.9% 
Master and above 18 8 44.4% 
Satisfaction 
Not at all 568 73 12.9% 
Unsatisfied 941 195 20.7% 
Mediocre 3,005 1,444 48.1% 
Satisfied 653 516 79% 
Very satisfied 87 71 81.6% 
Source: Comptroller Quarterly, No. 328, April, 2010 
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Overall Satisfaction with Military Service 
All in all, the fundamental problem for retaining soldiers in Taiwan’s armed forces lies in 
the volunteer soldiers’ dissatisfaction with military service, which was reflected in the 
survey results. Of all respondents, the majority of soldiers (57.2%) were neither satisfied 
nor dissatisfied with the military service. While around 14% of surveyed soldiers who 
were very satisfied and satisfied, those who were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the 
military service accounted for 29% (Figure 4-8).453 One important issue needs to be 
addressed; the armed forces should notice that a high satisfaction rate does not 
necessarily mean a favourable retention rate. The results of another survey conducted by 
the Army on volunteer soldiers’ satisfaction and retention demonstrated a good example. 
Despite figures as high as 75.3% of 935 respondents were satisfied with their service in 
the armed forces, paradoxically, only less than half (47.4%) had the intention to stay.454 
 
 
Figure 4-8 Job satisfaction of volunteer soldiers (N=5,254)455 
Source: Comptroller Quarterly, 2010 
 
Diversity of new recruits 
 
The issue of diversity of military personnel in Taiwan’s armed forces is centred on 
gender issue, as the population in Taiwan is relatively homogeneous. Other than 
increasing the share of female military personnel in the armed forces, unlike Sweden, 
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155-168. 
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ethnic minorities were not specifically highlighted as a potential group to recruit from. 
The recruitment of female soldiers into the armed forces has been carried out 
successfully; targets were not only met, but results were better than expected. As 
demonstrated in several survey results discussed in the previous section, compared with 
male soldiers, female soldiers have higher motivation, tend to be more satisfied with 
military service, and are more likely to stay in service for a longer time. The recruitment 
centre director discussed the reasons why the recruitment of women was successful: 
 
‘One of the reasons is that many women serve in lighter and less physical demanding units. The 
average wage for women in the private sector is lower than men, and there is less chance for 
women to achieve highly in private sectors. However, the military salary is universal regardless of 
gender, and the chance for promotion in the military is fair. Another is that women tend to have a 
stable job, so the job stability in the armed forces suits their needs.’456 
 
The MND set an 8% cap for females in the entire armed forces personnel. The current 
percentage of women accounts for 7.6% of the entire armed forces personnel, with 
around 15,000 female personnel.457 In light of the successful result in recruitment of 
female soldiers in past years and global trend of utilising females in operations, in 2013 
President Ma ordered the MND to review the female personnel policy and lift the 8% 
restriction on females.458 The armed forces have thus doubled the recruitment of female 
soldiers from 1,528 in 2012 to 3,058 in 2013, and raised the proportion of female 
personnel from 8% to 12%.459 
 
One question worth considering, since the recruitment of women has been better than 
expected but recruitment of men has been far from reaching targets, is should the armed 
forces consider shifting the recruitment strategy back to focus more on male soldiers? In 
addition, as in western countries where female personnel have been deployed for 
missions, the utilisation of female personnel must be re-evaluated by allocating more 
women to combat units and carry out duties from which hitherto they have been 
excluded.460 
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457 Military News, MND, 8 March, 2013. <http://www.mnd.gov.tw/Publish.aspx?cnid=65&p=56592>, 
accessed 10 March, 2013. 
458 United Daily, 8 March, 2013. President Ma: lifting the 8% restriction on female soldiers, 
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A quality NCO corps is essential to provide both troops and technical leadership to 
soldiers. The NCO corps in Taiwan’s armed forces has been existing and functioning, 
and play an important role in terms of the military capability. In line with the AVF 
implementation, the armed forces expect to enhance the quality of NCOs by 
emphasising longer periods of service and fostering training. According to the US 
experience, the better educated the NCO corps, the better the NCO perform, which 
creates stronger competition for advancement and retention.461 The NCO corps plays a 
crucial role in the armed forces with regard to troops training, execution of tasks, and 
performing specialised tasks; they have contributed to the competence of the armed 
forces. A navy captain praised the quality of naval Petty Officers: 
 
‘I have worked on surface ships for 16 years as an engineer; the Petty Officers with whom I worked 
were professional and highly experienced. In the past when ships were old, we frequently faced 
engine malfunctions. As a junior officer and engineer on board I had to consult and rely on these 
Petty Officers because they had built up enough experience and can quickly identify and fix the 
problems.’462 
 
In the past, Taiwan had sought to enhance the quality and competence of NCOs during 
1997-1998, but the results were unsuccessful because neither the roles and 
responsibilities between officers and NCOs could be clearly divided, nor were the salary 
and welfare for NCOs greatly improved in line with the enhancement project. In 
addition, the proportion of NCO in the entire armed forces personnel was not increased. 
A legislator from the defence committee of the Legislative Yuan identified Taiwan’s 
NCO problem: ‘NCOs often do not receive the respect that they deserve. We should 
learn from the American experience that NCOs are fully in charge of training and 
officers do not interfere with them.’463 
 
A competent NCO corps is essential to Taiwan’s AVF transition, as it is described in the 
Defence Report as ‘the backbone of basic level units and an important key to the 
success of voluntarism.’464The NCO corps is increasingly relied upon to train troops and 
develop their combat performance. Nevertheless, Taiwan’s NCO corps has encountered 
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a problem of a ‘brain drain’. After the majority of career NCOs have retired during the 
last decade, the proportion of career NCOs has been reducing and the percentage of 
NCO reservists in service has increased.465 The NCO reservists are on active duty for a 
limited period of time, thus making it difficult for them to keep up with changes in the 
operation and maintenance of sophisticated weapons and equipment. Solutions to this 
problem lie in the recruitment of new NCOs and reconfiguring the NCO organisational 
structure. A crucial approach in the midst of AVF transition is to cultivate volunteer 
soldiers to be qualified for promotion to NCOs.466 In other words, volunteer soldiers 
will become the largest manpower source for future NCOs. 
 
A new NCO enhancement programme went into force in 2009 in accordance with the 
implementation of AVF. The five objectives of the enhancement programme were to: 
‘increase the status of NCOs, increase their responsibility, build confidence, cultivate 
professionalism and develop their careers.’467 Since the transition started, the 
proportion of volunteer NCOs has increased from 70% in 2009 to 90% in 2012 along 
with the constant drop in the percentage of conscripted NCOs. Between 2009 and 2012, 
the number of volunteer NCOs has increased from 52,248 to 64,105, while the number 
of conscripted NCOs has reduced from 16,515 to 5,750.468 
 
The implementation policy for NCO enhancement centres on the clear division of 
labour between officers and NCOs so that the functions of ‘officers for planning, and 
NCOs for executing’ can be ensured and NCOs can be fully authorised to utilise their 
expertise. To enhance the competence of NCOs, various education and training 
programmes including courses for acquiring civilian professional certificates were 
offered to NCOs.469 In terms of recruitment, the NCO training programme did not 
attract enough applicants in 2012 with a low attainment rate of 41%. The other NCO 
intake through the two-year NCO colleges was much more popular (93%), see Table 
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Table 4-12 Recruitment of NCOs in 2012 
2012 NCO Recruitment Targets Recruited Recruitment Rate 
NCO Training Programme 1,155 470 40.69% 
Two-year NCO Colleges 1,945 1,808 92.95% 
Source: MND 2012 Performance Report 
 
Akin to the situation of filling the rank and file for combat units, it has been found 
difficult to fill NCO positions in combat units. Although there were vacant NCO 
positions in the more physically demanding formations including combat units, 
qualified soldiers were not motivated to serve in such units. For example, in the Air 
Force, it is hard to find vacancies in air force bases, but many available positions in 
air-defence units cannot be filled because these units are more demanding compared to 
serving on a base.471 
 
Another crucial task is to increase the proportion of NCOs in the military as a whole. In 
light of the experiences from Japan, US, France and UK, the MND decided to increase 
the proportion of NCOs from the current officer/NCO/soldier ratio of 1: 1.84: 1.92 to 
1:2.12:1.70 by the end of 2014 (see Table 4-13).472 Between 2010 and 2014, the 
proportion of NCO and soldiers in the entire armed forces personnel are expected to 
increase by 5% and 4.7% respectively.473 
 
Table 4-13 International comparison of the officer/NCO/soldier ratio  
 Japan US France UK Taiwan 
Officer 1 1 1 1 1 
NCO 3.34 3.64 6 1.4 2.12 
Soldier 1.98 1.52 3.5 3.5 1.70 
Source: The assessment of the officer: NCO: Soldier ratio and the AVF implementation, 
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MND, August 2009 
 
To create and expand a career development system for NCOs that parallels to that of 
officers, NCO supervisors and NCO staff positions are established at the levels of 
command headquarters, corps, regiment, battalion, and company. As described earlier, 
the division of labour has long been a problem between officers and NCOs; a defence 
analyst elaborated: 
 
‘As for responsibility, nowadays officers are doing tasks more suited to NCOs. Therefore they 
(NCOs) feel that they are not authorised to do such tasks. Because once something happened, 
usually officers are the ones to be blamed or punished. NCOs then ask what am I doing here? I have 
no authority or responsibility. So from the management perspective, the MND needs to clarify 
authority and relative responsibilities.’474 
 
To clearly divide authority and responsibility between officers and NCOs, ‘NCO review 
boards’ were held at each level as a means of division of authority and responsibility 
between officers and NCOs. The authorities include reviews of promotions, transfers, 
position assignments, trainings, punishments and rewards, and performance of NCOs 
and soldiers.475 
 
Reserve force reform 
 
In the face of the military threat from the PRC, Taiwan has been maintaining a large 
number of reservists. In theory, there are more than 2.8 million of reservists registered 
in the MND;476 nevertheless, according to an MND assessment, only 370,000 are 
needed, and the quantity of reservists can meet the MND demand until 2051.477 
Following the principle of ‘reducing regular forces and expanding reserves’, the reserve 
forces are expected to sustain a normal combat capability. Taiwan’s reserve force has 
undergone a change in terms of the influx of draftees after four-month basic training, 
changed pattern and frequency of recalls, frequent participation in the military exercises, 
and most importantly, conduction of HA/DR missions. In addition, according to the 
newly amended Defence Organisation Law, starting in 2013 the Reserve Command was 
degraded from an independent command headquarters to being placed directly under the 
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MND, and its six basic training regiments were shifted to the Army’s command.  
 
Taiwan’s reservists are all ex-regulars. All military personnel including officers, NCOs 
and soldiers after discharge from active-duty service become reservists and must report 
to their local reserve units immediately. In line with the AVF implementation, post 
four-month training draftees will be listed in the ‘reserve personnel management 
information system’ to expand reserve manpower. Depending on their military 
occupational specialty, reservists are organised into different units. Annual reservist 
training is conducted through various types of recalls. The purposes of recall are to 
maintain readiness by practicing immediate report on call-up and to update personal 
information on reservist list.  
 
Within eight years after discharge from active duty, reservists will receive four recalls 
for reservist training (biannually). The MND dictates the training period between 2.5 to 
5.5 days depending on demands of troops.478 Apart from high mobilisation report rates, 
most importantly, reservists have been integrated into the annual military exercises to 
validate the mobilisation, capabilities and joint operations performance of the reserve 
forces. In April 2013, a total of 12,000 reservists were mobilised by the MND to take 
part in the annual Han-Kuang military exercise. Within 24 hours after the issue of 
mobilization order, all personnel had reported to duty.479 In response to the demand for 
disaster prevention and relief during the flood season, reservist training will focus on 
HA/DR so the capabilities and efficiency can be enhanced. The reservists will stand by 
to assist with disaster relief missions along with regular forces.480 Regarding such 
missions, a defence analyst supported the view that HA/DR tasks should be performed 
mainly by reserve forces; he stated: 
 
‘I suggest that disaster relief missions should not be carried out by regular units, but instead should 
be conducted by reserve forces; because the main mission of reserve forces is to protect homeland. 
In addition, since the reserve forces keep close contacts with local governments, they can perform a 
better job. The reserve command can organise several battalions to be specifically dedicated for 
HA/DR missions.’481 
 
In contrast to Sweden’s significant utilisation of volunteer reservists, Taiwan’s reservist 
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reform is relatively superficial as it retains a dependence on ex-regulars. Opinions 
concerning the capability of Taiwan’s reservists have been mixed. Due to the reduced 
length of the four-month basic training, many people are concerned about whether the 
quantity-based reservists have the capability to defend the homeland. 
Counter-intuitively, a defence analyst was not worried because: 
 
‘Many people think that after AVF is implemented reserve mobilisation will become a big problem. 
Personally I don’t think so. Based on our experience in the past, do you think our reservists are able 
to fight? No! So what? They have been already incapable; therefore the service being reduced to a 
4-month basic training will not affect much. We’ve always cheated ourselves by saying that we 
have millions of reservists; everybody knows that they are useless...’482 
 
A good question thus worth considering is what kind of reserve force does Taiwan need 
in terms of functions and missions? If they are expected to be focused on war-fighting, 
it seems to be less capable due to the short period of basic training. Nevertheless, if it is 
aimed to conduct HA/DR missions or other social functions such as maintaining 
domestic security, four-month training would be sufficient and can allow regular troops 
to focus on military training and maintain readiness. Another question worth pondering 
is what should Taiwan learn from western countries (including Sweden) in building a 




According to the results of implementation in 2011 and 2012, Sweden is carrying out its 
military personnel reform at a rather stable pace as several important objectives have 
been achieved such as the abolition of ad hoc international units, the carrying out of 
international work obligations, and a satisfactory recruitment of regular soldiers in 
terms of quantity and quality. One obvious feature is that part-time volunteer reservists 
are significantly utilised. Most soldiers are motivated and satisfied with their military 
service. Although it is still too early to judge the retention result, the retention of 
soldiers has been foreseen by SAF as an important task. Several incentives, monetary 
and in-kind schemes, have been planned and carried out to boost recruitment and 
retention, including recently announced pay rises for soldiers. In addition, the SAF has 
been diversifying the personnel pool by recruiting more women and second generation 
immigrants. Some challenges that need to be tackled include: recruitment of part-time 





soldiers and Home Guard soldiers, a high drop-out rate of soldiers from the basic 
training, and the specialist officer reform. All in all, the SAF is aiming to create a public 
image of being an attractive employer. 
 
In the face of the Chinese military threat, the unique geostrategic context of Taiwan has 
compelled it to adopt a quasi-AVF, in which all male citizens are still obliged to receive 
four months of basic training. This has started and been implemented on schedule in 
2013. In contrast to Sweden’s high recruitment rate in 2012, Taiwan in the same year 
only managed to achieve three quarters of its planned recruitment target. The situation 
in terms of recruitment and retention has further deteriorated in 2013 due to a damaged 
public image of the military. At the time of writing (September 2013), with less than one 
and half years left, recruiting a sufficient amount of volunteer soldiers has become the 
greatest challenge to Taiwan’s armed forces in implementing an AVF by the end of 2014. 
The quality of soldiers has so far been acceptable as the training and performance of 
volunteer soldiers can meet the relevant requirements. Although the target of 
downsizing of the overall military establishment was achieved on time, the planned 
increase in the proportion of volunteer personnel failed to catch up in 2012. The NCO 
corps needs to refine its division of labour between NCOs and commissioned officers so 
they can better perform the middle management of troops. As for the reservist reforms, 
an issue worth addressing is whether reservists should stay where they are as a back-up 
for regular troops in conducting war fighting, or transform its mission to focus more on 
social functions such as HA/DR.  
 
Both Swedish and Taiwanese moves toward an AVF have faced a number of similar 
challenges, including recruitment, retention, NCO and reservist reforms. This has 
impacted, albeit to differing extents, on the progress to date. While personnel reforms in 
Sweden generally have been carried out in good shape, Taiwan’s armed forces, 
meanwhile, face significant challenges in recruitment, with similar concerns over 
long-term retention. Meanwhile, the sustainability of the respective reforms and their 
suitability to the defence needs of the two countries going forward will be equally 
telling and remains, as yet, to be seen. The next chapter will embark on the last part of 
the empirical trilogy: an analysis of the factors and conditions that either facilitate or 










Following the examination of metrics of the AVF transition and defence reform in both 
countries, a picture has developed in terms of what both countries intend to achieve, and 
what have they been doing so far. Nevertheless, there is still one important part missing; 
having provided a basic understanding about what and how have both countries done 
and been doing in making their way to the final success of AVF and personnel reform, it 
is necessary to look at factors and conditions that either help or impede their 
implementation process.   
 
As the last episode of the empirical trilogy, chapter five aims to answer the question: 
‘what factors and conditions have facilitated or obstructed the implementation process 
of AVF and personnel reform in both countries?’ Although the basic framework of this 
chapter is similar to the previous two chapters, the criteria and contents in terms of 
factors and conditions, although sharing some similarities, are different. From chapters 
three and four, it was found that Sweden and Taiwan, intent on an AVF transition, could 
set different strategic goals, such as Sweden building an expeditionary AVF while 
Taiwan’s AVF is focused on territorial defence. Interestingly, some similar objectives 
are shared such as attracting a sufficient number of volunteers with the right quality and 
a competent NCO corps. Likewise, countries can also, by emulating other countries’ 
AVF experiences, as discussed in chapter one, carry out similar measures to see through 
the transition; for example, creating incentives to boost recruitment and retention.  
 
Different countries can encounter similar factors which affect their defence reform, such 
as public support for the armed forces and defence reform, which is also a crucial factor 
for both Sweden and Taiwan. Countries also face different factors and conditions; for 
example, legislation was one of the most important issues that the SAF has faced in 




from MOD and Headquarters during interviews. Nevertheless, due to the more or less 
bi-partisan consensus in Taiwan on the AVF issue, introduction of legislation was not 
emphasised as much as in Sweden. Given the fact that both countries have very 
different strategic backgrounds and contexts as identified in chapter two, the factors and 
conditions discussed in the two country sections are thus not necessarily similar.483 
The other feature of this chapter is that, unlike the first two empirical chapters which 
were on the basis of qualitative data gathered from interviews and documentary analysis 
as the source of the quantitative results,484 in the penultimate part of this chapter, the 
results from a questionnaire-based survey on the qualitative features of soldiers will be 
analysed. The aim of the survey was to measure some important factors - soldiers’ 
motivation for, satisfaction with, and expectations from military service; their views 
surveyed through a retrospective method. That part of the discussion is based on 
qualitative evidence collected through a questionnaire-based survey conducted in both 
countries to examine the factors and conditions that either facilitate or obstruct the 
implementation processes. The approach allows fora triangulation method through a 
combination of interviews, surveys and documentary (secondary data) analysis. By 
using the triangulation method, it is expected that a more detailed and balanced picture 






Personnel reform of the armed forces is an important element of government policy and 
usually it involves the commitment of significant national resources and effort. 
Therefore, in countries seeking a smooth and successful defence transformation, an 
important factor in facilitating the implementation process is to acquire strong public 
support for the reform and for the armed forces as a whole.  
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Support for the Armed Forces 
 
Although the majority of the Swedish public supports the SAF engaging in international 
missions, that support is divided into support for the missions and for the Swedish 
troops.486 As discussed below, in order to make a smooth transition to the AVF, the 
armed forces need strong support from society.  
 
An MP from the defence committee argued that public support of the AVF is a crucial 
element; but he was doubtful that personnel reform has received support from society.487 
A senior personnel official of the Headquarters pointed out the main obstacle in gaining 
public support for the personnel reform is that small companies are seriously concerned 
about their employees if they are injured during service; who will pay for their loss?488 
 
Public support for the SAF can be analysed through three criteria during AVF 
transformation: 1. General support of the Armed Forces; 2. Support for the AVF reform; 
3. Support for international missions. The data adopted to evaluate these criteria were 
extracted from psychological defence surveys conducted by the Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency (MSB) over the past decade.  
 
Patterson observed a decline in public support for the SAF from about 70% at the end of 
the 1990s to about 50% between 2004 and 2008.489 Nevertheless, according to the 
surveys on defence conducted in the past decade, not only did Swedes feel that they 
needed military defence, but their willingness to put up an armed resistance and defend 
the country in the event of a military attack remained strong, both over 70% (see Figure 
5-1). From 2003 to 2012, around 50% of respondents believed that Sweden absolutely 
needs a military defence, and more than one quarter of respondents felt that military 
defence is somewhat important for Sweden. Likewise, with regard to defending the 
country, in the past decade around half showed a strong determination while a quarter 
were somewhat willing to fight for their homeland. With the majority of people who 
showed their willingness to defend the country, these results can be interpreted as strong 
                                                     
486 Interview, participant SE-2. 
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public support for the SAF. 
 
While support for the SAF remains positive, public interest in defence affairs has been 
shaky. In recent surveys an increasing number of respondents chose ‘no opinion’, ‘do 
not know’, or ‘cannot answer questions’, which implies that this is perhaps due to 
people’s lack of interest and knowledge of defence affairs.490 Despite the SAF enjoying 
general support from the public, its level of trust is lower in comparison with other 
government agencies. A survey compared the SAF with two other government agencies 
- police and the law courts, and found the level of trust among the public on the SAF 
has always been lower than the other two agencies.491 This can be ascribed to the fact 
that ‘the armed forces rarely get reported when they have done something good, but 
have always been reported when something bad happened’.492 
 
Figure 5-1 Support for SAF and people’s willingness to defend 
Source:493 
 
Support for AVF reform 
 
Despite the fact that, in general, Swedes support the Armed Forces and its function, 
support for AVF transformation has not been impressive. SPF surveys in the past decade 
showed a higher and stable support for conscription from the general public, see 
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Figure5-2.494 The surveys assessed people’s preferences concerning three types of 
armed forces: a conscripted military, a professional military, and a military entirely 
based on voluntary participation. The same questions were asked throughout the decade, 
and results showed no significant change, except in 2011 where the preference for a 
professional military for the first time exceeded that for the conscripted military. The 
remaining years’ results showed that the conscripted military was preferred by most 
Swedes, even after conscription was ended in 2010. In 2011 and 2012, almost 40% of 
respondents believed that Sweden should have a professional military, a figure which 
had increased over previous years. Nevertheless, more than 40% still preferred a 
conscripted military. Only slightly more than 10% of Swedes felt that Swedish defence 
should be based upon voluntary participation. Through a demographic analysis, a 
professional military was mainly preferred by people who are under age of 50, and a 
defence based entirely on volunteers was supported by the majority of young people. 
On the other hand, conscription was advocated mainly by people over the age of 30. An 
MP from the Defence Committee explained:  
 
‘I think this is the question about how different generations view the Armed Forces. Old people in 




This is partly because Swedes do not have strong opinions on conscription and AVF 
system, resulting in lack of public debate on this issue when the AVF decision was 
made.496 
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Figure 5-2 People’s preference of type of military 
Source: Opinioner 2012, pp.75-76. 
 
Support for international missions 
 
Swedes support international peace missions as long as they are under a UN and/or EU 
mandate. A defence journalist pointed out that Sweden is very loyal to the UN, and thus 
favours participation in peace support missions. However, he argued that public support 
for mission in Afghanistan has faded.497 In terms of public perception on two foreign 
missions that the SAF is currently engaging, half of people supported the KFOR 
mission in Kosovo with 20% opposing. In contrast to KFOR, the ISAF in Afghanistan 
received less support (43%) but higher levels of opposition (30%).498 
 
Public attitudes towards international operations has been positive since the 1990s, but 
it has decreased over time. The level of public support for international missions was 
strong throughout the 1990s, on average higher than 70%. Since the 2000s a downward 
trend was observed, and the support rate fluctuated between 50 and 70%. In 1999, 73% 
of Swedes favoured sending forces abroad; this figure dropped to 67% in 2003.499 From 
2004 to 2012 support for international missions stayed at around 60%, see Figure 5-3.500 
The majority of Swedes believe that it is the right decision to deploy troops abroad even 
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if Swedish soldiers may suffer casualties; only less than a quarter think the decision to 
deploy was wrong. Since 2008, an additional question was asked with regard to whether 
Sweden should increase or reduce the number of troops for international mission; 
around one third favoured an increase, while a quarter opposed it. In short, it can be 
concluded that international missions are supported by the majority of the Swedish 
population.  
 
Figure 5-3 Public support for international peace missions 
Source: Opinioner 2012, p. 58-59. 
 
Compared to Americans and other Europeans, Swedes are the most likely to support 
their Government‘s handling of foreign policy issues; with 74% of respondents showing 
approval.501 According to the results of the Transatlantic Trends 2012 survey, Sweden’s 
public opinion stood apart from other EU countries on many strategic issues. 
Furthermore, they were more willing to support maintaining the armed forces in 
Afghanistan, the operation in Libya, and more likely to support intervention in Syria (if 
mandated by the UN). However, when it comes to participation in NATO operations, the 
Swedish opinion is divided, with two-thirds opposed to a Syrian intervention if such an 
operation was not mandated by the United Nations.502 
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A senior information official of the Headquarters who is in charge of the public image 
of the armed forces explained the reduced support for the mission in Afghanistan, but 
support for the soldiers from society remains strong; his comments is worth citing in 
full: 
‘The key issue is that if you understand why you are in Afghanistan, Kosovo, you’ll have a higher 
acceptance rate. In Libya, there is much broader discussion, everyone understands why we should 
send troops to Libya, that is why we have a very wide support. We are in Afghanistan for 10 years, 
we need to explain to people why we are in Afghanistan, and how we do business in Afghanistan. 
The support for mission in Afghanistan has decreased overtime, but support for soldiers is good, so 
there is a difference. Now we have both national and international focuses at same time. When we 
report to general public, it is very important to stress the armed forces that you have, is available for 
both missions. For general public, it is very important to have national focus; but if you talk to 
soldiers, they prefer to do international missions.’503 
 
Perception of threats and NATO membership 
 
To evaluate how Swedes perceive the source of threats, a survey was conducted into the 
perception of threats among six countries and international organisations including 
Russia, China, USA, NATO, EU and the UN. Russia was assessed by respondents as the 
country posing the greatest impact to the world’s peace and security (48% felt Russia 
poses a particular problem, while 23% believed Russia poses a serious problem to world 
peace and security).504 Worries about Russia peaked in 2008 due to Russia’s invasion of 
Georgia. However, public worries about the threat from Russia has slightly increased 
from 31% in 2009 to 39% in 2012 (Figure 5-4).505 This can possibly be attributed to 
Russia’s recent increase in defence spending, Putin’s re-election to the presidency and 
some sporadic military activities.506 After a decade of emphasis on the development of 
an expeditionary force, the debate on territorial defence has gained momentum and is 
back on the Swedish defence agenda.  
 
A member of the personnel staff from the Headquarters noted that: 
 
‘Public interest in defence affairs… I think it maybe kind of come back because the bear is back to 
business. In the past 12 months the Headquarters has been reviewing the defence scenarios and 
                                                     
503 Interview, participant SE-2. In fact, no Swedish troops were actually deployed in Libya. Sweden 
deployed 8 Gripen jets and one C-130 air refuelling airplane for Operation Unified Protector. See Robert 
Egnell, 16 Oct 2012, The Swedish Experience in Operation Unified Protector, Stockholm Center for 
Strategic Studies. <http://media.wix.com/ugd/012b60_f1ddfbd759804fe6809fb4f09f536405.pdf>, 
accessed 28 Sep 2013. 
504 Opinioner 2012, p.39. 
505 Ibid. p.49. 
506 For example, the simulated attack from Russian air force on Swedish soil in March 2013 inspired a 




operational plans that we did during the Cold War.’507 
 
Figure 5-4 Threat perception on Russia 
Source:508 
 
As discussed in Chapter two, NATO has always been a sensitive issue in Swedish 
society. Despite the fact that Sweden has participated in several operations under a 
NATO mandate, public support for NATO membership has always been hesitant and 
never reached a majority. According to surveys conducted from 1997 to 2007, on 
average only about one quarter of Swedes favoured NATO membership while around 
60% were against it.509 In 2008 and 2009 more than one third of Swedes preferred 
joining NATO and the support rate reached its peak, which could be due to Russia’s 
attack on Georgia. Since 2011 the support rate dropped to around 30%, while opposition 
increased to nearly 50%. Since 2006 people who had no opinion has reached and stayed 
at about one quarter, see Figure 5-5.510 From another survey recently conducted by the 
Swedish newspaper SvD, 32% of respondents prefer Sweden to join NATO, which 
correlates to some extent with the result of SPF Opinioner 2012. Although the majority 
of Swedes are still against NATO membership, support has increased considerably from 
23% in 2011 to 32% in 2013. On the other hand, those who oppose Sweden's NATO 
membership dropped from 50% in 2011 to 40% in 2013.511 
                                                     
507 Interview with participant SE-4, second interview in October 2012. 
508 Opinioner 2012, p.49. 
509 And so Afghanistan has always been discussed in Sweden as if NATO is not there/involved. 
510 Ibid, p.84. 
511 The Swedes have softened in Nato issue (Svenskarna har mjuknat i Natofrågan), SvD, 16 May, 2013. 
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Figure 5-5 Public perceptions of Sweden’s NATO membership. 
Source:512 
 
Having not gained wide support from the society, more obstacles in terms of recruitment 
and other implementing measures can be expected. One possible reason for the low 
support of AVF transition is due to people’s lack of interest in and understanding of 
defence affairs. Many Swedes’ knowledge about military service derives from 
conscription era. Without knowing and understanding the AVF decision, it is difficult 
for people to support AVF transition. It is crucial for the SAF to focus on this issue and 
actively explain to Swedish people what the SAF is doing, including missions and 
reform, in order to gain public support of AVF. A defence analyst from FOI says: 
 
‘The Swedish soldiers who returned from Afghanistan have not always been met so nicely from the 
Swedish population. Since there are few people serving in Afghanistan and Kosovo, the society 
does not understand when they come back. (…) The armed forces have not been so good at 
explaining about what they do, what their purposes are, and therefore they have not been so visible 
in society. So if they (SAF) don’t do anything, it (the support) will disappear. People don’t see them 
so they don’t understand what they are doing. Politicians as well have been bad at 
explaining. …people rather would become policemen than soldiers; some people do the basic 
training because they think it would be a plus when they are applying for police officer. It’s never 
the other way around.’513 
 
In short, public support for the defence of Sweden and the SAF remains stable, but 
support for the AVF has been not impressive, as conscription is still favoured by the 
majority. Most Swedes support international missions, but recently support for ISAF in 
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Afghanistan has waned. As for threat perception, worry about Russia slightly increases 
and support for joining NATO, though still not reaching majority, has gained 
momentum. These various kinds of supports somehow reflect the dynamics of factors in 
facilitating or hindering the implementation process.  
 
Legal factors: Legislation 
 
Although legislation is not a metric for measuring the success of the AVF 
implementation, it is an essential facilitating condition especially in the initial phase of 
the implementation process. The transformation in the military personnel system usually 
involves a complicated set of changes including defence expenditure (salary and 
pension), service terms and conditions of military personnel, size and structure of the 
military establishment, recruitment of new personnel and disbandment of old personnel. 
Without appropriate new or amended laws and regulations for carrying out personnel 
reform, even though the armed forces are well-prepared and ready, they cannot proceed 
as it could either breach the old laws which might be still valid, or simply there is no 
legal basis for such new personnel system – recruiting part-time reserve soldiers being 
the best example. The period for the legislation could be lengthy, depending on how 
quickly the MOD can propose the new act and to what extent the consensus can be 
reached in the parliament. 
 
When the Swedish government decided to shift to an AVF system in 2009, the 
recruitment and employment of reserve soldiers (GSS/T) – a substantial part of the new 
SAF personnel system, could not be carried out because there was no legal basis to 
recruit into this category. For the Swedish Armed Forces, until July 2012, they could 
only consider the factors surrounding how to employ reserve soldiers but could not 
actually do so due to lack of a legislative framework. In fact, recruiting reserve soldiers 
has been more complicated than suspending conscription because, according to a senior 
MOD official, this not only involves just the relation between the armed forces and 
soldiers, but is a triangular relationship among three major parties: the armed forces, 
employers and soldiers.514 Universities were also included in the bill to give students 
the right to temporarily leave their studies to serve and be able to resume studies. The 
                                                     




special act’s provisions on the right to leave and employment protection, and on the 
right to interrupt or defer studies, are also to apply to reserve officers.515 The protection 
was designed in a way similar to the protection of activities linked to the existing 
legislation, such as the 1994 Total Defence Service Act on the protection of employment 
at some military service. The new employment law should not only provide protection 
against dismissal, but also protects against other intrusive measures of employment.  
 
A Swedish MP from the defence committee regretted that Parliament did not have the 
legislation for reserve soldiers in place when the decision was made.516 Almost all 
senior officials interviewed from the Headquarters and MoD stressed that the legislation 
was ‘extremely important’ because 75% of army billets will be filled by part-time 
reserve soldiers, without legislation there is no legal framework to protect the rights of 
reserve soldiers to leave their civilian jobs for military service and return to those 
jobs.517 Since Sweden has never recruited this type of soldiers, therefore it may be 
useful for Sweden to seek lessons from countries such as the US and UK who have 
abundant experience in recruiting and deploying such reserve soldiers.  
 
Support of materials and equipment (DIB) 
 
The Swedish Defence Industrial Base (DIB) was explained in chapter two as one of the 
four pillars that underpinned the security of Sweden during the Cold War. According to 
the 2009 Defence Bill, acquisition of equipment was cited as an influential factor in the 
process of the personnel reform. The rationale was to free the funding to subsidise the 
defence reform by reducing the costs of research and development and purchasing 
ready-produced weapon and equipment. This policy would inevitably have impact on 
the Swedish domestic defence industrial base (DIB). With such a long history of 
self-contained and reliable DIB, Sweden has been keen to develop a high-tech armed 
forces; therefore technology has been broadly mentioned to justify the defence reform in 
Sweden. 
 
Domestic DIB has always been the highest priority in terms of the acquisition of new 
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equipment; however, consideration should be given as to whether it is best to develop 
what is needed in partnership with other countries or whether ready-made equipment 
should be procured. If the alternatives are similar in terms of cost-efficiency, the Armed 
Forces should choose what best suits the future skills and development within the 
Swedish defence industry.518 
 
Michael Moore stressed that it is important for Sweden to have equipment comparable 
to that of the countries it co-operates with and that it be technically mature, reliable and 
accessible.519 With regard to new acquisition, he argued that it should be made from 
fully developed, tested equipment available in the market. Development should only 
take place when alternatives are unavailable. International co-operation should be 
placed in high priority, regardless of type, when it comes to acquisitions. Increased 
acquisition of mature and tested equipment and system can reduce the need for 
certification, verification and validation. Over time, this is expected to free up funds for 
operational activities and the personnel reform of the SAF.520 
 
The new acquisition policy revealed in the 2009 Defence Bill to a large extent follows 
Moore’s arguments. It stipulates that: ‘for acquisition of weapon and equipment, the 
priorities should be placed on the existing material which is economically viable while 
operational requirements can be achieved. If new purchases are required, it should be 
based on the market existing, fully developed and proven products. This means that the 
need for certification, verification and validation can be reduced.’521 According to the 
Government strategy, new equipment should only be developed when there are no other 
alternatives.522 A senior SAF official explained the acquisition policy: 
 
‘…there is little more international perspective on procurement. Government and parliament tell us 
to: first, you have to consider if there is something to buy in the market; if it is, buy it from the 
market; 2. If there is not anything in the international market, try to collaborate with other countries 
to develop new materiel; 3. We do it by ourselves. So, 1. Buy from the shelf, 2. Collaborate with 
other countries, 3. Develop ourselves. This is quite a lot of changes and different mindset.’523 
 
In addition, from government’s budgetary perspective, an MP from the Defence 
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Committee pointed out the current debates on the domestic DIB: 
 
‘We have another problem in Sweden for defence funding, as you know we have the big defence 
industry, armoured vehicles, jets…, we still have these companies. It is said that Sweden is 
exporting per capita more than any other country in the world. We also implemented the new 
strategy for procurement, that we are no longer rely on Swedish defence industry, we should buy 
existing defence materials on the shelf. We hope for this strategy to free money to invest on 
education and personnel costs. I don’t think there is political possibility to increase defence 
budget.’524 
 
Recruiting efforts: dedicated recruiting agency and campaigns 
 
Establishing and carrying out an effective recruiting effort is a crucial factor to ensure 
the armed forces are on the right track to acquire enough personnel of the right quality. 
Unlike countries such as the US and UK where the recruitment of personnel is 
conducted by armed forces itself through a designated recruitment agency, recruitment 
of all kinds of personnel in Sweden is carried out by an agency called the ‘Swedish 
Defence Recruitment Agency’. Before conscription was suspended, the selection of 
manpower was performed by the National Service Administration to screen and select 
qualified conscripts. Since the end of conscription, the strategy for recruiting personnel 
to the SAF has been modified because a source of guaranteed manpower can no longer 
be taken for granted. Starting in 2011, the National Service Administration was 
transformed and renamed as the Swedish Defence Recruitment Agency with its main 
tasks being to deal with recruitment of volunteer soldiers. It is a separate agency under 
the jurisdiction of the government and forms part of the Ministry of Defence. On behalf 
of the Armed Forces, this agency tests and surveys young men and women who intend 
to enter basic military training and seek employment in the SAF.  
 
The agency is capable of handling 12,000 applications annually, with the main tasks to 
administer all applications, conduct recruitment works, admission tests and selections. 
The selection process begins with the theoretical test and continues with initial health 
checks, physical tests, medical examinations and interviews with a psychologist. After 
admissions tests are completed, recommendations are made for the SAF to make a final 
decision on who should be chosen. To boost recruitment, in 2011 the SAF started to 
work in partnership with the National Employment Agency to help the military meet its 
target of recruiting 4,000 soldiers every year. Through its operation of 320 job centres 
                                                     




across the country, part of the agreement calls for representatives from the SAF to train 
the staffs of the employment agency and ensure that the agency can promote the armed 
forces as an attractive employer and provide accurate information to young people for 
available jobs.  
 
Reaching a favourable recruitment result has been neither easy nor cheap and it requires 
a great deal of effort and investment on recruiting campaigns. The SAF launched a 
series of TV advertisements called ‘Have you got what it takes?’ which were frequently 
broadcasted on TV, internet, and at public places such as train and metro stations. Most 
importantly, the SAF have been keen in using social media, and therefore Facebook and 
Twitter are substantially utilised to drive recruitment, and experimenting with creative 
campaigns.525 Other than TV and internet, recruiting campaigns were held on high 
streets to have direct contacts with the youth cohorts.526 Another advertising campaign 
called ‘What are you doing?’, whilst receiving both positive and negative reactions from 
the public, also encouraged broad debates in the society. The SAF considered this 
campaign successful because it has not only created public interest in the armed forces, 
but resulted in more applications than anticipated.527 In light of these recruiting efforts, 
a senior information official of the Headquarters remarked that ‘the initial successful 
result for recruiting regular soldiers relates to the successful marketing strategy.’528 
Apart from marketing and advertising in order to support the armed forces by providing 
a more accurate prediction on manpower, the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) 
has created a simulation tool which embodies several parameters including number of 
recruits, drop outs and various competencies that are needed in the armed forces. This 
tool allows the SAF to better understand the factors which could affect recruitment, 
retention, training and operations and how these factors interact. With such technical 
assistance, the SAF is expected to be able to calculate supply and demand of new 
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recruits in order to find a sufficient number of personnel with the right competencies to 
fill the vacancies in 15 years time.529 
 
Another facilitating factor to boost recruitment and reduce drop-out rate is to speed-up 
and simplify the selection process. From spring 2014, Sweden will introduce a modified 
selection process for new recruits, which is more continuous by adopting a graduated 
selection process. In the old system, between first selection, when people are requested 
to attend and by the time they attended the basic training test, on average only 6 out of 
10 showed up at the basic training test; therefore the drop-out during selection process 
was as high as 40%. The selection time in the new system will be greatly reduced to 
prevent unnecessary drop-outs and mind changing of youth cohorts. It is expected that 




Several factors have a bearing on the retention of soldiers and the measures countries 
take to retain personnel vary. One recurring factor that contributes to personnel leaving 
prematurely is a high rate of operations requiring long absences from home and family. 
Individuals who do not feel that their period of service is meaningful and see the future 
as uncertain also leave prematurely.531 Another potential factor that will affect and 
obstruct retention is the nature of the service contract as according to Swedish labour 
law, soldiers can resign at any time. With no way of changing the conditions of contract, 
the armed forces must take other measures to retain soldiers.  
 
Given that Swedish employment law allows soldiers to leave the service whenever they 
want, offering education and other opportunities for career development are thus 
important to boost retention. Monetary bonuses were only effective in a very short term 
and effectiveness will fade along with time.532 However, according to the favourable 
results in the first two years of transformation, an MOD senior official seems to be 
positive and optimistic about the current results of reform, and thinks that the SAF is an 
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attractive employer.533 Nevertheless, politicians start to worry about recruitment and 
retention if the Armed Forces continue to hold such optimistic attitudes as an MP 
warned that:  
 
‘…the SAF as well as MoD are very optimistic, say we have 10 applicants for every place; 
everyone is happy. I think that this enthusiasm perhaps make us less prepared for the problems that 
will reappear for the progress.’534 
 
One good example is that the SAF made a favourable assumption based on the interim 
agreements signed by ex-conscripts showing that they were interested in joining as 
reserve soldiers, and that many of those will turn up for recruitment. 
 
Ex-conscripts: important factor for initial success 
 
Ex-conscripts are important assets for countries undergoing an AVF transition, Sweden 
is no exception. These ex-conscripts serve as a manpower pool, and in the short-term, 
are an important facilitating factor with regard to the initial success of recruitment. The 
Armed Forces can save the basic training by recruiting ex-conscripts as they have done 
the conscript service, possessed the right competence, and intended to go abroad for 
missions. Those who applied and were employed as reserve soldiers were actually 
former conscripts serving in those posts, which therefore they did not need to go to the 
three-month basic training. The ex-conscripts, in the meantime, account for 70% of the 
regular soldiers.535 However, this group of manpower will eventually decline, and the 
SAF will need to recruit all personnel from new recruits. One Lieutenant Colonel thus 
questioned ‘what will happen in a few years time when we do not have those 
ex-conscripts anymore?’536 
 
Troubled NCO Reform – a hindering factor 
 
One of the influential factors that has so far affected the personnel transformation is the 
NCO reform, which has triggered dissatisfaction among officer corps. Several important 
issues need to be addressed here. First is the competence issue, as the Armed Forces 
have calculated that there will be some officers who should be made redundant because 
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they do not have the right competences.537 Second, as discussed in chapter four, the 
NCO reform dictates the majority of the existing officers to shift to specialist officer 
positions. Although their salary and ranks were retained, many felt that their self-esteem 
was damaged and chose to leave the armed forces. For example, a lieutenant colonel 
from an air-defence regiment noticed that there were as many as one third of officers in 
his unit decided to leave the military because: 
 
‘… they didn’t want to become or fill the NCO positions; they would have done the same work, but 
they didn’t want to fill the NCO positions. So instead they chose to quit. Those who left were 
people with 20 or 30 years of experience, and they were captains and majors, and were experts in 
tactics and technologies about air-defence, they can’t be replaced over days. It will take 20 to 30 
years to train.538 
 
The NCO reform has caused a cultural shock in the SAF. When young specialist officers 
have just finished their education and started working, it is difficult for them because 
they will work next to their older colleagues, also NCOs doing exactly the same work. 
There is a salary gap between them because these ex-officers are transformed to 
specialist officer so they keep their officer pay, but these young specialist officer will 
never make as much as their ex-officer counterparts.539 
 
Competence is another major issue. If platoon commander positions are filled by new 
junior officers without much experience and expertise, the problem is that the technical 
skill base of these junior platoon commanders is very limited, and therefore they will 
depend on the specialist officers. Dandeker identifies the tricky situation of the NCO 
transition facing the SAF from the perspective of four types of players involved at the 
platoon level – which he calls the four members of an ‘unhappy family’.540 First, there 
are soldiers who doubt the competence of their platoon leaders and their specialist 
officers if they are perceived to be inexperienced and incompetent. Second, there are 
NCOs who want to take on the role of specialist advisor to and support for the technical 
officers, but might encounter a deputy platoon commander who is the ex-platoon 
commander and retains an officer rank. Thus, he might feel that his expertise is inferior 
to that of the deputy commander. Third, the older officer who takes the position of 
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deputy platoon commander, feels pushed aside and having to support the inexperienced 
platoon commander. And last, there is the young platoon commander who just 
graduated from the National Defence College and holds a university degree. Facing the 
senior and experienced ex-officers, these inexperienced platoon commanders might fear 
being looked down by soldiers and the senior specialist officers. Important issues need 
to be addressed regarding the competence gap between the platoon commander and the 
rest of the platoon, and consideration given as to what might be done to make this new 





Drawing from experiences of the countries that have undergone AVF transition, budget 
has usually been a problem for a smooth shift from conscription to an AVF. An AVF 
system is always more expensive than conscription. Gilroy et al. argued that the 
transition to an AVF can be challenging and more costly than anticipated.541 The British 
experience shows that an AVF is not cheap, and defence budget constraints and rising 
input costs of personnel and equipment mean that difficult defence policy choices 
cannot be avoided.542 To cope with unexpected costs for the AVF transformation, 
Sweden estimated that the cost for training one volunteer soldier ready for active service 
is 2.4 times higher than training a conscript in a compulsory service system.543 
When Sweden started to embark on personnel reform and the AVF transition, one of the 
prerequisites that Government demanded SAF was to implement AVF with a flat budget. 
On the other hand, the SAF was also guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance that no cut 
in defence budget during the period from 2010 to 2014. The SAF will manage to stay 
with a flat budget to implement the AVF and organisational reform. A senior MOD 
official interpreted the defence financial situation as: ‘in one way you can say budget 
cut but on the other hand that the Armed Forces has stable and flat budget, which is a 
positive thing.’544 
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The SAF receives a budget of approximately 40 billion SEK each year, which accounts 
for about 1.2 per cent of GDP (See Table 5-1). Without receiving an increase in budget, 
the SAF therefore must allocate the budget appropriately in order to acquire sufficient 
funds to subsidise the personnel reform. As discussed earlier, due to personnel reform, it 
has seen a decrease on procurement of equipment and an increase on the personnel, 
from up to 28 to 30% of new procurement costs before 2010, down to current (2011) 22 
to 23%.545 One of the most important prerequisites and conditions for successfully 
implementing an AVF is to control the budget and have the information about how 
much budget the SAF can receive in the long term perspective. Focusing on the budget 
issue, a senior official of the SAF explained his role and main tasks in the AVF 
transition: 
 
‘My main assignment at the Headquarters has been to get the recruitment under financial control. 
Having a flat budget and knowing what we are going to get for budget in the coming 3 or 4 years is 
one of the most important prerequisites for a successful transformation; this is crucial for the reform. 
The triangle of Headquarters, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Finance all contribute to the 
transformation.’546 
 
Table1 5-1 Military Expenditure of Sweden 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
SKR in million 30710 38751 42423 41070 42072 
USD in million 6337 6215 6726 6324 6424 
GDP 1.2% 1.2% 1.3% 1.2% 1.2% 
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database547 
 
Nevertheless, from a long term perspective, it has been estimated by the SAF that the 
flat budget will not be able to successfully finance the transformation after 2014. The 
SAF have foreseen the need to increase their budget, especially the appropriation for the 
personnel cost from 2015 to 2019 in order to keep the system functioning. The SAF 
have informed the Ministry of Finance that after 2014 the budge need to be increased, 
otherwise the SAF will be forced to reduce its commitments.548 
 
Notwithstanding the above, from a government and political perspective, when current 
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defence minister Karin Enström was appointed in April 2012, Prime Minister Reinfeldt 
stressed that one of the fundamental tasks is to keep the armed forces’ finances in 
order.549 An MP highlighted that based on the agreement reached in the Parliament on a 
flat budget for defence reform, it is not politically possible to increase defence 
budget.550 Nevertheless, from the public’s perspective, a 2012 survey result showed that 
28% of people wanted the government to increase defence spending, a share in the 
similar level as 2011, while 41% believed that defence spending should remain 
unchanged, another 13% felt that defence expenditure should be reduced. The 




Changed perception of threat 
 
The situation of Taiwan’s AVF is unlike any found in the West. Taiwanese armed forces 
must maintain vigilant at all times because the PRC still refuses to renounce the use of 
force over the Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, cross-strait relations have been less 
tense since 2008 and economic exchange between two sides has increased significantly. 
It is thus a tricky situation for Taiwan to balance between the issue of national security 
and economic development (especially trade with the PRC). Under this dilemma, there 
is no easy way to recruit young people to join the military. As such, the real danger is 
not perceived as the military threat, but rather the economic output to mainland China. 
The security problem of Taiwan has thus shifted from the military front to the economic 
front, and therefore young people start to think ‘Why join the military?’ Some young 
people also question the need for a strong defence, because of Taiwan's rapidly 
improved relations and expanding trade with its once implacable foe. Moreover, given 
China's growing military strength, some think resistance would be futile.552 This was 
reflected in chapter three that the willingness of Taiwanese people to defend the country 
has been shaky,553 and further has impacted on the implementation of the AVF. A 
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defence analyst urged that: ‘Government should explain to public why AVF must be 
carried out; because I’ve heard nothing in the last two years.’554 
 
Focusing on territorial defence with the feature of ‘four-month military training’, 
Taiwan’s AVF implementation is quite different from that of Sweden and western 
countries. Therefore, the factors, conditions and constraints that affect Taiwan’s AVF 
transition have also been slightly different from what were discussed in the Swedish 
transition. Nevertheless, factors such as public support and finance, as reviewed in 
chapter one from previous AVF transition cases, still play a key role in either facilitating 
or impeding the implementation process in Taiwan.  
 
Public support of the military 
 
Unlike Sweden, which has been conducting a consistent annual survey on the public 
attitudes toward the armed forces, the evidence used in examining to what extent 
Taiwanese people support the armed forces depends on recent surveys conducted by the 
MND and the media. In addition, since Taiwan’s armed forces do not perform 
international operations, support for international missions is thus disregarded, and the 
support is therefore divided into two categories, support for the armed forces and the 
AVF.  
 
Support of AVF 
 
As indicated in chapter three, Taiwanese society has a somewhat negative image of the 
military; the view is that it tends to be authoritarian, dogmatic, and unproductive, which 
has affected the public support of the military and discouraged many young people from 
joining the military. In terms of support for AVF, according to chapter three, MND poll 
results showed that Taiwanese people favour the AVF.555 Nevertheless, according to 
another survey conducted by the MND about people’s attitude toward the personnel 
system; both military personnel and youth cohorts (college and high school students ) 
tend to favour the mixed two-tier system (46% each); 38% of military personnel and 
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24% of students supported the AVF system. Despite, counter-intuitively, students 
showed higher support for conscription (30%), in general support for AVF is higher than 
that of conscription (Figure 5-6).  
 
 
Figure 5-6 People’s attitudes toward the personnel systems  
Source:556 NB. Active-duty personnel include conscripts.  
 
Recently a survey was conducted by a newspaper on young people’s intentions to 
pursue careers in the military (as a soldier, NCO and officer) after the AVF is fully 
implemented. Results showed that only 27.9% of young respondents (between ages 18 
and 26) showed an interest in pursuing a military career while 53.5% had no intention. 
Nevertheless, according to the experience of the military, the MND considers that the 
results somewhat reflect the real percentage of the youth cohorts who are interested in 
joining the armed forces.557 
 
In fact, according to a MND’s AVF implementation team member, what young men and 
their parents only care about is the cut-off year in which men born afterwards will be 
exempted from serving one-year of conscription service, only the four-month basic 
training instead. Other than that, the issue of AVF is not keenly debated in society.558 A 
comment made by an Army corporal reflects the extent of public’s interest in the AVF: 
 
‘I don’t think the goal can be reached in 2015, it is too difficult. We went to many schools and 
almost every class, each with 40 students. When we asked if they were interested, only about 10 
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students (some only 2 or 3 students) showed interest. Among those who were interested, even fewer 
will actually apply. Because they don’t want to serve; they don’t want to stay 24 hours in barracks 
without freedom. So although the military provides a good welfare package, they only think about 
right now, they want to have fun and want leisure time. These students are still dependent on 
parents, so they don’t have a sense of salary.’559 
 
The media are usually sensitive to social trends and can quickly pinpoint the pulse of 
the society. The Public have a sharp observation in their attitude towards the military. A 
senior defence journalist argued that the public image of military is still not highly 
regarded in Taiwanese society due to lack the sense of honour; he explained:  
 
‘We are still lack the atmosphere for people to join the military. In the past few years, I feel the 
social status of military personnel is low in Taiwan. They don’t have the sense of honour for being 
serving in the military. Although the salary and benefits are good, the society treats the military 
personnel like ‘rice worms’,560 and are suspicious whether they are able to fight a war. This 
suspicion has been prevailing in the society. If this kind of perception still exists in the society, it 
will be difficult to make a successful AVF transition. If the society feels that serving in the military 
is honourable, it will become another story. I think the atmosphere about joining the military does 
not exist in the society.’561 
 
Furthermore, he observed that the MND has made progress in using the media to 
advertise the military; however, he is still pessimistic about the AVF: 
 
Only recently has the MND been successful in terms of how to use the media. The MND allowed 
us (media) to produce some special reports and TV programmes to let people know what they are 
doing and thus to create a positive image about the military. When the military’s image starts to turn 
to positive, then people would start to feel that it is honourable to join the military. (…) To enhance 
the image of the military, the MND should thoroughly change to modern concept. (…) About how 
the society perceives the AVF, I feel pessimistic; many people still think that ‘good men do not 
serve in military’. (…) If young people are able to find jobs in the private sector, 95% of their 
parents will not encourage their children to serve as volunteer soldiers.’562 
 
Volunteer soldiers are not highly regarded in society because people’s stereotyped 
impression is they are neither able to find a proper jobs, nor can perform well in schools. 
In addition, NCO and lower ranking officers such as first and second lieutenant are also 
not very highly regarded. An Army corporal pointed out: ‘even if you are a sergeant, the 
society treats you as a soldier; they don’t treat you as a sergeant.’563 
 
The AVF policy has also been doubted by the military staff. A senior sergeant major 
from the communication depot expressed his opinion on the prospect of AVF: 
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‘When I look back, no, I will not support the AVF policy. First, it increases too much the cost of 
personnel. The professional skill of volunteer soldiers is not high. In the past we went to boot 
camps to pick conscripts. Nowadays, before volunteer soldiers apply, they heard from their friends 
and relatives that the communication depot is a less demanding unit and they can learn skills. 
Therefore, we have to accept many volunteer soldiers who have no experience in the fields of 
electrics and electronics, which has caused serious capability problems.’564 
 
Damaged public image and impact on AVF implementation 
 
Towards the end of the writing of this thesis, in July 2013, a notorious incident 
happened which severely damaged the reputation of the armed forces and thus is worthy 
of discussion in full. A conscripted army corporal died in a military detention centre 
after being abused by several Army officers and NCOs. It has generated unprecedented 
national outrage, and was headline news for a whole month. Furthermore, more than 
200,000 people rallied in the capital to protest against the military for such unlawful 
treatment of the deceased army corporal. Not only has the President publicly apologised, 
but two defence ministers have resigned. Most importantly, this incident has severely 
damaged the image and reputation of the armed forces, which is already struggling to 
find enough volunteers as it tries to phase out conscription. 
 
A survey conducted by a think tank after this incident showed a sheer drop of people’s 
confidence in Taiwan’s Armed Forces. The results indicated that 75% of respondents did 
not trust the military’s ability to investigate the controversial death of the Army corporal. 
The public image of the armed forces and people’s perception on the capability of the 
armed forces after this incident were severely damaged. As high as 72.3% of 
respondents believed that the situation of inappropriate discipline and mistreatment of 
soldiers is serious in the armed forces; 77.7% felt that the MND has corruption 
problems. Regarding the AVF transformation, 59.1% worried that the armed forces are 
not able to recruit enough soldiers. Most importantly, three quarters of respondents do 
not think that Taiwan’s armed forces is capable of fighting a war should there is a 
military conflict.565 Another survey conducted in the similar timeframe showed that 
only 11% of respondents believed the military investigation, and a majority of 
respondents (67.4%) do not trust the investigation conducted by the armed forces. With 
regard to the prosecution, by the same token, only 17.8% of respondents were satisfied, 
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whilst 60.8% were discontent with the military prosecution system.566 
In short, the Taiwanese armed forces suffering an unprecedented impact on its public 
image and support, it should treat it as a turning point and opportunity to seek ways for 
radical reform and improvement.  
 
Recruiting efforts: dedicated recruiting agency and campaigns 
 
Recruiting efforts and motivation of young men and women are significant factors 
influencing the success of Taiwan’s AVF implementation. In contrast to Sweden, the 
recruitment of military personnel in Taiwan is conducted solely by the armed forces 
itself. To facilitate the AVF recruitment process the MND established the Armed Forces 
Recruitment Centre in 1999 with the objective of expanding manpower sources and 
recruiting officers and NCOs. Since the MND started to recruit volunteer soldiers in 
2003, the recruitment centre has gradually shifted its focus on the acquisition of such 
category. To date, the largest recruiting group has been volunteer soldiers.567 With the 
ultimate aim of achieving the annual recruitment target, the main tasks of the 
recruitment centre are to ‘formulate annual recruitment guidance and work plan, 
establish strategy for recruiting advertisement, set up selection standards and criteria for 
different categories of personnel, plan recruitment events and activities, train military 
recruiters, and supervise service commands and military academies’. The director of the 
recruitment centre summarised that: ‘the objective is to inform the society the existence 
of the Armed Forces Recruitment Centre.’568 He further stressed that: 
 
‘When we advertise we normally emphasise two incentives: the chance to be promoted to NCOs, 
and subsidised study of college degrees. We don’t worry about the recruitment of officers and 
NCOs; we worry about recruiting volunteer soldiers. So the results of recruiting professional 
officers and NCOs are quite good; the only problem is the volunteer soldiers. If retention is good, 
then the recruitment can be less.’569 
 
Nevertheless, recruitment of volunteer soldiers is not solely conducted by the 
recruitment centre; every operational unit is also responsible for recruiting soldiers and 
is therefore assigned a certain recruitment quota. The rationale behind this is that if units 
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do not reach their assigned quota, they will receive relatively fewer annual supplement 
soldiers in the following year. The director of recruitment centre explained how it 
works: 
 
‘Each unit has responsibility to recruit the allocated quota of soldiers. The operational units send 
some qualified recruiters including officers, sergeants and soldiers to form an interim recruitment 
team under the mandate of the Armed Forces Recruitment Centre. These units will cooperate with 
us (recruitment centre) by attending various recruitment events. They have the pressure of 
recruiting assigned number of soldiers so they will try hard.’570 
 
Planning and carrying out advertising campaigns is a crucial task for the recruitment 
centre. Apart from TV advertisements, social media and web-based advertisements are 
targeted to entice youth and student groups. Setting up recruiting information kiosks in 
local job fairs has been continually carried out in order to increase the exposure of the 
armed forces. Recently, the recruitment centre has negotiated with two large convenient 
store franchises to help provide and distribute recruitment leaflets and application forms 
in more-than 8,000 locations in the country. By marketing the armed forces in 
eye-catching places, it aims to make recruitment application easier and more visible. 
Furthermore, similar to Sweden, the MND has simplified the application process such 
as allowing people to apply on any given day of the year, and avoid the military fitness 




In contrast to western countries where constant expeditionary operations make people 
aware of the existence of the armed forces, in traditional Taiwanese society, it is 
relatively difficult to encourage young men and women to serve in the military, 
especially serving as a soldier in the Army. Motivation is thus a crucial factor for 
soldiers to retain in the military. To analyse the motivating factors, the MND conducted 
a survey on Taiwan’s volunteer soldiers who were asked to choose one of 13 factors that 
could influence their decisions to stay in the military. ‘Job stability’ was the most 
mentioned factor by 20.8% of surveyed soldiers; it was followed by ‘economic pressure’ 
(14.8%), and ‘expectations from parents and families’ (10.2%). Satisfaction with salary 
accounted for 8.9%, while 8.4% favoured that they could serve near home. Few 
respondents chose ‘profession of occupation’ (4.6%) and ‘personal interest’ (3.2%); 





influence from colleagues was insignificant as very few could be encouraged by 
colleagues (2.4%), see Figure 5-7. 
 
Apparently, occupational and economic factors were found to be significant in soldiers’ 
decisions, which can be attributed to the social backgrounds of volunteer soldiers. A 
volunteer private receives a starting salary of NT 29,480 (around US$ 1,000) a month, 
which is higher than the national starting wage.571 As a large proportion of volunteer 
soldiers come from poor families and thus cannot afford the tuition fees, many decide to 
work first and pursue college degrees later on. Therefore, providing the opportunity of 
education is a sound incentive; on the other hand, through enhanced education it can 
also strengthen the quality of personnel.572 In addition to direct salary, welfare or 
payment in kind provided by the military is also an attractive incentive especially for 
those come from poor families because it helps relieve their financial constraints. An 
Army corporal compared the salary between private sector and the military:  
 
‘I switched from private sector to the military because I saw its advantage in terms of welfare. In 
the long run, welfare in the military is pretty good. The salary I earned in the private sector was 
about the same as what I am earning now; so welfare was my main reason to join the military. (…) 
My family and friends support my decision.’573 
 
 
Figure 5-7 Motivating factors for volunteer soldiers to stay in the armed forces 
(N=5,254) 
Source: Drawn by author based on data from Comptroller Quarterly, 2010 
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In addition to motivating factors, the survey also explored the negative factors that 
prevented soldiers remaining in service through 16 variables. The most discouraging 
factor was ‘cannot go home/out after working hours’, in other words, lack of freedom 
obstructs soldiers’ willingness to stay longer.574 It was followed by ‘heavy workloads’ 
and ‘uneven distribution of work’. ‘Attractive incentives from private sectors’ also 
encouraged soldiers to leave; the factor ‘could not have regular holidays and leaves’ 
also discouraged soldiers to stay. Dissatisfaction with salary was found to be relatively 
low in this survey (Figure 5-8). 
 
 
Figure 5-8 Discouraging factors (obstacles) for volunteer soldiers not to remain in the 
armed forces (N=5,254) 
Source: Drawn by author based on data from Comptroller Quarterly, 2010.575 
 
The gap between expectation and reality in terms of military service could also be a 
negative factor which has made a majority of volunteer soldiers hesitant to remain in 
service.576 This was confirmed by another research on volunteer soldiers’ satisfaction 
with the military career,577 in which a majority (64.4%) felt that their jobs and life in 
the armed forces were not what they originally expected.  
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The results shown above reflect a crucial fact that has been neglected by the armed 
forces – ‘soldiers’ views about lack of freedom’. Although volunteer soldiers are 
normally satisfied with the salary, however, when salary is calculated in terms of an 
hourly rate, pay becomes less competitive as soldiers’ working hours are much longer 
than those working in both private sectors. This could explain why the survey conducted 
by MND’s Comptroller Bureau in May 2013 showed that soldiers were not satisfied 
with their pay. A volunteer Army corporal calculated his salary and compared his pay 
with his civilian friends; he found out: 
 
‘…because in the private sector, people get off work, say at 6 pm; then they can take another 
part-time job and adding two jobs together, their overall salary is higher than ours. So I think 
allowing soldiers to go home everyday is absolutely crucial; if so, they (volunteer soldiers) will be 
willing to stay longer in the military. Just allowing soldiers to go out on Wednesdays is not 
enough.’578 
 
The above statement is analysed by an MND staff on why volunteer soldiers did not 
want to stay in the military:  
 
‘For retention there are more important incentives. Money is a plus, but not an absolute factor. I met 
an outstanding volunteer solder who graduated from a prestigious national university. I asked him 
why you did not apply for retention and to be promoted to sergeant. He said “there is no freedom; 
my home is not far away from the barracks but I have to stay in barracks everyday”. (…) “if they 
(the military) allow me to go home or go out everyday (after normal working hours), then I am 
willing to stay, even without being promoted to sergeant”.’579 
 
These findings could potentially help those who carry out the AVF implementation in 
terms of what factors facilitate and hinder the process. If soldiers can be granted more 
freedom without affecting the regular readiness of units, not only are soldiers more 
likely to join and stay longer, but it does not add a financial burden to the AVF 
implementation. Apart from a challenge to Taiwan’s military culture, if current 
bureaucratic and menial tasks can be reduced or eliminated, it does not seem to be 




Taiwan’s AVF implementation has so far been difficult not only due to recruitment and 
retention problems, as identified in the previous chapter, but also lack of funding. 
Taiwan’s central government – the Executive Yuan, has been reluctant to give more 
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funding to the MND to subsidise soldiers’ pay rise (twice as the national minimum wage) 
and other incentives proposed by the MND. Lack of financial support from the 
government so far has been one of the major obstacles for Taiwan’s AVF transition.  
The allocation of the defence budget in Taiwan is divided into three main categories: 
personnel, operations, and military investment (procurement). The costs for personnel 
maintenance are to be prioritised by realising the policy guidance of the AVF. 
Nevertheless, one crucial consideration for Taiwan’s defence spending is that it has to 
purchase a large amount of defence equipment, especially from the US.580 The ongoing 
AVF implementation has to rely on the existing defence budget which has thus driven 
up the proportion of personnel expenditure in the overall defence budget. The increased 
proportion on personnel costs has reached over 45 per cent in 2010 and 2011 and is the 
highest among the top five Asian countries in defence spending.581 In 2011 Taiwan 
spent 47.5 per cent of defence budget on personnel, thus had crowded out budgets for 
operations and military procurement.582 Between 2009 and 2013, Taiwan increased the 
share allocated for personnel (from 40% to a projected 50.1%) and reduced shares 
allocated for operations (from 30.1% to a projected 22.5%) and investments (from 
28.4% to a projected 25.9%).583 Reduced spending on operations and maintenance 
could have a negative impact on the military readiness. Without extra funds added from 
government, the objectives of operational maintenance (readiness, exercise, training etc) 
will face a 20 per cent cutback,584 which can potentially jeopardise Taiwan’s security. 
In 2012 the Executive Yuan increased the appropriation to 155.5 billion NT for 
personnel costs of the armed forces, in which the MND considered satisfaction.585 
Table 5-2 shows Taiwan’s defiance spending in recent years. 
 
Along with the AVF implementation plan, President Ma pledged during his presidential 
campaign in 2008 that Taiwan would maintain a defence budget no lower than 3% of 
GDP. However, the government has failed to meet the 3% target in past few years. The 
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personnel costs have crowded out spending on operations and military procurement 
since there is no significant increase in defence budget. The MND acknowledges that 
there are substantial budgetary implications for recruitment and retention of an AVF, 
especially tied to pay rises, service bonuses, living facilities, benefits, retirement 
schemes, and insurance coverage. Indeed, like what had happened in the West, Taiwan 
has recognised that the AVF transition will be much more expensive and difficult than 
originally anticipated. 
 
Table 5-2 Military spending of Taiwan 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
TWD in billion 282 302 288 295 318 
USD in million 9,729 10,479 9,903 9,998 10,513 
GDP 2.2% 2.4% 2.1% 2.1% 2.3% 
Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database586 
 
According to the member of MND’s AVF implementation team, lack of financial 
support has made the MND concerned about the possible delay of the AVF transition 
(requiring even more funds to recruit and retain professional personnel), cut operation 
and maintenance funds (that could reduce readiness), postpone or cancel some arms 
acquisitions (while keeping the commitment to fund U.S. arms acquisitions), further 
reduce the force, or seek a special budget.587 He further explained that: 
 
‘The estimated 350-370 billion NT defence budget is not realised. The Executive Yuan only 
allocates 290 billion NT, the budget for 2012 is about 310 billion, which has satisfied the growth of 
the AVF manpower, but this does not include the measures and incentives. What we are doing now 
is that everything regarding budget and funds will wait until government can support the MND.’588 
 
Despite its growing military disadvantage relative to China and the implementation of 
AVF, Taiwan’s defence budget continues to decline relative to other areas of 
government expenditure. It is believed that Taiwan government needs to raise defence 
spending from its current 2.3 per cent of GDP to about 3 per cent to reach the 2015 AVF 
goal. However, Taiwan's official 2013 defence budget contracted to NT $312.7 billion 
(U.S. $10.5 billion) from NT $318 (U.S. $10.5 billion) in 2012. The opposition party 
DPP in its Defence Agenda thus urges the Ma administration to immediately increase 
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the defence budget to 3 per cent of GDP as the goal of the annual defence budget.589 
However, it seems unlikely as President Ma focuses on continuing to improve 
cross-strait relations with the PRC and thus judges the current level of defence spending 
sufficient and will remain unchanged. Apparently, while domestic and social welfare 
issues have become the foremost issue, the government is less likely to increase the 
defence budget since improved cross-Strait relations have reduced public perception of 
the China threat in Taiwan.590 An indication can be found in the 2013 Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) which has dropped reference to the goal of spending at 3% of 
GDP and noted that the defence budget as a share of the total government budget has 
declined year by year with negative implications for recruitment and retention.591 
 
Old management style should be eliminated 
 
One underestimated but important factor found by this study through interviews is the 
out-fashioned management style in the armed forces. From bottom up, normally this 
factor is rarely discussed in government reports and documents, and therefore it has 
usually been ignored by Taiwan’s armed forces. Although over the past two decades 
Taiwan’s armed forces have seen a significant modernisation, the management and 
leadership style has not caught up with the pace of modernisation and is thus obsolete - 
the cause of the death of Army corporal discussed in the previous section is a good 
example. The old style leadership has seriously obstructed the progress of the armed 
forces. The mindset of many military officials still stays in the era of conscription which 
relies on the mass type of manpower with cheap labour costs. The human resources are 
still not efficiently utilised.  
 
This can be divided into two issues: manpower and time. In the conscription era, 
manpower was cheap and they could be used 24/7. Nevertheless, in the AVF, human 
capital is much scarcer than those of conscripts and their working time should be 
utilised sparingly. That is to say, the old concept of manpower usage needs to be 
abandoned. Nevertheless, this is not happening yet; the most common example is to ask 
soldiers to carry out unnecessary, worthless and menial tasks which do not contribute to 
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the military readiness and competence.  
 
Unfortunately, these kinds of tasks account for the majority of soldiers’ working time. In 
addition, many high officials still believe that, except for normal leave, military 
personnel should stay in barracks as long as possible to prevent incidents and accidents 
happening. Therefore, many senior military officials set restrictions on young soldiers 
and sergeants going, despite the MND rules stipulate that volunteer soldiers can go out 
once a week after working time.  
 
Soldier’s expectation of more free time has been proved by surveys and interviews. 
According to a survey conducted by the Army, nearly 90 per cent of participants felt that 
it is crucial to be able to go home every day after work.592 In fact, this wish is 
widespread if it can be addressed retention can be potentially boosted. Heinecken in her 
thesis claimed that it is particularly these work-life issues – the effect of separation on 
family life, leave restrictions, and hours worked - which have influenced retention 
negatively.593 As discussed in chapter four, most of the interviewed volunteer soldiers 
and NCOs stressed that allowing soldiers to go home everyday is vital in order to retain 
them in the military.  
 
Another issue regarding the internal management is that soldiers are asked to do too 
many meaningless tasks. Many soldiers, as described in the interviews complained that 
they have worked overtime everyday for such worthless tasks. This has not just 
happened in the Army, one staff sergeant from the Air Force who repairs avionics also 
pointed out that: ‘only one third of my job is the real professional repairing jobs, the 
other two thirds are just superficial or pointless jobs such as dealing with superiors’ base 
visits and so on.’594 A defence analyst pointed out the problem of the ‘meaningless 
tasks’ as he explained: 
 
‘I think the point is whether the new tasks are meaningful or not. The big problem is that soldiers 
think the tasks they are ordered to do are meaningless. Therefore they don’t have the feel of 
achievement. (…) What the MND is thinking is to build new living quarters and so on which needs 
lots of money. That is important, but I don’t think that should be the main focus; the main focus is 
to reform management and leadership style. You must let them have the feel of achievement, and 
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that does not cost money.’595 
 
Furthermore, after soldiers have finished work and go back to the sleeping quarters 
which they have to share with other 10 or 20 colleagues, these are not only old and 
uncomfortable [no air conditioning], but they cannot have their own privacy. It is thus 
not difficult to imagine that working and living four years in this kind of environment 
without much leisure time, privacy, esteem, sense of achievement, and most importantly, 
freedom, it is unlikely soldiers would like to stay, even pay is raised. One legislator 
from the defence committee commented: 
 
‘Soldiers need privacy. This is to be seen in two aspects; first is the hardware which is the condition 
of the barracks; the second is the internal management rules. Soldiers have no privacy in the 
barracks; now they are still sleeping in the large group sleeping quarters and don’t have their leisure 
time. I strongly urge the armed forces to create the concept of work rotation and do not just want to 
ask soldiers to treat the military as their homes. Army is the worst, navy is alright, air force is the 
best. After soldiers have finished their jobs, they should be allowed to have their own privacy and 
break times. Therefore, good management and leadership style is crucial for the AVF.’596 
 
In sum, the old-styled management has negatively affected the efficiency of the armed 
forces; it not only wastes human capital, but also damages soldiers’ morale and retention. 
Therefore, the efficiency of human resource management should be dramatically 
improved at all levels in the armed forces by eliminating red-taping and redundancy, 
which prevail in the military, lead to unfair work-loads and waste of human resources, 
and, as a side effect, hinder solders’ family life.597 
 
5.4 Questionnaire-based survey on soldiers’ attitudes, motivation and 
satisfaction 
 
The analysis of defence reforms in both countries has so far been mainly focused on 
quantitative features such as number of soldiers being recruited and retained. It has only 
touched upon some qualitative (or psychological) factors which are vital to the success 
of AVF implementation – soldiers’ motivation, satisfaction and expectation of the 
military service. They are measured through a questionnaire-based survey in terms of 
morale, attitude, satisfaction with and motivation toward the military service and basic 
training. Three groups of soldiers were surveyed: Swedish and Taiwanese volunteer 
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soldiers and Taiwanese conscripts. It is important to bear in mind that Taiwan still has 
conscripts as its AVF transition is not as advanced as Sweden. None of these survey data 
has previously been discussed and analysed.  
 
Three respondents of the survey were different groups and were asked to fill out the 
questionnaire after they have signed up (Swedish and Taiwanese volunteer soldiers) or 
been drafted (Taiwanese conscripts) for military service and when they were in the 
midst of basic training. Therefore, from a retrospective point of view, respondents were 
asked the following questions: what factors motivated them to join the military? How 
were they satisfied with the military service? What did they expect from the military? 
How did they feel and assess about the quality of soldiers? Did they intend to pursue a 




This survey was initiated by the Swedish National Defence College in July 2010 in 
Gothenburg, with a total of eight countries participating including Sweden and 
Taiwan.598 The author represented Taiwan as one of the researchers. After agreement 
was reached, the original questionnaire was co-designed in English and then translated 
into the languages of the participating countries. The questionnaire contained closed 
questions which were divided into four parts: Part one focused on respondents’ 
demographic information including age, gender, education, branch and type of service 
and family background. The survey questions started in the second part which measures 
soldiers’ expectations and attitudes toward the military service; it also assessed the 
reasons and factors that influenced and motivated their decision to join voluntary 
military service. The third part investigated how the social context could have 
influenced the willingness of soldiers to join the military. It examined soldiers’ 
self-identity within their roles in the armed forces, their perceptions of working 
conditions, and satisfaction with the quality of training in basic training 
centres/regiments. Finally, the last set of questions assessed soldiers’ perceptions of the 
military’s merits and values and their intention to pursue a military career. The survey 
data were analysed by using the statistical software Statistical Package for Social 
                                                     






The survey on Swedish recruits was conducted by the Department of Leadership and 
Management of the Swedish National Defence College, which took place in February 
2011 at two basic training schools: LV 6 in Halmstad and the Naval Base in Karlskrona 
during week three or four of basic military training. Being a member of the research 
team, the author was granted full access to the Swedish data in order to make 
comparison with Taiwanese soldiers. With the conduct of survey approved by the 
Manpower Division of MND, the Taiwanese survey was started in March 2011 in two 
major venues: the 903rd and 907th basic training regiments in northern and southern 
Taiwan respectively. To expand the sample size in order to get a wider range of soldiers 
to participate, soldiers who had recently finished their basic training and been deployed 
to the Combined Logistics Command and Air Force Headquarters were contacted to 
participate this survey.   
 
Most questions contained either six or ten grades of the Likert Scale. For six-grade 
scales, grade one represents ‘not at all’, while grade six means ‘absolutely agree’. For 
the purpose of discussion, the results were calculated through the dichotomous approach 
by combining (adding up) those who tend to agree and thus choose from grade four 
‘somewhat agree’, grade five ‘agree’, to grade six ‘absolutely agree’. By the same token, 





Basic military training in Sweden is three months long. A total of 275 recruits 
participated in the survey. They were among the first batch of volunteer soldiers who 
were recruited after conscription ended in July 2010. The majority (74%) of 
participating Swedish recruits were between 20 and 22 years old. The female 
participants in the survey accounted for 10.5% of the entire sample. In terms of 
educational level, only a small number (0.7%) of people had completed the nine-year 
compulsory school education; the majority of the recruits stated that their highest level 




postgraduate education. With regard to military branches, recruits from all three services 
were surveyed.  
 
The major difference between Swedish and Taiwanese samples was that Taiwanese 
samples contained two types of soldiers: volunteer soldiers and conscripts, as 
conscription will continue in Taiwan until the end of 2014. Both categories have to 
complete basic training, which is a five-week course conducted in basic training 
regiments. It took one month from March to April in 2011 to conduct the survey and 
collect data. In total, 656 soldiers took part in the survey, of which 357 were volunteer 
soldiers and 299 were conscripts. Taiwan’s sample size is twice as large as that of 
Sweden, which reflects the larger size of Taiwan’s armed forces. 
 
The majority of Taiwanese soldier participants were between 20 and 25 years old (86%). 
Although selection of gender is not a key metric in this research, 47 female volunteer 
soldiers (7.2%) took part in the survey. The proportion of female soldiers in the sample 
coincidently corresponds to the gender distribution within the Taiwanese military as a 
whole.599 As for the educational level, 47% of respondents received high 
school/vocational school diploma, 40.7% held university degrees, while 6.4% possessed 
postgraduate degrees; only 4.7% finished just the 9-year compulsory education (junior 
high school or below).600 In terms of arms of service, 51.5% were in the Army and 
33.5% were in the Reserve Command. This is due to two reasons: 1. The Army is the 
largest branch of service, and 2. at the time the survey was conducted, all basic training 
regiments were under the Reserve Command.601 There were 9.9% of respondents in the 
Air Force and 4.4% in the Combined Logistics Command.  
 
Results 
1. Expectations of basic training 
The questionnaire started by asking about the soldier’s expectations of basic training in 
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terms of eight variables. Swedish recruits expressed very high expectations as all 
variables were agreed by more than 90% of surveyed recruits. Almost every new recruit 
(99%) stated that they expected a good team spirit from the boot camps (Figure 5-9), 
slightly less (97%) wished to receive physical challenges and personal benefits, while 
91% anticipated benefits in civilian life. For personal development, 96% expected 
stronger self-discipline, 95% expected character-strengthening, 93% expected better 
resistance to stress, and also 93% anticipated high psychological stress from basic 
training.  
 
Both Taiwanese volunteer soldiers and conscripts expected less from basic training in 
all eight variables. Volunteer soldiers demonstrated slightly higher expectation than 
conscripts in six variables with the self-discipline to be the highest (90.8%); it was 
followed by stress resistance (87%), physical challenge (85.7%), 
character-strengthening (83.8%), personal benefit (81.8%) and benefit in civilian life 
(74%). Conscripts, on the other hand, except on team spirit (91.3%) and psychological 
stress (80.9%) which were higher than volunteers, had the lowest expectations in the 
remaining six variables. 
 
From the results, the Swedish recruits scored highly in all eight variables by showing 
very high expectations toward the basic training with all categories showing over 90%. 
They not only wished to receive more benefits, but they also expected to take on 
challenges and worked in a more disciplined environment with high stress so their 
physical and psychological strength could be enhanced. Taiwanese volunteer soldiers 
demonstrated slightly lower expectations, and expectations were even lower for 
Taiwanese conscripts, except in team spirit and psychological stress. It could thus be 
argued that Swedish soldiers expected more rigorous training than Taiwanese volunteer 
soldiers and conscripts. In other words, Swedes were more ambitious about what they 





Figure 5-9 Expectations of basic military training 
2. Motivation to join the military 
One of the crucial tasks of this survey was to identify soldiers’ motivation for joining 
the military. Given the fact that Swedish recruits were all serving on a voluntary basis, 
not surprisingly, a high percentage (85%) of the surveyed recruits indicated that they 
were highly motivated to serve in the military. According to a majority (95%) of the 
surveyed recruits, the high motivation in basic military training was attributed to the 
quality of their superiors, while 89% felt that the atmosphere in the group was very 
important. These were followed by the chance to take leadership responsibility which 
was supported by 74% of the respondents (Figure 5-10). 
 
Taiwanese volunteer soldiers also felt that the opportunity to exercise leadership could 
motivate them to join the military (74%). Good superiors (63.6%) and atmosphere in the 
group (61.1%) were somewhat equally important factors to Taiwanese volunteer 
soldiers. There was a considerable drop in percentages when conscripts were asked 
whether they might be motivated by these three factors. Conscripts showed strong 
resistance towards these three factors, and only 14.7% would have joined the military in 
order to experience leadership. Very few, around 8% of conscripts would be inspired by 
atmosphere in their group and good superiors. 
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Figure 5-10 Motivation to serve in the military 
 
3. Reasons for joining the military and completing basic military training 
To identify the reasons and factors for new recruits to join the military and enter basic 
training, the next set of questions were designed based on 11 variables. Seven out of 11 
reasons/factors were considered by the majority of Swedish respondents as influential 
on their commitment to join the military and complete basic military training (see 
Figure 5-11). The high figure of 96% of Swedish recruits felt that personal development 
was the most important reason. Contributing to national security ranked second as 85% 
of recruits highlighted this factor; it was followed by helping people in need, which was 
agreed by 83%. Next was friendship mentioned by 79%; it was followed by 
contributing to world peace (77%), travelling to foreign countries (70%) and 
experiencing adventure (63%) as reasons mentioned by Swedish recruits. Monetary 
factors seemed to be trivial for Swedish recruits as motives to complete basic training. 
Most Swedish recruits were not inspired by monetary factors as the opportunity to earn 
money was only agreed by 31% with an even lower figure for those expecting to 
finance future studies (9%). Quite a few (12%) chose the military because they had no 
better option, and interestingly, lifestyle in the armed forces was the most irrelevant 
factor (7%). The survey result is associated with what is claimed by SAF that the 
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attracting them to join.602 
 
Due to Taiwan’s non-participation in international peace missions, the variable 
‘travelling to foreign countries’ was highly unlikely to have been selected and therefore 
this question was not surveyed. Among ten other variables, the most obvious difference 
between Swedish and Taiwanese soldiers was found in lifestyle and money. Contrary to 
Swedish soldiers’ very low approval of lifestyle, Taiwanese volunteer soldiers valued 
the lifestyle as the most important factor (75.9%); nevertheless, it was perceived by 
conscripts as one of the least important factors (13.4%). Salary was another major factor; 
while only less than one third of Swedes felt that earning money was important, as high 
as 74.2% of Taiwanese volunteer soldiers considered that money was important for 
them to serve in military. Conscripts held opposite views as they were much less 
interested in earning money in the military (11.7%). Similar patterns were found in the 
variable ‘financing future studies’, which was supported by a majority of volunteer 
soldiers (63%), whereas only 10% of conscripts agreed. All ten variables were perceived 
by a majority of Taiwanese volunteer soldiers as important factors with the variable ‘no 
better option’ being considered slightly important (51%). This figure could be 
interpreted as suggesting that a military career is not a job option of last resort. On the 
other hand, Taiwanese conscripts seemed to be resistant to the military service and basic 
training as they tended to disagree on nine out of ten variables ranging from ‘adventure’ 
(38.8%) to ‘financing future studies’ (10.4%). Only ‘friendship’ received a slight 
majority (58.5%) of approval. These results confirm that it will be quite challenging for 
Taiwan armed forces to attract and recruit conscripts to join the voluntary service and 
will, therefore have to look at wider civilian society for new personnel. 
                                                     





Figure 5-11 Reasons for completing the basic military training 
 
4. Who and what can motivate soldiers to join the military? 
With regard to who and what can motivate soldiers to join basic training, respondents 
were given 12 variables to rate who and what were influential to their decision in 
joining the military. The most influential factor was ‘exciting training’ agreed by 95% of 
the Swedish surveyed recruits. It was followed by ‘team spirit’ which gained approval 
from 93% of recruits. Whereas money, with an approval rate of merely 20%, had an 
insignificant influence on recruits’ motivation (Figure 5-12). From the point of view of a 
majority of respondents, direct superiors, such as platoon leader (75%), company 
commander (62%) and squad leader (53%) to some degrees were able to motivate 
recruits; nevertheless, higher ranking superiors such as battalion commanders had lower 
influence (45%). This confirms the direct contact with recruits, or closeness between 
recruits and superiors, influences the extent of motivation among recruits. Furthermore, 
Swedish recruits considered that the influence of direct superiors on their motivation to 
join the military was less influential than the influence of their colleagues (83%), 
support from the environment (75%), and from parents (71%). As high as 62% of 
respondents considered the factor of personal benefit in civilian life as motivating. 



































the sample (49%). 
 
In contrast to Swedish soldiers, money was considered by Taiwanese volunteer soldiers 
the most important factor for them to join the military (81.2%). Support from parents 
(77.9%) and surrounding environment (71.7%) were also crucial factors. They were 
followed by exciting training (71.1%), team spirit (70.3%) and colleagues (67.5%). 
Tradition (59.9%) and personal benefit in civilian life (55.5%) could be somewhat 
influential. In terms of direct superiority, squad leaders (63.9%) were more influential 
than company commanders (58.8%), platoon leaders (56%), and battalion commanders 
(52.4%). Conscripts apparently were less likely to be motivated and influenced by these 
factors; with the exception of team spirit (53.5%), the rest of the variables did not 
acquire approval from the majority of conscripts. Exciting training (49.5%) and money 
(47.2%) can slightly inspire conscripts. Support from environment (43%), parents (40%) 
and colleagues (38%) were relatively lower. Direct superiors were not able to motivate 
conscripts as only around one third of surveyed conscripts stated that they were likely to 
be influenced by their direct superiors from squad leaders (34.1%) to battalion 
commanders (28.8%). Likewise, personal benefit in civilian life (34%) and tradition 
(32%) were less likely to inspire draftees. Again, the results clearly indicated that 
conscripts were a difficult group from which to recruit to the AVF. 
 












































5. Soldiers' self-assessment of their quality of new recruits  
To assess the quality of new recruits, participants were requested to assess themselves 
and their military colleagues by evaluating 13 variables on motivation, ambition, level 
of education, civilian professional skills, military skills, reliability, morals and ethics, 
social skills, fairness, firmness, friendliness, physical fitness, and following rules and 
regulations. Swedes enjoyed very high self-assessment on quality, over 90% on every 
variable, except on ‘civilian professional skills’. There was a very positive assessment 
on the general qualities of the Swedish military personnel (not their own) among 
surveyed recruits, indicating Swedish soldiers felt that the general quality of soldiers is 
very high, with the approval rates of variables ranging from 92% to 97% (Figure 5-13). 
The only variable that was significantly lower was the civilian professional skills (72%). 
The favourable results were in accordance with the quality of volunteer soldiers 
assessed by the SAF, which showed a significant improvement compared with 
conscripts.603 
 
Taiwanese volunteer soldiers in general are also satisfied with the quality of new 
recruits as a whole, but to a much lesser extent in comparison to their Swedish 
counterparts. Unlike Swedes’ high approval rating soldier’s quality, Taiwanese 
volunteer soldiers gave lower approval rates to all variables of soldiers’ quality. 
Surveyed volunteer soldiers felt that the general quality of the entire new recruits was 
good, ranging from 57.4% to 75.1%. Among all variables, volunteer soldiers were 
satisfied most with the ‘physical fitness’ of new recruits (75%). It was succeed by 
‘following rules and regulations’ (73.4%), and ‘firmness’ (71.7%). Reliability, morals 
and ethics, military skills, friendliness, social skills and ambition were agreed by 
volunteer soldiers between 60% and 70%. The other four variables received slightly 
lower approval from volunteer soldiers: ‘civilian professional skills’ (59.9%), ‘level of 
education’ (58%) and ‘fairness’ (57.4%). The variable of motivation was agreed by 
59.4% of volunteers, indicating that from their point of view the motivation of 
Taiwanese volunteer soldiers was perceived to be mediocre.  
 
Conscripts perceived the quality of the entire group of new recruits to be much lower 
with more stereotyped masculine views. Similarly, they also felt that new recruits had 
                                                     




good ‘physical fitness’ (76.3%), which could be due to the new standard raised by the 
MND in recent years to improve soldiers’ physical strength. It was followed by 
‘firmness’ (67.2%), ‘following rules and regulations’ (65.9%) and ‘military skills’ 
(60.5%). The ‘morals and ethics’ (55.5%) and ‘reliability’ (50.2%) were only assessed 
as slightly positive. Conscripts were less enthusiastic concerning the remaining: ‘social 
skills’ (47.2%), ‘friendliness’ (37.8%), ‘fairness’ (36.1%), and ‘civilian professional 
skills’ (31.1%). They tended to disagree with the factors of ‘ambition’ (27.4%), ‘level of 
education’ (24.4%), and ‘motivation’ (21.4%) of recruits.  
 
Figure 5-13 Soldiers' self-assessment of quality 
 
6. Recruits' self-assessment of working attitudes 
Recruits were further invited to assess themselves in terms of working attitudes with 
four variables. A very high proportion of the surveyed Swedish recruits (99%) claimed 
to have helped colleagues with a task that was too hard. Similarly, almost every recruit 
(99%) declared that they actively participated in group tasks (Figure 5-14). Besides, 
93% of the respondents view themselves as self-disciplined and claimed to do things 
correctly even if they were not monitored. However, if self-discipline is measured 
indirectly, by the degree of compliance with rules and information, the numbers were 
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Taiwanese volunteer soldiers and conscripts evaluated themselves along similar lines, 
but slightly lower. A high proportion (91.3%) stated that they will help colleagues with 
difficult tasks. It was followed by ‘self-disciplined and can carry out tasks correctly 
without monitoring’ (90.2%). If self-discipline was assessed through the compliance 
with rules and regulations, a lower result is observed (82.6%). Volunteer soldiers also 
stated that they actively participated in group tasks (88.5%). Unlike previous categories 
in which sharp contrasts were observed between volunteer soldiers and conscripts, 
conscripts showed rather positive attitudes toward the basic training. In particular, a 
very high proportion of conscripts (96.3%) would help colleagues. They also actively 
participated in group tasks (84.3%), were self-disciplined and did things correctly 
(81.9%), and to a less extent, followed rules and regulations (73.2%).  
 
 
Figure 5-14 The surveyed recruits' self-assessment of working attitudes 
 
7. Identification with military roles 
In terms of identification with soldier’s roles, recruits were given three types of core 
business/role of the armed forces to identify: peacekeeper, war fighter, and humanitarian 
aid worker. Due to the multi-tasked nature of the armed forces, it is possible that 
soldiers can simultaneously play different roles, so these three role models are not 
mutually exclusive. The majority of the Swedish recruits identified themselves as 
‘peacekeeper’ (88%) followed by ‘war fighter’ (63%) (Figure 5-15). These two roles 
emphasised the soldier’s military tasks in the armed forces. Much fewer (42%) recruits 
agreed that a soldier is a ‘humanitarian aid worker’, which underlined the social 
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Common sense, with the existing military threat from the PRC, might indicate that 
Taiwanese soldiers would see themselves more as war fighters than other two roles. 
Nonetheless, as discussed in early chapters, Taiwan’s armed forces since 2009 have 
made a strategic shift by incorporating the HA/DR operations as one of its core 
responsibilities, which has influenced soldiers’ identification of roles. This phenomenon 
was reflected in the survey results, as the majority of both volunteer soldiers (78%) and 
conscripts (63.5%) identified themselves as humanitarian aid workers. Furthermore, 
despite the fact that Taiwanese armed forces have no Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) 
before nor are they likely to do so in the near future, ‘peacekeeper’ was nevertheless 
selected and ranked the second, agreed by 59.9% of volunteers and 34.8% of conscripts. 
The traditional role of war fighter was selected by 58.3% of volunteers and 34.8% of 
conscripts. Apparently, the strategic shift in missions has made soldiers feel that the 
non-traditional role of ‘Military Operations Other Than War’ (MOOTW) and social 
functions of the military have become a higher priority. 
 
According to results, counter-intuitively, soldiers from both countries did not uniformly 
consider war-fighting as the core business of the armed forces, but instead choosing the 
other two less kinetic functions, which somewhat deviates from the nature and 
characteristics of the armed forces. It is understandable that, with the absence of war for 
over two centuries and having conducted various peacekeeping operations in the past 
decades, has made a large proportion of Swedish soldiers see their role more as 
peacekeepers. An interesting but ambivalent result was derived from the responses of 
the Taiwanese soldiers, as the unlikely role of peacekeeper was perceived similarly to 
that of war fighter, despite Taiwan still facing a military threat from the PRC.  
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8. Satisfaction with basic training  
An important purpose of the survey was to evaluate soldiers’ satisfaction with basic 
training through nine variables. Generally speaking, Swedish soldiers expressed higher 
satisfaction in eight out of nine variables. Most surveyed recruits felt that they were 
treated well by their superiors (94%). This was followed by ‘mutual respect for one 
another in the platoon’ which was agreed by 92%. With regard to the future prospects of 
basic training, 91% agreed that the basic training they received was of a very high 
quality, and accordingly 89% were satisfied with the quality of training. They were also 
content with the quality of cooperation in their platoons (88%). Also, a high proportion 
of recruits (89%) were proud to be a member of their military branches. With regard to 
the situation of living and training in the boot camp, 87% were satisfied. However, 
when asking soldiers whether they intended to stay in their current branch of service, 
73% would choose the same service again. Regarding the relevance of basic training for 
military tasks, only 55% agreed that basic training was very relevant to the war-fighting 
operations (Figure 5-16). This result indicates that the recruits were in general very 
satisfied with the training, but they did not perceive the training to be specifically aimed 
at military tasks.  
 
The highest satisfaction score for Taiwanese volunteer soldiers was found in the mutual 
respect in the platoon, as around 78% of both volunteer soldiers and conscripts agreed 
with this variable. To a similar degree, 77.3% were content with the high quality of 
cooperation within their platoons. Three quarters of volunteer soldiers were happy with 
the way they were treated by their superiors and also they liked their branches of service. 
72.5% of volunteer soldiers believed that the basic training was relevant to war-fighting 
operations. Regarding the quality of training, 70.6% agreed that this was high; 66.2% 
were satisfied with the training quality and 64.1% were happy about their current 
situation in the boot camps. Taiwanese conscripts on average expressed much lower 
satisfaction with basic training. They were satisfied with mutual respect within their 
platoon (77.9%), relevance of basic training for war-fighting (70.2%), and their 
branches of service (65%). The majority of conscripts did not think the quality of basic 
training was high (46.5%), and therefore they were less satisfied with the quality of 
training (43.1%) and current situation at the boot camps (37.8%). However, conscripts 




and slightly more than half (55.2%) of conscripts felt they were well treated by 
superiors. In terms of branches of service, 74.8% of volunteer soldiers and 64.9% of 
conscripts were proud to be a member of their Service branches. But in terms of their 
current branches of service, if they could choose again, around 65% of both types of 
soldiers claimed that they would stay. These results indicate that volunteer soldiers were 
satisfied with the basic training but conscripts were not. Nevertheless, both types of 
soldiers perceived the training to be specifically aimed at military tasks. This was 
probably a reflection of the fact that the content of basic training focusing on 
war-fighting against military invasion. 
 
Figure 5-16 Satisfaction with basic training 
 
9. Impact of basic training on knowledge and skills 
To explore whether basic training could enhance soldiers’ knowledge and skills, recruits 
were assessed with four variables which were designed for this purpose. In terms of 
skills and knowledge acquired from basic training, 93% of Swedish recruits felt that 
their basic military knowledge increased along with their basic training. Furthermore, 
military training could increase skills for a recruit’s specific position (79%) and social 
skills (55%). However, recruits disagreed with the statement that basic training could 
increase knowledge of foreign cultures (18%), see Figure 5-17. 
 
Unlike most variables where Taiwanese conscripts tended to disagree or had lower 
approval rates than volunteer soldiers, conscripts highly agreed with the first two 







































































variables that their general military knowledge (85.6%) and specific position skills 
(77.9%) were enhanced through basic training, which were higher than those of 
volunteer soldiers (78.4% and 70.6% respectively). As for social skills, 75.1% of 
volunteer soldiers believed that the basic training enhanced their social skills; this was 
agreed by 56% of conscripts. It is interesting to note that Taiwanese volunteer soldiers 
recognised a slight increase in their knowledge on foreign cultures during basic training, 
while only 28% of conscripts nodded.  
 
 
Figure 5-17 Perceived impact of basic training on knowledge and skills 
 
10. The Intention to pursue a military career 
An important aim of the survey was to discover how many soldiers were interested in 
pursuing a career in the armed forces. To address this issue, results showed that as many 
as 93% of the Swedish recruits (surveyed during basic training) had an intention to 
pursue a military career. By contrast, 357 Taiwanese volunteer soldiers were asked 
about their willingness to extend the contracts after the end of four-year term.604 A total 
of 55% (196) of surveyed volunteer soldiers claimed that they intended to serve for 
another four-year term. Although the intention of Taiwanese volunteer soldiers to pursue 
military career was lower, the result correlates with the 53% retention rate in 2012 
described in the previous section, which showed an increase in the retention rate in past 
two years. 
 
External motivating factors on soldiers’ decision to pursue a military career  
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The survey also explored not just the intention to pursue a military career but soldiers’ 
motives for doing so. For Swedish recruits who intended to pursue a military career, 
support from the private sphere was crucial (90%), viz. support from family, friends and 
partners. The high regard and respect for officers and other ranks in society were also 
significant factors in motivating recruits to pursue a military career, as 74% felt that 
officers were highly regarded in society, whereas 70% believed that being in military 
service was respected in society. Furthermore, 62% of recruits might be encouraged by 
the high prestige of officers in society. Tradition was not generally considered as an 
important reason for pursuing a military career as it was supported by a slight majority 
(54%). Most surveyed recruits who were interested in pursuing a military career were 
not motivated by family tradition, as it was only claimed by 11% (Figure 5-18). 
 
Similarly, but to a lesser extent, among 196 Taiwanese volunteer soldiers who desired to 
dedicate themselves to a military career, 74.4% expressed the view that support from the 
private sphere would play a part in motivating their decision. The high regard and high 
prestige of officers in the society were also influential (both accounting for around 65%). 
However, when it came to respect for military service in society, the approval rate 
dropped slightly to 57.9%. A fairly large proportion of surveyed soldiers (77.9%) 
considered that tradition was not essential for them to pursue a military career. 
Nevertheless, more than one third (37%) claimed that joining the military was a family 
tradition, which could be ascribed to historical reasons.605
 
Figure 5-18 Motives for pursuing a military career 
                                                     
605 This is especially obvious in the families of so called ‘mainlanders’ who retreated to Taiwan with the 
Nationalist Army in 1949. A higher proportion of the second generations of mainlanders choose military 






































11. Influential factors from within the military on soldiers’ decision to pursue a 
military career  
Having examined the external (social and traditional) factors that could motivate 
soldiers to pursue a military career, for the last set of the questions, all recruits were 
asked about the factors from within the military which could influence and motivate 
their decisions to pursue a career in the armed forces. Among five variables, Swedes 
were obviously influenced by good superiors (97%) and good team spirit (95%). 
Colleagues in the platoon could somewhat inspire recruits on their decisions (53%). 
Specific superiors to the recruits seemed to be irrelevant to soldiers’ decision as only 
half felt platoon leaders and 31% felt that squad leaders could inspire their decisions to 
pursue a military career (Figure 5-19).  
 
Taiwanese conscripts were generally resistant to joining the military; nevertheless, it 
was beyond anticipation that a rarely high percentage of conscripts (93%) stated that 
good team spirit could motivate their inclination to pursue a military career, whereas 
84.3% of volunteer soldiers might be motivated by this factor. For military superiors as 
a whole, 82.9% of volunteer soldiers agreed that they could be motivated by good 
superiors; while only a slight majority (56.5%) of conscripts expressed the same 
opinions. Although more than half of the volunteer soldiers claimed that their decision 
can be influenced by platoon leaders (56%) and squad leaders (58%), it was difficult for 
them to motivate conscripts as very few would possibly be influenced by platoon 
leaders (16.7%) and squad leaders (15.1%). 
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This chapter has reviewed the factors and conditions that will either assist or hamper the 
process of AVF transition and defence reform in both countries. Generally speaking, the 
SAF enjoys a relatively favourable public support for the armed forces and for 
international missions, although support for the ISAF has reduced. In addition, defence 
based on voluntary participation also showed weaker support; the likely reason is that 
many Swedes do not know about or do not pay attention to defence issues. Perception 
of Russia as a threat has slightly increased in the past three years. Although the majority 
still do not favour joining the NATO, support for this has increased. Like a pendulum, in 
the past two years Swedish defence strategy has seen a swing back from expeditionary 
operations to territorial defence. 
 
Legislation was highlighted by many senior defence officials as a crucial factor in its 
implementation of personnel reform, as it serves as the foundation for recruiting the 
second largest group of personnel – part-time reserve soldiers. The Swedish DIB also 
plays a role in the reform as the government demands the funds to be freed from buying 
the ‘on-the-shelf’ equipment in order to subsidise the personnel reform. The recruitment 
of personnel is not carried out by SAF but rather by a government recruiting agency; the 
recruiting campaigns have successfully attracted public attention. Ex-conscripts have 
been a major contributor to the initial success of recruitment. The discontent with 
specialist officer reform among officer corps could be a potential obstacle if this reform 
is not handled properly. The SAF thus needs to pay extra attention to this issue. In terms 
of funding, the SAF is guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance to have a flat defence 
budget until 2014 to carry out the reform; however, after 2014 the SAF has requested 
more funding to keep the reform running.  
 
In Taiwan, improved Cross Strait relations since 2008 has altered the perception of the 
threat among Taiwanese people, especially youth cohorts, who feel that the security of 
Taiwan has been less important and has shifted from the military to the economic front. 
Traditionally, Taiwanese people show lower support to the armed forces but in general 
people favour the AVF. The low social status of military personnel is mainly due to 




incident of a corporal’s death has dramatically impacted on public image of the military 
and the recruitment of soldiers. The budget is another major problem. Although the 
MND has been keen to raise the base salary for volunteer soldiers, the central 
government is unwilling to appropriate funds to subsidise the AVF implementation. 
Another important factor is the inflexible and old fashioned internal management which 
has prevented soldiers to remain in service. 
 
The factors of motivation, satisfaction and expectation were analysed by conducting a 
questionnaire-based survey, an important empirical part of the thesis. Among three 
groups of respondents, the majority of Swedish soldiers showed much higher 
motivation, satisfaction, and expectation toward military service; they are also more 
likely to pursue a military career. Taiwanese volunteer soldiers, in general, also showed 
good motivation and satisfaction with the military service, and responded positively to 
those variables. The lowest assessments on motivation, satisfaction and expectation 
toward the military service were found on Taiwanese conscripts, indicating that this 
group of people is difficult to recruit from. 
 
Emerging factors: low birth rate 
 
Finally, in addition to the important factors and conditions discussed in each section, 
there is an emerging factor which will be likely to affect the implementation of defence 
reform or the post-reform armed forces in the future. In both Sweden and Taiwan, a 
factor that could affect the AVF and personnel reform will be the low birth rate because 
both Sweden and Taiwan are among the countries in the world with the lowest birth 
rates (In 224 countries in the world, Sweden ranks 187th and Taiwan ranks 216th in 
terms of birth rate).606 Having predicted the number of draftees, the armed forces 
should plan ahead to deal with the ‘war for talent’.  
 
Through qualitative and quantitative empirical approaches, this study has explored the 
post-decision implementation of AVF and personnel reform in Sweden and Taiwan. 
Results show that both countries have spent similar and also different kinds of efforts 
for their strategic goals and objectives of the transition. Facilitating factors and 
                                                     
606<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2054rank.html?countryname=




impeding obstacles were also identified. Now important questions arise: ‘Which 
transition is successful and which transition is problematic?’ and ‘Which transition is 
doing better than the other?’ After concluding the empirical part of the thesis, next 
chapter will try to answer these questions by engaging in an integrated comparison on 









The decline of mass armed forces (MAF) is used as the theoretical framework for this 
study. However, although much has been written on the themes of conscription and 
all-volunteer force (AVF) transition in Western states, the literature focuses mainly on 
why decisions were made with little analysis of how the transformations were 
implemented and managed. Also, research on the MAF in Asia has long been a 
neglected theme: in the post Cold War era. Furthermore, comparisons of AVF transition 
between Eastern and Western states were rarely made. The on-going AVF 
transformation in Sweden and Taiwan provide researchers an opportunity to fill this 
knowledge gap, and indeed, this empirical research has deepened the understanding of 
this neglected theme.  
Among many theorists of decline of the MAF, Haltiner and Burk’s arguments have 
shown two contrasting yet important models in analysing the causal logic of the decline 
of MAF. Haltiner’s international strategic model (3 arguments) in general can justify the 
AVF transformations in the West. With a reduced military threat, it appears that 
Haltiner’s model offers a persuasive account of the Swedish case. The shift in priorities 
to missions that make a contribution to international peace and stability as the most 
likely basis for the deployment of force has added pressure to shift away from the MAF. 
Nevertheless, Haltiner’s model is less convincing if relied on to explain Taiwan as 
international factors are less important. Taiwan has not joined a defence alliance, still 
faces threat from the PRC, and does not perform international operations. Burk’s 
integrated approaches are rather applicable to the case of Taiwan in that domestic 
politics and social-economic factors play a key role in the decision making. Both 
countries represent good examples of the AVF transformation in their respective 
geographical regions, as Sweden is the first Scandinavian state while Taiwan stands out 
in East Asia in ending conscription in the post-Cold War era.607 
 
                                                     
607 The Japanese Self-Defence Forces have long been a volunteer force. Although conscription still 
formally exists in PRC and the Philippines, in reality the recruitment of the armed forces has been mainly 
on voluntary basis and universal conscription has yet been fully enforced. The long stand-off between 
South and North Korea makes it difficult for both to terminate conscription in the near future. Therefore, 




Sweden and Taiwan have been selected for comparison in this study as both share 
several characteristics in terms of their position in international affairs. Similarities can 
be found in their strategic postures. First, both countries have not joined a defence 
alliance as Sweden maintained neutrality and its military non-alignment throughout 
Cold War. Taiwan, due to its special international status, is banned from joining any 
defence alliance. Second, both have faced a serious military threat in the past. Sweden 
encountered threat from the Soviet Union during Cold War while Taiwan has been 
constantly facing PRC military threat since 1949. And finally, both have coincidentally 
decided in 2009 to suspend conscription. 
 
6.2 Contexts, goals, metrics and factors 
 
In the empirical part of the thesis, three approaches - interviews, surveys and documents 
- were adopted for data collection. This study looks at the two AVF transitions from 
three perspectives, namely: from states’ perspectives, the criteria, variables and the 
priorities considered and adopted by both countries. Second, how states draw on the 
experiences and lessons from other AVF cases. And, third, according to author’s 
judgment as an analyst of the nature and conditions of a successful AVF implementation. 
The empirical questions of this study: What strategic goal and the specific objectives it 
contains are both countries trying to achieve their AVF? What are the metrics and 
criteria that both countries have taken so far to implement their transition? And finally, 
what are the influential factors that can either help or impede their implementation 
process? The first question was answered in chapter three regarding what strategic goals 
and objectives were set by those cases. In general, both are trying to produce an AVF 
that is capable, but different in purpose. Sweden desires to build a more capable 
expeditionary force that can be quickly deployed for international missions; Taiwan 
aims to build a smaller but smarter AVF that focuses on homeland defiance and to 
conduct HA/DR missions. 
 
Shaped by contrasting historical, geostrategic and domestic circumstances, these 
countries’ experiences of personnel reform ostensibly have little in common. Indeed, 
despite both have faced serious military threats while remaining militarily non-aligned, 
their decisions to transition to AVF were taken in very different contexts, with different 
aims. Sweden has not faced a threat to its territory since the Cold War, and has gradually 
abandoned its military non-alignment by participating more frequently in international 




Taiwan, meanwhile, still faces a military threat from China despite the cross-strait 
détente that has endured since 2008. It aims to enhance its deterrence capability, to 
defend the homeland in wartime and conduct disaster-relief operations in peace time. 
Yet despite the differing contexts, these concurrent transformations have faced a number 
of similar challenges, which presents an opportunity to examine the critical issues 
surrounding personnel reform in practice. 
 
Sweden became the first Scandinavian country to suspend conscription. This came as 
part of a broader package of reforms adopted in 2008, including specialist-officer 
reform, the disbanding of international units, and the establishment of regular and 
reserve units, as outlined in the 2009 Defence Bill, ‘A Functional Defence’. The 
overarching aim was to transform the territorial defence force into one that could be 
effectively deployed on international operations. The 2009 ‘Declaration of Solidarity’ 
saw a further shift, guaranteeing military support to Sweden’s neighbours and EU 
countries in case of crisis, and expecting the same in return. 
 
Suspending conscription was a crucial part of this reform, and was completed, in the 
main, by July 2010. Due to the higher personnel costs associated with a volunteer force, 
the transition has been coupled with considerable military downsizing. By 2014, 
personnel will be reduced from 65,000 to around50,000; 28,000 of these will serve in 
regular and reserve units which can be deployed overseas, replacing the former, ad-hoc 
units previously deployed on international operations. Meanwhile, the remaining 22,000 
personnel will serve in forty battalions of the Home Guard, dealing with domestic tasks. 
 
Such considerations recall the very different calculations of Taiwan. Facing an ongoing 
military threat from China, and with participation in multinational peace operations not 
an option for Taiwan, the country’s transition to a volunteer force and reduction of 
active-duty military personnel is taking place within the very different context of a 
focus on homeland defence, and a military strategy based on ‘resolute defence and 
credible deterrence’ aimed at China. This saw President Ma Ying-jeou, in his 2008 
presidential campaign, vow to respond to concerns over the erosion of the country’s 
military capability (the result of recently shortened terms of conscription) by suspending 
conscription within four to six years. 
 
The implementation of this reform since 2009 has involved a step-by-step reduction in 
both the military establishment and conscript ratio. In contrast to Sweden, this was to 
take more than five years and occur in three stages, concluding by the end of 2014. 




who do not volunteer in Taiwan will still be required to undergo a four-month infantry 
basic-training programme to form a reservoir of reservist manpower and will be recalled 
every two years to sharpen their skills as reservists. 
 
With the first and second stages of the all-volunteer transition successfully completed, 
the third stage, from January 2011 to the end of 2014, is expected to see the proportion 
of volunteer soldiers grow incrementally by 10 percent each year. At the same time, a 
significant reduction in military personnel, from 275,000 to 215,000, is underway, with 
the actual end-strength of volunteer personnel to be 176,000. 
 
Briefly, for the SAF, in terms of the recruitment of regulars, the experience of the 
volunteer force has so far been positive. The main personnel inflow is through 
three-month basic training, and having satisfactorily attained recruitment targets for 
regulars over the past two years – especially in 2012, when target was reached 
satisfactorily. Qualitatively, according to SAF assessments, volunteer soldiers are also 
highly motivated and more competent than conscripts in terms of intelligence, 
leadership potential, and both physical and psychological ability. Meanwhile, the 
recruitment of females has also been a key, and the proportion of females among regular 
soldiers has increased in the past three years. The SAF has also effectively targeted 
youth with non-EU backgrounds and second generation immigrants for recruitment. 
 
Despite positive results with regulars, however, recruiting other personnel has been 
more problematic. Due to a two year delay in the passage of employment legislation, 
the recruitment of reservists did not start until July 2012. Having recruited only around 
1,600 reservists in 2012, the SAF were forced to postpone the objective of recruiting 
9,500 reserve soldiers by 2018 to 2023. In terms of the Home Guard, meanwhile, the 
SAF aims to fill 16,600 positions by 2022, with a further 5,100 to be recruited locally 
by voluntary defence organisations. Yet it has proven difficult to attract bright, young 
people to the Home Guard due to its unfavourable reputation. The planned rebranding 
of the Home Guard will thus be crucial. 
 
A final consideration is the creation of the cadre of specialist officers – a subset of 
senior NCOs, as in the US military. As part of broader government plans to eliminate 
the old, class-based hierarchical society, the NCO cadre was abolished in the 1980s, 
resulting in a shortage of specialists. Senior NCO ranks have since been re-introduced, 
under the title of ‘specialist officers’, with these positions to be filled by existing 
officers. This process has progressed rapidly, the proportion of specialist officers among 




number of officers will be reduced from some 9,000 to 4,100, while specialist officers 
will be increased to 5,100. 
 
While the Swedish government had expected all aspects of the broader personnel reform 
to be accomplished by 2014, the SAF have stressed that, due to ongoing budget 
constraints and other issues – which have also delayed full implementation – 
transformation will not be completed until 2019. At the same time, the armed forces 
have also claimed that the government’s reluctance to increase defence expenditure after 
2013 may leave it no choice but to mothball core naval and air force assets, while the 
sustained underinvestment in defence led Supreme Commander Sverker Göranson to 
highlight in January the country’s incapacity to defend itself, alone, for more than a 
week.608 
 
Indeed, although Sweden’s defence reform emphasises participation in international 
operations, recent incidents, including Russia’s simulated bomber strikes on Sweden in 
March and the flight of a Russian spy plane close to its airspace in April, have caused 
Sweden to re-assess its defence priorities.609 These events have not only caused a 
majority of Swedes (83 percent) to doubt Sweden’s ability to defend itself, but have led 
to increased support for de jure NATO membership (up to 32 percent from 23 percent 
two years ago). They have also led to calls, in some quarters, for a return to territorial 
defence, casting a shadow over recent personnel reforms.  
 
In contrast to the favourable recruitment results of the SAF, The recruitment of 
volunteer soldiers in Taiwan has so far been difficult, with recent targets seldom 
achieved. In 2012, only 72 percent of the 15,000 target was achieved. Yet recruitment 
targets in the final stages are even more ambitious: 23,000 and 39,000 in 2013 and 2014, 
respectively. A further cause for concern is the aversion of young people to service in 
the most rigorous branches. The army, for example, achieved barely half of its target in 
2012, while the marines and military police recruited only around 45 percent. 
Nonetheless, the recruitment of female soldiers has been more successful than expected, 
and the MND has raised the target for female personnel from 8 to 12 percent.  
 
In terms of the quality of soldiers, according to a recent MND survey, most officers 
were satisfied with the training and performance of volunteers, despite the average 
educational level being below that of conscripts. Motivation was found to be generally 
                                                     
608 The Local, Report confirms ‘one-week defence’ analysis, 15 Feb, 2013, 
<http://www.thelocal.se/46212/20130215/>, accessed 25 Mar, 2013. 
609 The Local, Russian spy plane spotted in Swedish strait, 25 Apr 2013, 




good, but likely to drop after a certain period in service. This reflects a negative trend in 
the retention of volunteer soldiers, with rates in the last three years under 50 percent.  
 
These difficulties relate to the military’s public image. Having not participated in 
significant operations for decades, the public increasingly sees the military as 
unnecessary. Its reputation has also been damaged by various incidents, with the recent 
death by heatstroke of a conscript corporal provoking unprecedented national anger. To 
prevent further deterioration in recruitment and retention, it is therefore essential that 
Taiwan’s military radically overhauls its culture and old fashioned management in order 
to regain public support. 
 
Like Sweden, budget restraints have caused problems in implementation and impeded 
the MND plans to increase soldiers’ pay to twice the minimum wage. Without a 
substantial budget increase to assist the transition, the US has expressed concern about 
the potential hollowing out of Taiwan’s military resulting from the allocation of 
insufficient resources to the recruitment and retention of volunteers, and the diversion of 
expenditure from weapons acquisition and near-term training. 
 
Summary of survey results  
 
To look at the transition from soldier’s psychological perspective, from the surveys 
conducted in Sweden and Taiwan with regard to expectation from basic military training, 
Swedish soldiers expected more rigorous training than Taiwanese soldiers and 
conscripts. In other words, Swedes were more ambitious about what they expected of 
basic training. In terms of the motivation to join the military, in general, Swedish 
soldiers showed a higher motivation to serve in the military as volunteers than 
Taiwanese volunteer soldiers. As for reasons to join the military and completing basic 
military training, a very high percentage of Swedish recruits felt that personal 
development and exciting training was the most important reason, and monetary factors 
seemed to be trivial for Swedish recruits as motives, while Taiwanese volunteer soldiers 
considered that money was the most important factor for them to serve. In terms of 
soldiers' self-assessment of their quality of new recruits, there was a very positive 
assessment on the general qualities of the Swedish military personnel (not their own) 
among surveyed recruits, indicating that Swedish soldiers felt that the general quality of 
soldiers is very high. Unlike Swedes’ high approval rating for the quality of their soldier, 
Taiwanese volunteer soldiers felt that the quality of the entire new recruits was good, 





As for the self-assessment of working attitudes, both Swedish and Taiwanese soldiers 
claimed they have positive working attitudes. When it comes to the identification with 
military roles, the majority of the Swedish recruits identified themselves as 
‘peacekeeper’ followed by ‘war fighter’; while more Taiwanese soldiers identified 
themselves as humanitarian aid workers than as warfighters and peacekeepers. Soldiers’ 
satisfaction with military service is crucial to their intention to stay longer in the military. 
Swedish soldiers expressed higher satisfaction with military service, including how they 
are treated, and the quality and facility of basic training. Generally speaking, Taiwanese 
soldiers are also satisfied with their military service and basic training, but to a lesser 
extent than that for Swedes. For Swedish recruits who intended to pursue a military 
career, support from family, friends and partners is important, which is similarly 
confirmed in Taiwan. With regard to the willingness to pursue a military career, a very 
high (93%) of Swedish soldiers had intentions of pursuing a military career. By contrast, 
only 55% of surveyed Taiwanese volunteer soldiers claimed that they intended to serve 
longer. Team spirit is found to be an important motivating factor which was chosen by 
most Swedish and Taiwanese soldiers. 
 
The statistics gathered from this survey have shown a highly positive trend for the 
Swedish AVF transformation. It also shows a positive but to a less degree for Taiwan’s 
AVF transition. One important issue needs to be addressed here. In contrast to Swedish 
ex-conscripts, which account for the majority of current regular and reserve soldiers, 
Taiwanese conscripts, according to this survey’s results, are much less interested in 
joining the military as volunteer soldiers. They have more critical views of the basic 
training and the existing incentives offered by the armed forces were not attractive to 
them. They were also less likely to be inspired by their superiors to join the military. 
Conscripts’ affinity for traditional military values has declined, and especially their 
enthusiasm, indicating that they are less interested in pursuing a military career. This is 
a warning sign for Taiwan’s armed forces in the midst of AVF transformation, which 
could cause difficulty in recruiting conscripts into the AVF. 
 
6.3 Comparisons between two cases 
 
This study examines the implementation process of the two countries, and compares 
these two concurrent AVF cases as both are trying to make successful transition. 
Although both share some strategic similarities, both countries set different strategic 
goals and objectives for their AVF transitions, adopt different measures and have 
different metrics, and are affected or assisted by different factors and conditions. 




other?’However, before answering this question, it is a necessary to ask that ‘Are both 
countries trying to produce AVF which is in similar and comparable size?’ 
 
According to the three empirical chapters, the results show that Sweden in many aspects 
is doing well in terms of reform implementation. However, it seems to be unfair to 
simply judge the performance of implementation by these figures alone because the size 
of the Taiwanese armed forces is several times larger than the SAF; one can argue that it 
is more difficult for Taiwan because Taiwan is building a larger AVF and easier for 
Sweden because its target is easier. To this end, a method is needed that is broad enough 
to incorporate both military and demographic factors. The Military Participation Ratio 
(MPR), as described in Chapter 3.4, should be taken into consideration in the analysis 
for a fairer comparison. 
 
Two perspectives are needed to answer the question of comparison. The first is: how are 
they doing in meeting their own targets? Then the second question is, overall, is one 
doing better than the other? Taiwan has been struggling to meet its targets for several 
years but Sweden’s recruitment of regular soldiers has been good in the past two years. 
There are reasons behind the results. With a reduced threat level, Sweden is tasked for 
international mission and less interested in territorial defence, Taiwan’s armed forces are 
unlikely to go abroad such as Afghanistan but rather frequent HA/DR operations. On 
the other hand, with regard to the level of military threat, Taiwan is much more worried 
about China than Sweden worries about Russia in terms of territorial defence, which is 
why its size is much larger than SAF. Taiwan is thus in a tricky situation; its AVF is not 
only bigger in relative numbers, it also has a larger MPR. In addition, Taiwan has the 
budget pressure for equipment and technology. From a conservative perspective, some 
people would think the armed forces do not need extra budget to carry out AVF 
implementation, especially some officials in the central government. However, their 
view is not the predominant one? That is part of the reason that the MND cannot acquire 
extra funding to implement AVF. To build a smaller but smarter AVF, it can cost even 
more than conscription. Unfortunately, the Taiwan armed forces are facing an even 
more difficult situation, which is that young men and women are not willing to join the 
military. As identified in chapter five that the much improved cross-strait relations with 
China has made people perceive threat differently towards the economic front. 
 
Learning lessons from other countries 
 
For concurrent AVF transitions, it is useful to find out how ‘have both countries looked 




to countries that are implementing a similar reform. It seems that Sweden is doing better 
in this regard as they have adopted the lessons from previous experiences in various 
ways. The Swedish experience of voluntarily recruited soldiers is limited and therefore 
the MOD commissioned the FOI to conduct an international comparative study on 16 
countries on international experiences of voluntary recruitment, retention, and costs.610 
Similarly, by assigning defence attachés in 18 different countries to collect information 
via questionnaires, the government’s Inquiry on the Future Personnel Provision in the 
Swedish Armed Forces was able to generalise certain tendencies and trends in the 
following themes: disseminating information, average period of employment, support to 
relatives, the length of international operations and transition to a civilian career.611 
Regarding gaining public support, Ivarsson et al. suggested that it can be of interest for 
Sweden to study how the UK has worked to highlight the armed forces’ work in wider 
society.612 
 
In addition to an international comparison on various AVF issues, experiences of 
specific countries were also studied. For example, visits to Denmark and the 
Netherlands were made to study their military personnel supply systems; the Canadian 
model and experience was also examined.613 In terms of the shift from conscription to 
AVF, according to personnel staff of the Headquarters, the main examples looked at 
were the Netherlands and Canada.614 This was because in the assessment of the SAF, 
these two countries were most similar to the Swedish society; the American experience 
was also taken into account. In terms of the restructuring of operational organisations 
from an old-styled basic training organisation to a professional and usable operational 
unit, the experiences from the UK and US were studied and learned.615 
 
While this thesis specifically looks at the case of Sweden and Taiwan, it is interesting to 
know whether these two countries are aware of that each other is concurrently 
undergoing a similar transition and whether they are learning from each other. Given the 
fact that Sweden and Taiwan rarely conduct mutual military contacts and exchange, no 
                                                     
610 Ulf Jonsson and Peter Nordlund, 2010. Transformation from Conscription to An All Volunteer 
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reformerat försvar), SOU 2010:86, pp. 29-40. 
612 Malin Ivarsson and Amanda Eriksson, Who wants to be s soldier? in Magdalena Tham Lindell, Jerker 
Hellström, Lena Molin and Åke Wiss (eds.), Strategic Outlook 2013, FOI, June 2013, p.24. 
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(Totalförsvarsplikt och frivillighet, Slutbetänkande av Utredningen om totalförsvarsplikten),  
Stockholm 2009. SOU 2009:63, p.42.  
614 Interview, participant SE-4, second interview. 




evidence has been found that the two countries are studying each other’s case. However, 
there are some political and academic contacts that have made connections between 
both countries in terms of the mutual understanding of the AVF transition. Through the 
visit and talk to Taiwan’s Defence Committee of the Legislative Yuan (Parliament), 
Johan Forssell, a Swedish Member of Parliament, noticed that both armed forces are 
currently engaging in AVF transformation. He discussed with his Taiwanese 
counterparts how both armed forces might successfully recruit and retain the right 
personnel by exchanging Swedish experiences of military manpower system.616 In 
terms of academic cooperation, on the occasion of a visit to Taiwan’s Ministry of 
National Defense with a courtesy call to the vice minister, Dutch military scholar Joseph 
Soeters noted that he acted as an intermediary of the Swedish-Taiwanese connection in 
terms of conducting an international study into the consequences of the abolition of 
conscription.617 
 
In contrast to Sweden which has sought to learn lessons from many countries, Taiwan 
has been inactive in reaching out to other AVF experiences. According to an MND staff 
who is in charge of AVF implementation, Taiwan has visited US and Japan.618 Similar 
to what Sweden has done, the MND has assigned tasks to the military attaches to gather 
the information and experiences of the AVF transformation. According to Taiwanese 
military attaches, they have been asked to gather the AVF experiences of these 
countries.619 Nonetheless, despite it is also in the midst of AVF transformation, Taiwan 
is not looking at the case of Sweden. Both countries should take advantage of this 
opportunity to emulate each other. For example, Sweden can learn NCO system from 
Taiwan and Taiwan can draw some lessons from the Swedish reservist system.  
 
This study has contributed to the academic field by strengthening the knowledge of the 
decline of MAF. As for policy implications, it is hoped that policy makers and those 
who are in charge of the AVF implementation can take advantage of this study. But it 
should be made clear that policy implication is not the main purpose of this study. 
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From a theoretical point of view, this thesis has closed the gap in the decline of mass 
armed forces literature, which has rarely touched upon the issue of the post-AVF 
decision implementation process, let alone conducted a comparison of on-going AVF 
transition between an Eastern and a Western country. Two theoretical perspective based 
on the decline of MAF literature have underpinned this thesis. The first perspective – 
rooted in theories of the decline of the MAF established the research context within 
which the key research questions could be identified. Meanwhile, the second approach –  
based on lessons drawn from the western AVF transitions, provides the means of 
answering the key the research questions of this thesis: ‘Do the nature and manner of 
decisions, the contexts in which they are located, and the metrics they adopt determine 
and influence the eventual success of all-volunteer force transition?’ According to the 
evidence gathered and analysed by this study, the answer is a partial yes, as Sweden 
shows a relatively favourable transition result. Taiwan, on the other hand, has 
demonstrated that it is experiencing difficulties. Public support for the Armed Forces 
has been low, meeting the recruitment target has been far from satisfactory, and the 
overall AVF transition has become shaky. Hence, Taiwan’s MND announced in 
September 2013 the postponement of its AVF transition for two years. Two different 
initial results of these AVF transitions have, therefore indicates that this comparative 
study has been worth conducting.  
 
The two cases of Sweden and Taiwan share several similarities in terms of strategic 
context. After the decision was made to suspend conscription in 2009, both countries 
adopted different ways of implementing an AVF. Sweden is reforming its defence 
organisational structure in a more radical way through a significant use of reservists. In 
contrast, Taiwan is taking a rather conservative approach by using a phased approach 
and downsizing while still relying on a higher proportion of active-duty personnel than 
is the case in Sweden. Thus Sweden’s significant use of reservists and off-the-shelf 
acquisition strategy has helped to relieve the financial pressure on the armed forces, 




together with the government’s unwillingness to provide extra funds has made its 
transition more problematic. Experience tells us that an AVF is usually more expensive 
and complex challenge than governments anticipate. Hence, inter-governmental 
co-operation and coordination is crucial for the success. The Swedish government 
(Ministry of Finance) guaranteed the SAF to have flat budget from 2010 to 2014, which 
is a good example of how a strong will to push forward personnel reform can provide 
the key to a successful process of implementation. Although the SAF was not given a 
significant budget increase, by not cutting defence budget in the age of austerity this at 
least confirmed the government’s political will to implement the reform.  
 
Soldiers’ motivation and satisfaction toward the military service is another key factor in 
a successful AVF transition. Surveys conducted by the MND and also by this study have 
both shown that Taiwanese volunteer soldiers are not highly motivated and satisfied 
with the military service in terms of various criteria such as lack of freedom and poor 
facilities at work. This is a warning sign for Taiwan’s armed forces and they must face 
this fact and deal with it properly. Apart from the government’s financial support, this 
study suggests that what Taiwan’s MND can do is to take useful measures that do not 
require increases in the defence budget, such as a more flexible approach to troop 
management. It has been confirmed by numerous surveys and interviews with soldiers, 
NCOs, senior officers, and defence analysts that eliminating unnecessary and pointless 
tasks and ‘red-tape’ can significantly boost the morale and willingness of soldiers to join 
and remain in the military.  
 
With respect to Taiwan, there have been unforeseen elements that may have made the 
transition to AVF even more difficult than anticipated. Recruitment is likely to prove a 
major problem, far more so than in Sweden. The Armed Forces start from a generally 
lower level of respect in Chinese/Taiwanese culture than in the West. Service as a 
soldier is traditionally regarded as low down on the social scale. This problem has been 
highlighted and indeed seriously exacerbated as observed in chapter five above, by an 
incident involving fatal abuse of a soldier by NCOs. In a short period of time this 
became nothing less than a national scandal.  
 




The events concerned took place right at the end of the research period for this thesis. In 
any event it may take years for its effects to play out. However, with the impending 
introduction of AVF this could hardly have come at a worse time. It is highly likely that, 
within the short to medium term this issue will affect very seriously the recruitment of 
volunteers. Not only does the narrative of abuse produced by this incident contribute to 
the overall negative public perception of military service in Chinese society in general 
and Taiwanese society in particular. It also contributes to the view that military service 
entails unpleasantness and restrictions upon personal freedom.   
 
Those elements which positively impact upon Swedish recruitment, such as the prospect 
of service on international peacekeeping missions are entirely absent for Taiwan. 
Having said that, it is likely that after the ending of the international mission to 
Afghanistan, opportunities for active service combat related deployments will be very 
limited. Whilst it is likely that UN missions, or lower intensity operations such as those 
currently in the Balkans, will continue, opportunities for overseas, adventurous and 
interesting training may decrease overall. This may affect future SAF recruitment and 
retention. Defence planners are aware of this. As for Taiwan, in any event, for clear 
political reasons unless there is a vast shift in the political context, there is at best very 
little prospect, and in fact almost no prospect of service outside the Taiwanese islands. 
For young people looking for purpose and adventure, a common attractor to the armed 
forces in most highly developed countries, a major selling-point is almost entirely 
absent.   
 
Finally, underlying these cultural and essentially political questions, there is the more 
day to day matter of pay and benefits. In Taiwan, as in many other developed nations, 
youth unemployment is high. However, the market for skilled and intelligent recruits is 
strong and in financial terms the armed services do not compete well. Finally, an 
element which was almost entirely ignored in Taiwan’s planning of AVF was the falling 
birth rate. This is likely to become a far more important factor as the implementation of 
AVF moves forward.   
 
All these matters lead to the question as to whether the decision to introduce AVF in 




have been set-aside for its implementation, even if that implementation has been 
delayed. There is clearly an argument to be made that Taiwan has acted too early, or at 
the very least with too little research and unrealistic expectations.  
 
With respect to the cultural, political and indeed financial issues Sweden finds itself in a 
far more favourable situation. Sweden has a highly developed culture of respect for the 
armed forces. This, combined with the emergence of Sweden over the last two decades 
as an active military participant in European and NATO military operations, has made 
the armed forces a more attractive proposition for talented young people. Allied to this 
has been a strong focus on the benefits of service, compared to Taiwan.  
 
One area of research, which might produce positive results, covered only briefly in this 
study, is the question as to which benefits are, relative to each other, more likely to 
attract recruits. Clearly every country with an AVF finds itself in a highly competitive 
jobs market. Both Taiwan and Sweden might benefit from a study, not so much as to the 
experience of countries such as France and Italy concerning the structural issues of AVF, 
but the key element of recruitment. An AVF will only ever work if sufficient people of 
an adequate quality can be persuaded to sign at the recruiting office. Here, experiences 
of transition shade into the arguably more generic question of what attracts potential 
recruits and, equally importantly, what is likely to retain them.  
 
In developed free societies, these are major issues and future research may be able to 
contribute to a more realistic assessment of what might, in the case of both Sweden and 
Taiwan, be achieved. The United Kingdom, for example, faces a potentially serious 
recruitment crisis,620 not so much in its regular forces, which retain a relatively high 
social status, but in its reserves. British reserve forces have been commonly used to 
supplement regular forces on deployment. The ‘2020’ army reforms posit an even 
greater role for reserves. Yet the results of recruitment are poor and the reasons for that 
are a matter of some controversy. Planning for this has been characterised, some 
analysts say, more by hope than realism. It may well be that the UK’s response to what 
is a potential recruitment crisis for the UK Military reserves, could offer useful lessons 
for both Sweden and Taiwan.    
                                                     





Public support of the armed forces play a key role in the success of AVF transition. As 
identified in Chapter five, favourable public support of the SAF and poor support for 
Taiwan’s armed forces have become facilitating factor and impeding obstacle 
respectively. Therefore, one lesson can be drawn from these two cases, as results 
showed, is for the armed forces to gain support from the society. Better and more 
frequent communication is the key.  
 
The experiences and lessons drawn from the cases of Sweden and Taiwan can provide 
other countries seeking the same direction to some useful pointers. Indeed this study 
provides the first analysis of AVF implementation that compares Western and Asian 
contexts, highlighting the similarities and differences in their styles of personnel 
transformation. The strengths of this thesis lie, perhaps in three areas; first, from the 
academic perspective it provides a combination of quantitative and qualitative data and 
analysis. Second, the thesis draws on data from a very wide range of interviews, from 
senior military and policy-orientated officials to conscripts by way of senior NCOs and 
officers and outside government, journalists and academic commentators. Finally, as 
stressed from the outset, the insights produced from comparisons between Western and 
Eastern experiences provide mutually beneficial lessons, but particularly for Taiwan.  
 
Necessarily for a thesis based so much on two examples, discussion has not focussed on 
other examples of recently completed AVF transition programmes. Consequently the 
scope of this thesis might be considered to be rather narrow. Further research on this 
topic may benefit from a critical engagement with nations which have recently 
completed AVF and transitioned successfully, or at the very least without conspicuous 
failure. Germany is an example that might have been instructive. Rather than looking so 
closely at how AVF has been implemented, more attention might have been directed at 
the major gaps in the planning for it in both countries, which seem upon further 
reflection to be rather clear. For example, the effects on recruitment of declining birth 
rates. Secondly, one aspect which has been addressed only in passing is the question of 
operational effectiveness. Whilst this thesis has stressed the fact that AVF is more 
expensive, is it necessarily more operationally effective than a conscripts system in 
meeting today’s military scenarios and requirements. In other words, whilst it may 




national defence. Finally, in turn, is operational effectiveness itself a sufficient criterion? 
Going further and also not considered in this thesis what is the social (and potentially 
politically) impact of removing the responsibility of defence from the entire fit 
population , and placing it into the hands of what might be considered as a self-selecting 
and separate cadre? In some ways, Taiwan might have been considered to be analogous 
to Israel in its focus on territorial defence. Yet Israel is not likely to adopt an AVF partly 
for military reasons but also because of what it perceives to be those social and political 
costs of detaching defence from society. 
 
To sum up, thesis has found that Sweden’s and Taiwan’s moves to AVF have therefore 
faced a number of similar challenges, including budget constraints and negative public 
perceptions of the armed forces. This has impacted, albeit to differing degrees, on their 
progress to date. While personnel reforms in Sweden have, for the most part and as 
shown by the survey results in terms of soldiers’ high motivation and satisfaction, been 
carried out to schedule and are generally in good shape, there are concerns that a 
retention problem will loom after withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. Taiwan’s 
armed forces, meanwhile, face significant challenges in recruitment, with similar 
concerns over long-term retention, and Taiwan’s MND has announced a postponement 
of the transition. In both cases, it is clear that for the transition to be smooth, neither 
soldiers’ attitudes to service nor the public image of the military should be neglected. 
Both countries, in their adoption of divergent approaches to the implementation of a 
volunteer force, potentially offer important lessons to other countries considering a 
similar course of action. Meanwhile, the sustainability of the reforms, in terms of 
recruitment and retention, and their suitability for the evolving defence needs of the two 
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Appendix II. Questionnaire 
Dear participant, 
 
Increased co-operation between the military forces of different countries in 
multinational operations around the world gives rise to an increased need 
for shared knowledge and understanding among these forces. 
 
As part of an international research project aiming to improve the basic 
military training of participating forces from Europe and Asia, this 
questionnaire is an important tool in gathering such shared knowledge and 
understanding. In order to obtain the highest quality of research, we need 
YOUR help in answering the questionnaire. 
 
It is crucial that as many respondents as possible answer all of the questions. 
Your support in answering the following questions in a very frank and open 
way is greatly appreciated. Please be assured, however, that the 
questionnaire will remain completely anonymous, as we are interested in 
numbers and percentages only. Since the questionnaire has an international 
outlook, you may be unfamiliar with the subject of some questions. Please 
try to answer them to the best of your knowledge, nonetheless. Simply 
cross the answer which best describes your personal opinion/situation. 
Thank you! 







1.  Are you? 
1 Male 2 Female 
 
2.  Are you? 






























2.1 What is your branch of service  
 
1 2 3 4 
 
3. What is the year of your birth?  ██████████████████ 
 
4. Are you?  
single 1 




5. Where did you spend most of your childhood?  
A completely rural part of my country 1 
A small village in my country 2 
A town or larger community in my country 3 
 
6. What is your highest level of civilian education?  
Basic schooling 1 
Secondary school 2 
Vocational school 3 




Postgraduate school 5 
University  6 
Other  7 
 
We will now consider your military service.  Yes  No 
7. Did you volunteer to attend recruit school?  1  2 
8. Were you able to join the branch of service you wanted as first 
choice? 
 1  2 
9. Among your acquaintances, does anyone work as a military 
professional? 
 1  2 
 
Evaluate the following statement. 
















10. The information I received prior to recruitment 
as a (conscript) soldier was helpful 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
11. How many weeks have you now served 
in military service? 
 ██████████████████ 
 
What I expect from recruit school... 
















12.1 training from which I benefit personally 1 2 3 4 5 6 
12.2 physical challenges 1 2 3 4 5 6 
12.3 high psychological stress 1 2 3 4 5 6 
12.4 a good team spirit 1 2 3 4 5 6 
12.5 that I become more resistant to stress 1 2 3 4 5 6 
12.6 that I become more self-disciplined 1 2 3 4 5 6 
12.7that I benefit from military training in civilian life 1 2 3 4 5 6 
12.8 that my character will be strengthened by 
military service 





Now we want to know more about your reasons for starting basic military 
training. 
Cross the number on the scale 



















13.1 Have an adventure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
13.2 Personal development 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
13.3 Travel to foreign 
countries and cultures 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
13.4 Friendship within your 
own contingent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
13.5 An opportunity to earn 
money 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
13.6 Earn money to finance 
future studies 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
13.7 Comfortable lifestyle 
(no need to cook, wash 
clothes etc.) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
13.8 Contribute to world 
peace 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
13.9 Contribute to the 
national security of 
(INSERT NATION) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
13.10 Help needy people in 
the area of operation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
13.11 Had nothing else to 
do and no better option 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
Influence of the environment 









































































14.1 Father 1 2 3 4 5 6 
14.2 Grandfather 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Evaluate the following statements. 





























15.1 The regular income during recruit 
school motivates me 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15.2 The military is more profitable for me 
than private industry 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Evaluate the following statements. 
















16.1 I am highly motivated for military service 1 2 3 4 5 6 
16.2 A good boss / teacher motivates me 1 2 3 4 5 6 
16.3 The atmosphere in a team / group is very 
important to me 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
16.4 Being able to take on leadership responsibility 
at such a young age could motivate me to do cadre 
training 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Evaluate the following statements about the 
current situation at the recruit school. 
















17.1 I’m content with my current situation at the 
recruit school 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
17.2 I’m content with the quality of the training at 
the recruit school 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
17.3 There is mutual respect for one another in our 
platoon 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
17.4 I’m proud to be a member of my branch of 
service 




17.5 If I could choose again, I would choose this 
branch of service 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
17.6 My motivation in the military has declined 
since starting recruit school 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
17.7 Basic military training has increased my 
general military knowledge 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
17.8 Basic military training has increased my 
specific position skills 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
17.9 Basic military training has increased my 
knowledge of other nations’ cultures 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
17.10 Basic military training has increased my 
social skills 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
17.11 Basic military training has been very relevant 
for peacekeeping operations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
17.12 Basic military training has been very relevant 
for war fighting operations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
17.13 Basic military training has been of very high 
quality 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
    
Please evaluate each line individually regarding 
who or what is motivating you to attend basic 
military training at the moment. 

















18.1 Squad leader 1 2 3 4 5 6 
18.2 Platoon leader 1 2 3 4 5 6 
18.3 Company commander 1 2 3 4 5 6 
18.4 Battalion/regiment commander 1 2 3 4 5 6 
18.5 Team spirit 1 2 3 4 5 6 
18.6 Support from my environment 1 2 3 4 5 6 
18.7 Support from my parents 1 2 3 4 5 6 
18.8 Money (remuneration during service) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
18.9 Tradition  1 2 3 4 5 6 




18.11 Exciting training 1 2 3 4 5 6 
18.12 Colleagues 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Now we would like to know more about the way you see yourself as a 
military person.  
I see myself as… 
 
Cross the number on the scale 















19.1 a peacekeeper 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
19.2 a warfighter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
19.3 an aid worker 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Evaluate the following statements. 
















20.1 I follow military rules and regulations even if 
I’m not observed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
20.2 I inform myself about the weekly program 1 2 3 4 5 6 
20.3 I will help a colleague with a task that is too 
hard for him 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
20.4 I actively participate in group work 1 2 3 4 5 6 
20.5 I am very self-disciplined and do things 
correctly even if I’m not monitored 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Now we would like to know more about the way you perceive the quality of 
your country’s soldiers. 
 
Cross the number on the scale 












21.1 Motivation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
21.2 Ambition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 




21.4 Level of civilian 
professional skill 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
21.5 Level of military skill 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
21.6 Reliability 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
21.7 Morals and ethics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
21.8 Social skills 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
21.9 Level of fairness 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
21.10 Level of firmness 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
21.11 Level of friendliness 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
21.12 Physical ability/level 
of fitness 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
21.13 Soldiers follow rules 
and policies 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Leadership evaluation  
Evaluate the following statements about the 
current situation in the recruit school. 




























22.1 Generally, my superiors treat me fairly and 
respectfully 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22.2 The quality of cooperation in our platoon is 
high 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22.3 My platoon leader has influenced my decision 
in favour of further military training 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
7 
22.4 My squad leader has influenced my decision 
in favour of further military training 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
7 
22.5 The more incompetent a superior is, the more 
motivated I am to pursue a military career in order 
to show that it can be done better 




22.6 Good superiors can motivate recruits to 
pursue a military career 







Evaluate the following statements. 
















23.1 A good team spirit is very important for any 
further training in the military 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
23.2 As new recruits, we rarely go out together in  
our free time 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
23.3 My platoon colleagues have no influence on 
my decision regarding whether or not to pursue a 
military career 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
23.4 I’m willing to put the group’s needs before my 
own 




Are you planning to pursue a military career? 
 
1 
No (this is the end of the 
questionnaire) 
2 Yes  
continue with the 
questionnaire 
 
Prestige and Tradition 
Evaluate the following statements. 
















25.1 A cadre position in the military is still highly 
respected by society 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
25.2 I think that my environment will support a 
military career 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Evaluate the following statements. 
















26.1 The high prestige of an officer motivates me to 
also pursue a military career 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
26.2 Nowadays, tradition is no longer a reason to 
pursue a military career 




26.3 Officers are still held in high regard by society 1 2 3 4 5 6 
26.4 Pursuing a military career is a tradition in my 
family 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Support 
Evaluate the following statements. 
















27.1 If I were to pursue a military career, it would 
be important that my parents supported my 
decision 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
27.2 If I were to pursue a military career, the 
support of my partner would be very important (If 
single, please leave blank) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
27.3 If I were to pursue a military career, the 
support of my colleagues would be very important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
Thank you very much for answering the questionnaire.  
This will be very helpful in improving basic military training 
 
